PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS LAVONNE COLEMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 21, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 205428
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 96-013019 FC
THOMAS LAVONNE COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Murphy and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), assault with intent to rob while unarmed, MCL 750.88; MSA 28.283, and
kidnapping by secret confinement, MCL 750.349; MSA 38.581. Defendant was sentenced to life in
prison for the CSC conviction, 10 to 22-1/2 years for the assault conviction, and life in prison for the
kidnapping conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion for an independent
psychiatric examination of the complainant. We disagree. The trial court has discretion to order
discovery in a criminal case. People v Graham, 173 Mich App 473, 477-479; 434 NW2d 165
(1988). Thus, we review the lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See id.
In general, a trial court should grant discovery where the information sought is necessary to a
fair trial and a proper preparation of a defense; it should not be granted where to do so would be to
sanction a fishing expedition. Graham, supra at 477. Moreover, in granting or denying pretrial
discovery in a criminal case, the trial court should consider whether the defendant's rights can be fully
protected by cross-examination. Id. A trial court may order a psychological examination of the
complaining witness in a criminal sexual conduct case, but there must be a compelling reason to do so.
Id. at 478.
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Here, defendant proffers that a psychological examination of complainant was necessary
because of complainant’s age, because a psychologist in a probate court hearing found that she suffered
from dementia, and because the psychologist’s tests of complainant did not address whether
complainant could also experience hallucinations. However, the psychologist testified at both the
preliminary examination and at trial that complainant was capable of identifying her perpetrator or
accurately relating to others what happened because the event took place over a number of hours and
caused significant emotional trauma. Moreover, the psychologist testified that complainant could not
have hallucinated the events of the night in question and that further testing would not reveal that she had
the capacity to hallucinate. Last, defendant’s rights were fully protected by his cross-examination of
complainant about her veracity and ability to recollect the details of the evening in question. Therefore,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for an
independent psychological examination of complainant.
II
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of
“similar acts” indicating that complainant had previously made false accusations of crimes. We
disagree. The trial court found that the majority of the evidence presented on a separate record was
inadmissible pursuant to MRE 404(b), but the court permitted defendant to present evidence about how
complainant had blamed defendant for her daughter’s death and how she allegedly threatened to seek
revenge on defendant.1 The admissibility of bad acts evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and
will be reversed on appeal only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. People v Crawford,
458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
MRE 404(b) is not limited in application to the admission of evidence of a criminal defendant's
acts but includes the acts of any person. People v Rockwell, 188 Mich App 405, 409-410; 470
NW2d 673 (1991). To be admissible under MRE 404(b), bad acts evidence must satisfy three
requirements: (1) it must be offered for a proper purpose, i.e., one other than establishing the person’s
character to show propensity to commit the act; (2) it must be relevant; and (3) its probative value must
not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490,
496-497; 577 NW2d 673 (1998); People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d 114 (1993),
modified 445 Mich 1205 (1994).
Defendant argues that the evidence of complainant’s prior false accusations should have been
admitted because it revealed her motive to falsely accuse defendant in this case. However, the only
evidence relevant to complainant’s motive to lie in this case was that she blamed defendant for her
daughter’s death, which was evidence admitted at trial. Defendant desired the admission of the other
evidence only to show that, by falsely accusing defendant of assaulting her, complainant was acting in
conformity with other accusations she had made in the past. This is not a proper purpose under MRE
404(b). Similarly, to the extent that the testimony is relevant to complainant’s motive, it is relevant only
on the prohibited basis that, if complainant falsely accused once, she is likely to do it again. Last, the
scant probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice
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against complainant. Therefore, the evidence was inadmissible pursuant to MRE 404(b), and we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit it.
III
Next, defendant argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence for a rational trier of
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he forcefully or secretly confined complainant. We
disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515;
489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). However, this Court should not interfere with the
jury's role of determining the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 514.
A person can be convicted of kidnapping if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person wilfully, maliciously, and without lawful authority forcibly or secretly confined or
imprisoned any other person within this state against the other person’s will. MCL 750.349; MSA
28.581; People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 343; 578 NW2d 692 (1998). Here, defendant claims
that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he forcefully or secretly confined complainant
because he did not prevent complainant from leaving the house after she was assaulted. Defendant
argues that his purpose in restraining the complainant was not to secretly confine her, but only to assault
her.
Our Supreme Court has defined “secret confinement” as the “deprivation of the assistance of
others by virtue of the victim’s inability to communicate his predicament.” People v Jaffray, 445 Mich
287, 309; 519 NW2d 108 (1994). “Secret confinement,” the Court explained, “is not predicated
solely on the existence or nonexistence of a single factor[;] [r]ather, consideration of the totality of the
circumstances is required when determining whether the confinement itself or the location of the
confinement was secret, thereby depriving the victim of the assistance of others.” Id. On the basis of
the “totality of the circumstances,” the Court in Jaffray concluded that sufficient evidence of secret
confinement was established where the defendant tied the victim to a pole and gagged his mouth. Id. at
304.
Here, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant lured the victim into her bedroom, tied
her limbs to the bed with telephone cords, and placed paper in her mouth. The fact that complainant
was able to later spit the paper from her mouth and get away from the house does not negate the fact
that a kidnapping occurred. Therefore, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable
factfinder’s conclusion that defendant confined the victim and intended to keep the confinement secret.
See also People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 112; 570 NW2d 146 (1997).
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IV
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte give the jury three
standard jury instructions regarding his out-of-court statements, evidence of his flight, and evidence of
his prior bad acts. We disagree. Use of the standard criminal jury instructions is not required, and a
trial court should examine the standard instructions carefully to ensure their accuracy and their
appropriateness to the case before it. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 677; 550 NW2d 568
(1996). It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury as is required and appropriate as to the
applicable law. Id., citing MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052 and MCR 6.414(F). Here, defendant failed to
object to the trial court’s instructions at either of two opportunities to do so. Therefore, we review
defendant’s arguments only to determine whether his failure to object to the instructions waives error or
whether relief is necessary to avoid manifest injustice. See MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052, People v
Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545; 494 NW2d 737 (1993).
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte read CJI2d 4.1, which is
the standard jury instruction on a defendant’s statements, such as a confession or an admission.
Defendant argues that the jury needed to know how to evaluate his out-of-court statements admitted in
this case because the statements were “central” to the prosecution’s case against him, but he fails to
identify the alleged statements on which he wished to have the instruction given. Consequently, we
deem defendant’s argument abandoned as being insufficiently briefed. See People v Dilling, 222 Mich
App 44, 51; 564 NW2d 56 (1997). Indeed, we note that the record contains no inculpatory
statements by defendant because defendant maintained his innocence throughout the trial and
sentencing.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte read CJI2d 4.4,
which is the standard jury instruction on flight, concealment, escape or attempted escape. Defendant
argues that the standard jury instruction was necessary for the jury to determine how to evaluate the
evidence of his flight in this case because the prosecution used this evidence as proof of his guilt.
Specifically, defendant refers to how the prosecution “painted a picture of defendant as returning to the
scene of the crime, breaking in and attempting to escape detection, and arrest.” There was evidence in
the record that a caller to the police department had left information that defendant was at complainant’s
home on the afternoon in question and that an investigation of complainant’s house later that day
revealed that the back door had been kicked off its hinges; however, this evidence was not conclusively
linked to defendant. More important, this evidence did not reveal that defendant attempted to flee after
the crime, that he concealed himself from the police, or that he escaped or attempted to escape after
committing the crimes. Indeed, the evidence pertinent to those inquiries was a police officer’s testimony
that she went to locate defendant at complainant’s home and that, when she arrived, defendant
appeared to be sleeping in a chair. Therefore, defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to
read CJI2d 4.4 is without merit because that instruction is inapplicable. The trial court instructed the
jury as is required and appropriate as to the applicable law.
Third, defendant argues that, because the jury heard testimony of his probation violation, the
trial court erred in failing to sua sponte read CJI2d 4.11, which is the standard jury instruction on
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evidence of other offenses. Defendant argues that the standard jury instruction was necessary to instruct
the jury on limiting the relevance of the evidence to a particular issue, especially after the prosecutor
referred to the probation violation in his closing argument. However, our Supreme Court has declined
to impose on trial judges a sua sponte duty to give such limiting instructions, noting that defense counsel
may not request such an instruction because it might be counter-productive to emphasize the prior acts
to the jury. People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410, 416-417; 213 NW2d 97 (1973). Here, too,
where defendant did not request the instruction and did not object to the instructions as given, and the
trial court instructed the jury as is required and appropriate as to the applicable law, we conclude that
no manifest injustice resulted from the court’s failure to give CJI2d 4.11.
V
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct. We
disagree. Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and we must examine
the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context. See People v
LeGrone, 205 Mich App 77, 82-83; 517 NW2d 270 (1994). Further, we must read prosecutorial
comments as a whole and evaluate them in light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to
the evidence admitted at trial. See People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 353; 492 NW2d 810
(1992); People v Johnson, 187 Mich App 621, 625; 468 NW2d 307 (1991).
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial
trial. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). A defendant’s
opportunity for a fair trial can be jeopardized when the prosecutor interjects issues broader than the guilt
or innocence of the accused. People v Rohn, 98 Mich App 593, 596; 296 NW2d 315 (1980).
In this case, defendant makes several general allegations of prosecutorial misconduct but makes
only two citations to the record to support his argument. To the extent that defendant argues that other
instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred in addition to these two cited examples, we
again deem defendant’s argument abandoned for insufficient briefing. See Dilling, supra. An appellant
must cite to specific page references in the record for the facts underlying an issue presented. MCR
7.212(C)(7).
Defendant’s first specific allegation of prosecutorial misconduct concerns a statement of the
prosecutor at the start of his closing argument thanking defendant for not killing the complainant in this
case when he had the chance. The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and subsequently
instructed the jury that the attorney’s statements and arguments were not evidence. It is well established
that a prosecutor may not state his personal belief in a defendant’s guilt. See, e.g., People v Hill, 258
Mich 79, 88; 241 NW 873 (1932).
Although the jury could have inferred from the prosecutor’s statement that the prosecutor
believed in defendant’s guilt, that is a conclusion it would have reached in any event, just as it likely
would have reached the conclusion that defense counsel believed that defendant was innocent. See
People v Cowell, 44 Mich App 623, 628; 205 NW2d 600 (1973); People v Erb, 48 Mich App 622,
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632; 211 NW2d 51 (1973). Without more, the prosecutor’s statement in this case, “I thank the
defendant for not killing her when he had the chance,” does not represent an improper vouching for
defendant’s guilt, which is the critical inquiry in determining whether defendant was deprived of a fair
trial. Compare Erb, supra at 631 and People v Kulick, 209 Mich App 258, 260; 530 NW2d 163
(1995).
Defendant’s other allegation of prosecutorial misconduct is that, during rebuttal argument, the
prosecutor appealed to the sympathies of the jurors by asking them to place themselves in
complainant’s position. However, defendant did not object to this alleged instance of prosecutorial
misconduct; therefore, our review is precluded unless an objection could not have cured the error or a
failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643,
687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). This alleged misconduct by the prosecutor followed defendant’s closing
argument in which defense counsel emphasized the inconsistencies among the versions of the event that
complainant told the investigating police officers and the hospital personnel.
A prosecutor has no duty to use the least prejudicial evidence available or to state inferences in
the blandest possible terms. People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 452; 537 NW2d 577 (1995); Ullah,
supra at 678. Indeed, emotional language is “an important weapon in counsel’s forensic arsenal” and
may be used during closing argument. People v Mischley, 164 Mich App 478, 483; 417 NW2d 537
(1987). We conclude that, in light of the many attacks upon complainant’s veracity both during trial and
during defendant’s closing argument, the prosecutor likely intended to highlight the elderly complainant’s
state of mind at the end of the long night in order to explain the various inconsistencies. Moreover, we
find that any prejudice that resulted from the prosecutor’s statements could have been eliminated by a
curative instruction had one been requested by defendant. See, e.g., People v Hogan, 105 Mich App
473, 485-486; 307 NW2d 72 (1981). Accordingly, appellate relief is not warranted.
VI
Next, defendant argues that the trial court failed to articulate reasons for the sentences imposed
and that the trial court imposed disproportionate sentences. Provided permissible factors are
considered by the sentencing court, our review is limited to whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion. See People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 525; 583 NW2d 199 (1998).
To facilitate appellate review, the sentencing court must articulate on the record the criteria
considered and the reasons for the sentence imposed. People v Peña, 224 Mich App 650, 661; 569
NW2d 871 (1997), modified 457 Mich 885 (1998). From our review of the sentencing transcript in
this case, it is clear that the atmosphere in which defendant’s sentence was imposed was acrimonious
and that the trial court at least attempted to articulate to defendant the reasons for its sentence.
Defendant’s interruption of the court’s explanation cannot be a basis for finding that the court failed to
sufficiently articulate on the record the criteria considered and the reasons for the sentence imposed. To
hold otherwise would allow defendant to harbor error as an appellate parachute. See, e.g., Fetterley,
supra at 520.
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In any event, we note that, before defendant interrupted, the court stated on the record that it
was relying upon the sentencing guidelines and described the seriousness of the crime in this case.
Although the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offenders, People v Gatewood, 450 Mich
1025; 546 NW2d 252 (1996), a trial court may consider them in imposing a sentence upon a
defendant, People v Haacke, 217 Mich App 434, 438; 553 NW2d 15 (1996). Accordingly, where a
court considers the guidelines, its statement on the record that it is relying on the sentencing guidelines is
a sufficient explanation of the sentence. People v Lawson, 195 Mich App 76, 77; 489 NW2d 147
(1992); People v Poppa, 193 Mich App 184, 190; 483 NW2d 667 (1992).
Defendant also maintains that his sentences are disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime.
See People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636, 654; 461 NW2d 1 (1990); Paquette, supra at
344-345. Defendant contends that his sentences are disproportionate because complainant was not
injured and that, “[a]s soon as she was able to, she left the home without any interference by
Defendant.”
From the record in this case, the jury found defendant guilty of committing first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, assault with intent to rob and steal, and kidnapping against his great-grandmother. We
reject defendant’s claim that complainant was not injured by his crimes against her or that her ability to
eventually flee from him are a credit to his person. These are not grounds for imposing lesser sentences.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant as it did.
VII
Next, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing by
his counsel’s alleged failure to allocute on his behalf.
At sentencing, a trial court must on the record give the defendant, the defendant’s lawyer, the
prosecutor, and the victim an opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances they believe the court
should consider i imposing sentence. MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c); People v Westbrook, 188 Mich App
n
615, 616; 470 NW2d 495 (1991). Here, defense counsel first expressed some disagreement with the
manner in which one of the offense variables was scored, but he noted that the alleged error made no
difference in the final scoring. Next, counsel declined to make any comment on defendant’s behalf,
stating that this Court, rather than the sentencing proceeding, would be the more appropriate forum in
which to raise various issues. Nonetheless, defense counsel commented about defendant’s character
and opined that defendant was innocent.
Several panels of this Court have emphasized that the decision to address the court at
sentencing is a tactical one. People v Allay, 171 Mich App 602, 612; 430 NW2d 794 (1988);
People v Arney, 138 Mich App 764, 766; 360 NW2d 291 (1984); People v Williams, 117 Mich
App 262, 266; 323 NW2d 663 (1982). The fact that defense counsel otherwise remained silent
because of his belief that the remaining issues about this trial were more appropriately addressed to an
appellate court does not mean that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. This Court
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has properly remained reluctant to second guess a trial counsel’s strategy because a difference of
opinion as to trial tactics does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Arney, supra.
VIII
Last, there is no merit to defendant’s argument that the cumulative effect of several errors
denied him a fair trial where we have found that none of his issues on appeal reveal error.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
Regarding at least one witness’ testimony about the false accusations complainant had allegedly made
in the past, the trial court also ruled that the evidence was inadmissible because it was based on hearsay.
Although defendant’s discussion of this issue is limited to a discussion of MRE 404(b), we note that
defendant did not proffer an exception to the hearsay rule to support admission of the out-of-court
statements allegedly made by complainant; therefore, the trial court properly prohibited the testimony on
this basis too.
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