PEOPLE OF MI V ARTHUR LAERZIO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206877
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003016 FH
ARTHUR LAERZIO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Kelly and Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a two-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of fraudulently obtaining a controlled
substance, Vicodin, by false prescription, MCL 333.7407(1)(c); MSA 14.15(7407)(1)(c). As an
habitual offender, fourth offense, defendant was subject to enhanced penalty pursuant to MCL
769.12(1)(b); MSA 28.1084(1)(b), and was sentenced to four to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence as of right. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App
103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997).
To support a conviction for fraudulently obtaining a controlled substance by false prescription,
the prosecutor m prove that (1) the substance in question was a controlled substance, (2) the
ust
defendant knowingly or intentionally obtained possession of a controlled substance, (3) the defendant
obtained the controlled substance by false prescription, and (4) the defendant knew the prescription
was false. MCL 333. 7407(1)(c); MSA 14.15 (7407)(1)(c). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the offense. People v
Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 337; 553 NW2d 692 (1996).
In the present case, the evidence established that defendant arrived at Bloch Drugs to pick up a
prescription for Vicodin for a “Karen Muller” approximately one hour after a male impersonating “Dr.
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Weisenberger” had called in the prescription. The pharmacist testified that the substance he used to fill
the prescription was Vicodin, a schedule three controlled substance. Defendant paid for the
prescription and left the store in a hurry. When the police approached defendant outside the drugstore,
he gave them a false name. Although he was heading toward a Ford vehicle parked in front of the drug
store, he denied that it was his and told the police that he had been driven to the store by a white,
heavy-set female in a blue station wagon, that the prescription was for her, and that she was waiting in
the parking lot. When the police could not locate the white female in a blue station wagon, one deputy
used the set of car keys he found in defendant’s possession to unlock and start the Ford vehicle that
defendant was walking toward when they arrived. The vehicle was registered to an individual at
defendant’s address.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that there was
sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that the substance in question, Vicodin,
was a controlled substance and to infer that defendant knowingly or intentionally obtained possession of
the controlled substance and knew that the prescription was false.
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a disproportionate
sentence which exceeded the recommended guidelines’ range. Because defendant was sentenced as an
habitual offender, the sentencing guidelines do not apply. People v Cervantes, 448 Mich 620, 625
626; 532 NW2d 831 (1995); People v Gatewood (On Remand), 216 Mich App 559, 560; 550
NW2d 265 (1996), and may not be considered on appeal in determining the appropriate sentence.
People v Edgett, 220 Mich App 686, 694; 560 NW2d 360 (1996). Our review is limited to whether
the trial court abused its discretion in imposing defendant’s sentence. People v Elliott, 215 Mich App
259, 261; 544 NW2d 748 (1996). A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is
disproportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
After a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant
committed the instant offense, his twelfth drug-related offense while he was on parole for another
offense. The sentence imposed appropriately reflects defendant’s extensive criminal history, his
apparent inability to reform his behavior, and his willingness to utilize drastic means to satisfy his habit.
See People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich 320, 325; 562 NW2d 460 (1997). The sentence
does not exceed that which has been authorized by our Legislature for an habitual offender, fourth
offense. MCL 769.12(1)(b); MSA 28.1084(1)(b); Id. at 326. Accordingly, we find that the trial court
did not abuse its sentencing discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
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