PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC A GALLANT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 27, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207172
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-152210 FH
ERIC A. GALLANT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Murphy and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(3); MSA 28.331(2)(3). The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, third
offense, MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, to two to four years’ imprisonment. Defendant now appeals as
of right. We affirm.
On July 19, 1996, Rochelle Edwards returned to the apartment that she shared with her
daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend, defendant, to discover her five-and-one-half-month-old
grandson pale and unresponsive. The baby had been left in defendant’s care for approximately fifteen
minutes while Edwards drove her daughter to work. The baby vomited, could not hold his head up,
and started to cry, whine, and shake. In the weeks before this incident, he had appeared very healthy
and happy. Defendant told Edwards that he did not know what happened to cause the baby’s illness.
The baby was transported to St. John’s Hospital where he underwent x-rays, CAT scans, and
MRIs. Pediatric Neurologist Dr. Hugh Walker testified that the CAT scans showed blood between the
posterior hemispheres of the baby’s brain that, he opined, resulted from shaking trauma. Upon
examination, Dr. Walker observed signs of limpness, hypotonia, and three bruises on the baby’s back
that, he surmised, were caused by holding the baby forcefully. Diagnostic Radiologist Dr. Richard
Chesbrough testified that, after reviewing the x
-rays and CAT scans, he suspected that the bleeding
along the middle and top sections of his brain was caused by non-accidental trauma, zero to six days
before the CAT scan. Defense expert, Dr. Fred Lamb, testified the trauma causing the injuries could
have occurred up to four days prior to the time the baby exhibited signs of illness.
-1
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the prosecutor’s
objections to Dr. Lamb’s testimony on the basis that the testimony was non-responsive to questions
asked by defense counsel during direct examination. Defendant claims that only defense counsel had
the right to object on that basis. We disagree. The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is
within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
It is the duty of the trial judge to control trial proceedings and to limit the introduction of
evidence to relevant and material matters while considering the need to expeditiously and effectively
ascertain the truth of the matters involved. MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052; People v Ullah, 216 Mich
App 669, 674; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Specifically, the trial court has discretion to determine
preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence. MRE 104; Starr, supra at 497-498.
Given the lengthy, technical answers offered by Dr. Lamb, we conclude that the trial court acted
within its discretion in sustaining the prosecutor’s objections. The record establishes that Dr. Lamb’s
responses to questions by defense counsel were lengthy and outside the scope of what was being
asked. The trial court acted properly in refocusing Dr. Lamb’s testimony to issues related to the
questions posed by defense counsel.
To the extent that defendant argues that the trial court erred when it excluded portions of Dr.
Lamb’s testimony under MRE 703, defendant’s argument is unpreserved for our review. Defendant
claims that the trial court failed to determine whether studies relied upon by Dr. Lamb were admissible
and, instead, simply sustained the prosecutor’s objection to the testimony referencing the studies.
However, defendant’s trial counsel failed to submit an offer of proof regarding the substance of the
studies that Dr. Lamb referenced. Further, the content or conclusions drawn in the studies were also
never fully discussed at trial and are not otherwise apparent from the record. Thus, because this Court
can only speculate as to whether relevant evidence was excluded from trial, we can not properly
address defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in precluding Dr. Lamb from referencing the
studies. See People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1, 14; 330 NW2d 814 (1983).
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding relevant testimony
regarding the baby’s mother’s drug use. Defendant claims that testimony by medical experts established
that the baby’s injuries may have occurred prior to July 19, 1996, and thus, the injuries may have been
caused by a person other than defendant. Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly excluded the
testimony of Susan Voytal of Child Protective Services regarding whether her investigation focused on
family members’ use of illicit drugs. We disagree.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence
to the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401; People
v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). However, even if relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. MRE 403; People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 74-75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995).
-2
On this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing Voytal to
testify regarding her investigation of drug use among the victim’s family members. We conclude that,
had Voytal been permitted to respond to the questions regarding drug use by a family members, her
answer would not have had a tendency to prove that the baby’s injuries were a result of such drug use.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the prosecutor’s
objection to Voytal’s testimony.
To the extent that defendant argues that Brandy Powers’ testimony was improperly excluded,
defendant’s argument is unpreserved for our review. At trial, defense counsel conceded that Powers’
reference to the baby’s mother’s drug use was irrelevant and stipulated to strike her testimony. We will
not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal absent plain error, People v Grant, 445 Mich
535, 551-552; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), which does not appear on this record.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.