PEOPLE OF MI V GREGORY JOHN PIASECKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 11, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204024
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 93-017129 FH
GREGORY JOHN PIASECKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
AFTER REMAND
Before: Gage, P.J., and Gribbs and Hoekstra, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
In late 1993, defendant pleaded guilty to felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277,
resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747, and habitual offender, second
offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. On January 10, 1994, he was sentenced to enhanced terms of
three to six years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction and two to three years’
imprisonment for the resisting or obstructing conviction. This Court remanded the case for resentencing
on the maximum terms of the sentences only, on grounds that the sentencing court failed to recognize its
discretion in determining the enhanced maximums. People v Piasecki, unpublished opinion per curiam
of the Court of Appeals, issued February 28, 1997 (Docket No. 173546). On remand, the trial court
imposed the same sentences as before, with sentence credit for 1,081 days. Defendant appeals as of
right, challenging only the amount of sentence credit awarded. We remand for a recalculation of
sentence credit.
At the resentencing on April 28, 1997, defendant’s counsel argued that defendant is entitled to
1,244 days of sentence credit for time already served in prison and on parole. The trial court only
awarded defendant 1,081 total days of credit without any explanation of its reasoning, apparently
excluding the time defendant had served on parole. Defendant contends he is entitled to additional
sentence credit for time served on parole. In response, plaintiff contends that credit should not be
awarded for parole time because there has never been any defect in defendant’s underlying convictions.
Whenever a void sentence is set aside and a new sentence is imposed, any time served on the
void sentence, including time spent on parole, must be credited against the new sentence imposed.
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MCL 769.11a; MSA 28.1083(1); People v Sims, 38 Mich App 127, 131; 195 NW2d 766 (1972).
Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, this credit is not limited to cases where the conviction underlying the
initial sentence was itself void or erroneous, but also applies in cases where, as here, only the initial
sentence is set aside for resentencing. See, e.g., People v Lyons (After Remand), 222 Mich App 319;
564 NW2d 114 (1997), lv den 456 Mich 952 (1998); People v Sims, supra.
Remanded for a recalculation of the amount of sentence credit consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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