PATRICIA GAY CROUCH V THOMAS B BAYNTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA GAY CROUCH,
a/k/a/ PATRICIA GAY HIGHLEY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 14, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214899
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 87-016952
THOMAS B. BAYNTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Thomas B. Baynton, appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying his request to
amend an existing order of filiation and thereby grant him joint legal custody of the parties’ minor son.
Denial of the request resulted in plaintiff, Patricia Crouch, retaining sole legal and physical custody of the
child.1 We affirm.
Plaintiff gave birth out of wedlock to Derek Thomas Baynton on November 5, 1986.
Defendant admitted that he is Derek’s father, and on March 17, 1988, an order of filiation was entered
in the Ottawa Circuit Court, which provided for support and granted plaintiff physical custody of the
child. On April 15, 1998, defendant, seeking to amend the prior order, filed motions for access to
records related to Derek and for joint legal custody of the child. After a hearing, the trial court granted
the motion giving defendant access to the child’s records and to any non-confidential friend of the court
records, but denied defendant’s motion for joint legal custody and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration and/or relief from judgment and motion for sanctions. When reviewing child custody
cases, this Court reviews findings of fact under the great weight of the evidence standard. MCL
722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 877-878; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).
The trial court’s findings will be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite
direction. Id. The trial court’s custody decision, which is a discretionary dispositional ruling, is
reviewed under a palpable abuse of discretion standard. MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Fletcher,
supra at 879-880. Finally, questions of law in child custody cases are reviewed for clear legal error.
MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Fletcher, supra at 881.
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Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request for joint legal custody
without first considering and explicitly stating its findings on each of the statutory best interest factors
pursuant the Child Custody Act of 1970, MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq. We disagree.
A trial court may amend or modify its previous custody judgment or order only "for proper
cause shown or because of change of circumstances . . . .” Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456,
457; 522 NW2d 874 (1994). This initial burden must be satisfied before a trial court is permitted to
engage in an analysis of the best interest factors:
The plain and ordinary language used in MCL 722.27(1)(c); MSA 25.312(7)(1)(c)
evinces the Legislature’s intent to condition a trial court’s reconsideration of the
statutory best interest factors on a determination by the court that the party seeking the
change has demonstrated either a proper cause shown or a change of circumstances. It
therefore follows as a corollary that where the party seeking to change custody
has not carried the initial burden of establishing either proper cause or a change
of circumstances, the trial court is not authorized by statute to revisit an
otherwise valid prior custody decision and engage in a reconsideration of the
statutory best interest factors. [Id. at 458 (emphasis added).]
See also, Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165; 449 NW2d 59 (1997).
In this case the trial court found and we agree that defendant failed to establish either proper
cause or a change of circumstances which would warrant a modification of legal custody. Defendant’s
desire for increased involvement in his child’s life, while commendable, does not constitute either proper
cause or change of circumstances to warrant modification of the custody order. Further defendant’s
belief that he needs greater legal rights regarding his son in order to keep abreast of Derek’s activities is
similarly insufficient to satisfy the threshold burden that is a prerequisite to a trial court revisiting an
existing custody order.2 Because neither a change in circumstances nor proper cause was established,
the court was not permitted to modify the existing order and was not required to address the statutory
best interest factors. Rossow, supra at 458; Dehring, supra at 166.3
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly considered the fact that the parties were
never married when deciding that joint legal custody would be denied. Our review of the record
compels this Court to reach a different conclusion. The trial court did not rely upon the fact that the
parties had never been married when denying joint custody, but rather, simply made this observation
when setting forth the procedural background in the case. In any event, in light of our resolution of the
first issue, we need not address defendant’s argument that the trial court considered improper
information when denying his request for joint legal custody. As we have held, under the circumstances
in this case, the trial court was not authorized to amend the existing order.
In his motion for reconsideration, defendant argued that because plaintiff and her counsel made
fraudulent misrepresentations in her reply to defendant’s motion, the trial court should have reconsidered
its initial ruling and ordered joint legal custody. In the alternative, defendant requested an evidentiary
hearing to explore the extent to which plaintiff and her counsel made misrepresentations to the court.4
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The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and refused to award sanctions. MCR
2.612(C)(1)(c) permits a court to relieve a party from an order on the grounds of “[f]raud (intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” Relief under this court rule is
discretionary and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Huber v
Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co, 160 Mich App 568, 576; 408 NW2d 505 (1987). We find no abuse
of discretion.
The trial court accepted, despite everything that plaintiff represented to the contrary, the
allegations set forth in defendant’s motion. The circumstances that defendant cited did not constitute
“proper cause” or a “change in circumstances” sufficient to authorize the trial court to modify or amend
an existing custody order. Because the alleged misrepresentations made by plaintiff had no bearing
upon the trial court’s decision to decline to revisit the custody order, we find no error requiring reversal.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for sanctions against
plaintiff’s attorney for allegedly signing a document without conducting a “reasonable inquiry” into the
matter as required by MCR 2.114. A trial court's decision regarding the imposition of sanctions will not
be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Schadewald v Brule, 225 Mich App 26, 41; 570 NW2d
788 (1997). A trial court's decision is clearly erroneous when, although evidence exists to support it,
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.
Sufficient objective evidence exists within the record from which the trial court could determine whether
sanctions were required with regard to the statements made by plaintiff through her attorney. Based on
the particular facts and circumstances in this case, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that
the trial court made a mistake.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
Defendant represents that because the order of filiation was silent, the issue of legal custody was never
determined. Because this issue is not dispositive in our analysis, we briefly address defendant’s position
in a footnote. Although the order of filiation did not specifically address legal custody, plaintiff clearly
enjoyed sole legal custody of the child. MCL 722.2; MSA 25.244(2) provides that “Unless otherwise
ordered by a court order, the parents of an unemancipated minor are equally entitled to the custody ,
control, services and earnings of the minor . . . .” If the minor is illegitimate, “parents” refers solely to
the mother. MCL 722.1; MSA 25.244(1). Because the order of filiation did not address legal
custody, by virtue of MCL 722.1; MSA 25.244(1) and MCL 722.2; MSA 25.244(2), plaintiff, as the
mother of a child born out of wedlock, possessed legal custody of the child.
2
Defendant alleged that through a recent review of Derek’s school records he discovered that plaintiff
was attempting to conceal his existence from the school and others involved in Derek’s care and
education. This, in part, prompted defendant’s motion. In this regard, we would note that while the trial
court refused to amend the existing custody order, it did grant defendant access to any records, other
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than confidential friend of the court documents, regarding the child. Thus, defendant’s concern that he
had been denied information concerning his son was remedied.
3
Defendant also argues on appeal that because the Legislature, in 1993, added statutory provisions
permitting a third person to seek custody of a child when (1) the child was placed for adoption with the
third person, has resided with the third person for at least six months, the child’s biological parents never
married and the child’s parent who has custody of the child dies or is missing and the other parent has
not been granted legal custody under court order, MCL 722.26c; MSA 25.312(6c), the Legislature
statutorily created “proper cause” or “change in circumstances.” If this were true, the language in MCL
722.27; MSA 25.312(7) would be rendered a nullity and all custody orders providing for sole legal
custody in one parent would be subject to modification. In any event, because this argument was not
raised below, we decline to address it on appeal. Vander Bossche v Valley Pub, 203 Mich App 632,
641; 513 NW2d 225 (1994).
4
Plaintiff represented in her brief in the lower court that she and defendant could not agree and did not
cooperate with regard to important decisions in their child’s life, that defendant made misrepresentations
about missing parenting time, that defendant made little or no effort to participate in his child’s schooling
and that defendant was harassing plaintiff through litigation.
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