MARIAN E GUELFF V MERCY HEALTH SERVICES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARIAN E. GUELFF,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 200040
Crawford Circuit Court
LC No. 95-003707-NO
MERCY HEALTH SERVICES and DEBBIE
LARSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition
on her age discrimination and retaliation claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(10),
based on a determination that the claims were subject to arbitration. We affirm in part but remand for
further proceedings.
On appeal, a trial court’s grant of summary disposition will be reviewed de novo. Pinckney
Community Schools v Continental Casualty Co, 213 Mich App 521, 525; 540 NW2d 748 (1995).
This Court must review the record in the same manner as must the trial court to determine whether the
movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 398; 541
NW2d 566 (1995). In reviewing a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7)
(claim is barred because of an agreement to arbitrate), this Court must accept the plaintiff’s well
pleaded allegations as true, Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 543; 564 NW2d 532 (1997),
and examine any pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and documentary evidence submitted by
the parties in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Skotak v Vic Tanny
International, Inc, 203 Mich App 616, 617; 513 NW2d 428 (1994). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) should be granted only if no factual development could provide a basis for recovery.
Skotak, supra. A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is
factual support for a claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). Giving
the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmovant, the court must determine whether a record might be
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developed which will leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. Bertrand v Alan
Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in holding that defendant Mercy Health Services’
(Mercy’s) human resources manual constituted an agreement to arbitrate. Plaintiff relies on Heurtebise
v Reliable Business Computers, Inc, 452 Mich 405, 413; 550 NW2d 243 (1996), where the Court
held that it is undisputed that an arbitration provision is unenforceable if it is not a binding contract. In
Heurtebise, however, language in the employment handbook stated that the policies did “not create any
employment or personal contract, express or implied.” Id. at 413. Unlike Heurtebise, in Rushton v
Meijer, Inc (On Remand), 225 Mich App 156, 161; 570 NW2d 271 (1997), overruled in part on
other grounds, Rembert v Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___
(Docket No. 196542, issued April 9, 1999), slip op, pp 1, 3, the handbook at issue contained no
similar language stating that the employer did not intend to be bound by its provisions. Under these
factual circumstances, the Rushton Court found that, even though there was reservation language in the
Meijer handbook stating that the existing policies may be “modified or deleted” by the employer, both
parties were bound to utilize the alternate dispute resolution procedure described in the handbook. Id.
at 162.
Here, Mercy’s human resource guidelines manual did not contain a specific disclaimer to the
effect that the manual was not a contract of employment, or an explicit statement that Mercy did not
intend to be bound by its provisions. To the contrary, the fair treatment policy’s arbitration language
indicates that its nonsupervisory employees may be discharged only on a showing of just cause, further
distinguishing the instant policy from that at issue in Heurtebise, supra. Rushton, supra at 161-162.
Although there was reservation language implying that Mercy could amend the policies, there was no
evidence that the arbitration provision had been revoked or amended. Thus, Rushton, supra at 162,
indicates that Mercy was retroactively bound by the arbitration provision. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court did not err in finding that the parties were contractually bound.
Plaintiff also contends that the human resources manual did not constitute a binding agreement
because she did not have knowledge of it and had never assented to it. Plaintiff denied that her
supervisor had ever discussed the fair treatment procedure policy with her in a staff meeting or in a one
on-one conversation, and alleged that she had never been provided with a copy of the policy, nor had
ever seen it posted on a bulletin board. Moreover, plaintiff represented that she was not aware of the
policies in the large guidelines manual that was maintained by the hospital and not distributed to
employees. Plaintiff additionally stated in an affidavit that at no time while she was complaining of
discrimination nor at her exit interview was she ever advised of any internal grievance procedure or
given the opportunity to pursue such a procedure. However, uncontradicted evidence showed that the
fair treatment policy was inserted into the guidelines manual located in the medical social work
department where plaintiff and one other employee worked. Moreover, an affidavit of Mercy’s human
resource director established that during the years of plaintiff’s employment, she availed herself of many
of the benefit provisions contained in the guidelines manual. Under these circumstances, plaintiff’s
conduct conveyed assent to the written policies, Ehresman v Bultynck & Co, PC, 203 Mich App
350, 354-355; 511 NW2d 724 (1994) (An employee who had otherwise operated under the terms of
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employment agreements that also provided for arbitration was bound to arbitrate even though he failed
to sign the documents.), and even though plaintiff claimed that she did not have actual knowledge of the
manual, the distribution of the manual provided plaintiff with reasonable notification of the employment
guidelines. Grow v General Products, 184 Mich App 379, 386-387; 457 NW2d 167 (1990).
Plaintiff next argues, relying on Justice Cavanagh’s plurality opinion in Heurtebise, supra at
414-438, that parties cannot be compelled to arbitrate claims covered by the Michigan Civil Rights Act,
MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. During the pendency of plaintiff’s appeal, a conflict
panel of this Court convened to address the validity of employee-employer agreements to arbitrate civil
rights claims. Rembert contains an extensive review of state and federal law regarding arbitration, civil
rights and contracts. The panel adopted new requirements to determine whether the parties intended to
arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims, and whether the arbitration procedures are fair and
the agreement waives no substantive rights and remedies. The conflict panel concluded that so long as
the arbitration agreement does not waive any statutory rights or remedies and so long as the agreement
provides for a fair arbitration procedure, employers may contract with their employees to arbitrate
statutory civil rights claims. Rembert, supra at 1, 16-20. Therefore, plaintiff’s argument that the fair
treatment policy violates public policy is without merit. Because the trial court was not afforded an
opportunity to specifically address Rembert’s concerns that the arbitration agreement not waive
statutory rights and that it provide fair procedures, id. at 16-20, we must remand to the trial court solely
for a determination whether the conditions were met for application and enforcement of the parties’
agreement. In the event the arbitration agreement satisfies Rembert’s concerns, defendants should be
granted summary disposition.
Affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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