HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM V NAGLE PAVING CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM d/b/a HENRY
FORD HOSPITAL FAIRLANE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 27, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 205773
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-701300 NO
NAGLE PAVING COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Murphy and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor
of plaintiff. We affirm.
Before this Court is an action involving a dispute over contract formation and interpretation.
Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff’s purchase order did not constitute a binding contract;
therefore, the indemnity provision outlined in the purchase order could not be enforced against
defendant. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant to
indemnify plaintiff for any loss, damage, or expense associated with an underlying lawsuit brought by
Paul Ervin after he injured himself while traversing a plywood walkway over pulverized asphalt at
defendant’s construction site, which was on plaintiff’s property.
On appeal, this Court reviews the trial court’s decision granting or denying a motion for
summary disposition de novo. Zurich Ins Co v CCR & Co (On Rehearing), 226 Mich App 599,
602; 576 NW2d 392 (1997). A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support
underlying a plaintiff's claim. McGuirk Sand & Gravel, Inc v Meridian Mutual Ins Co, 220 Mich
App 347, 352; 559 NW2d 93 (1996). When there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact,
except for the amount of damages, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The
reviewing court “must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other
evidence in favor of the opposing party and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing
party.” Id.
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Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff’s purchase order
constituted the parties’ contract. We disagree. To have a valid contract, there must be an offer and
acceptance. Pakideh v Franklin Commercial Mortgage Group, Inc, 213 Mich App 636, 640; 540
NW2d 777 (1995). “Unless an acceptance is unambiguous and in strict conformance with the offer, no
contract is formed.” Id. If an offer is silent with regard to the specific form of acceptance, acceptance
may be implied by the offeree’s conduct. Id. An offer terminates at the expiration of the time given for
its acceptance. Id. at 640-641.
In this case, Gary Trocino, plaintiff’s building supervisor, testified to the process followed by
plaintiff when it sought to hire defendant. Trocino solicited a bid for the job from defendant and put the
bid in a purchase request, which was sent to plaintiff’s purchasing department. After the purchasing
department evaluated the purchase request, it issued a purchase order number to defendant. When
defendant received the purchase order number, Trocino and defendant coordinated the job. According
to Trocino, the only documents that he received from defendant were quotes, which he attached to the
purchase request that established defendant’s price for the job.
All documents submitted by defendant to plaintiff were clearly marked as a “proposal” for
construction. Each of defendant’s proposals contained the following provision:
Everything concerning this contract is incorporated herein and that nothing
verbal shall be construed as part hereof. This contract will not be binding upon our
company until checked by our engineer and countersigned by an officer. This proposal
remains firm for 30 days.
None of defendant’s proposals were signed by plaintiff, and the proposals only indicated the work that
would be done for a given price. These proposals were not contracts, but were firm offers, valid for
thirty days, to complete certain construction work at a given price.
After defendant submitted its written proposals or offers, Trocino submitted a requisition to
plaintiff’s purchasing department. After plaintiff’s purchasing department reviewed defendant’s offer,
they issued a purchase order reflecting defendant’s proposed price, but added additional terms, one of
which is the indemnity provision that is the subject of this case
Plaintiff’s purchase order specifically provided for a method of acceptance by defendant.
According to the purchase order, defendant could accept the offer by executing the document or by
commencing the work. While defendant did not sign the purchasing/confirming order, defendant began
the construction work. Therefore, a contract formed between the parties when defendant commenced
work.
Because plaintiff’s purchase order constituted the parties’ contract, the trial court did not err
when it required defendant to defend and indemnify plaintiff for any loss as a result of Paul Ervin’s
negligence lawsuit. Paragraph 11 of the purchase order provides:
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Seller shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless HFHS, its employees,
customers, patients, and users of the Articles, from and against any claim, loss, damage,
expense arising out of the purchase and/or use of the Articles purchased hereunder and
arising out of Seller’s (or its subcontractor’s) work or performance hereunder . . . .
Indemnity contracts should be construed strictly against the party who drafted them and against
the indemnitee. Fischbach-Natkin Co v Power Process Piping, Inc, 157 Mich App 448; 452; 403
NW2d 569 (1987). However, indemnity contracts should be interpreted so as to give effect to the
intentions of the parties. Id. When determining the intentions of the parties, one must consider, in
addition to the language used in the contract, the situation of the parties and circumstances surrounding
the contract. Id.
In this case, defendant’s actions contributed to Ervin’s injuries. The record shows that
defendant’s employees assisted in laying the plywood walkway over the pulverized asphalt.
Furthermore, defendant’s employees testified that they “doctored” up the walkway in an effort to make
it safer. Even though plaintiff may have been partially responsible for Ervin’s injuries, we believe that the
indemnification provision in the parties’ contract requires defendant to defend and indemnify plaintiff for
its losses as a result of Ervin’s lawsuit.
Next, defendant asserts that plaintiff’s indemnity provision should be void as a matter of law
pursuant to MCL 691.991; MSA 26.1146(1), which provides:
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in connection with or
collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair or
maintenance of a building, structure, appurtenance and appliance, including moving,
demolition and excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify the promisee
against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to
property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee or indemnitee,
his agents or employees, is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.
“[A]n indemnitor is not liable for the indemnitee’s negligence, unless the indemnitor is also negligent,
regardless of contractual language to the contrary.” Sentry Ins Co v National Steel Corp, 147 Mich
App 214, 219; 382 NW2d 753 (1985).
In this case, we do not believe that the evidence established that plaintiff was solely liable for
Ervin’s injuries. Defendant’s employees pulverized the old asphalt during normal business hours without
closing down the main entrance. Although defendant contends that plaintiff would not allow the
entrance to be closed, there was evidence presented that the plywood used for the walkway was
provided by plaintiff and defendant. Even one of defendant’s employees admitted that he and his fellow
employees “doctored” up the walkway in an attempt to make it safer. Moreover, defendant’s
employees helped place the plywood planks to create the walkway.
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Because there was evidence on the record to establish that defendant’s negligence contributed to
Ervin’s injuries, we believe that MCL 691.991; MSA 26.1146(1) does not apply.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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