AMERICAN MEDICAL SECURITY INC V ALLSTATE INSUR CO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
AMERICAN MEDICAL SECURITY, INC., as
Subrogee of DEBRA GUILES,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 206300
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-624567 NF
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff after the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and denied defendant's motion for summary
disposition. Defendant appeals as of right, and we reverse.
This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) is reviewed to determine whether the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, or any other
documentary evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact to warrant a trial. Id.
The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff's subrogor, Debra Guiles, was injured in an automobile
accident and incurred medical expenses. Guiles was a participant in her employer's welfare benefit plan,
which was administered by plaintiff. The health care plan was insured by a group health insurance
policy issued by United Wisconsin Life Insurance Company. At the time of the accident, Guiles was
also covered by a policy of no-fault automobile insurance issued by defendant. Medical expenses were
paid to Guiles under the group health policy. Plaintiff filed this action to recoup those paid medical
expenses.
Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the statute of limitations had run prior to
plaintiff's filing suit and that pursuant to controlling Michigan law, plaintiff’s health coverage was primarily
responsible to pay the medical expenses. Plaintiff countered with its own motion for summary
disposition, arguing that the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 USC 1001 et
-1
seq. preempted Michigan law, specifically MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1), which makes health
insurers primarily responsible for medical expenses when health insurance and no-fault automobile
insurance policies are coordinated.
The trial court declined to impose a one-year statute of limitations pursuant to MCL
500.3145(1); MSA 24.13145(1), and instead held that because the action sought a determination of
which insurance policy had priority, the action was governed by the six-year statute of limitations for
contract disputes generally. We disagree.
Defendant argues that because plaintiff brought this action as subrogee of Guiles, it had no
greater rights than Guiles and thus, because a one-year statute of limitations would have applied to
Guiles, it applies to plaintiff1. Defendant correctly states the general principles. Specifically, a subrogee
acquires no greater rights than the subrogor would have had. Federal Kemper Ins Co v Isaacson,
145 Mich App 179, 182; 377 NW2d 379 (1985). And, when a plaintiff is contractually subrogated to
the rights of its insured, the plaintiff insurer’s subrogation action is ordinarily barred by the statute of
limitations if the insured’s action would be so barred. Citizens Ins Co of America v American
Community Mut Ins Co, 197 Mich App 707, 710; 495 NW2d 798 (1992).
In Citizens, supra, the no-fault insurer sought to recover payments from the defendant medical
insurer. The defendant asserted that a three-year statute of limitations barred the claim. The plaintiff
argued that a six-year limitation period applied. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff, "ruling that this
was a claim for money paid by mistake, a common-law cause of action to which the six-year period
applied." Id. at 709. This Court held that the plaintiff's claim was not a common-law action for money
paid by mistake, but rather was a common-law subrogation action. Id. The insured subrogor was
bound by a three-year statute of limitations against its medical insurer. Therefore, the subrogee, which
was attempting to recover payment from the medical insurer, was similarly held to that period of
limitation.
Regardless of whether a right of subrogation arises by operation of law or by contract,
the controlling general principles are the same: the subrogee, upon paying an obligation
owed to the subrogor as the primary responsibility of a third party, is substituted in the
place of the subrogor, thereby attaining the same and no greater rights to recover
against the third party.
Specifically, the insurer's subrogation action is barred by the statute of
limitations if the insured's action would be so barred, unless circumstances would make
that result inequitable. No such circumstances exist in this case. The three-year
limitation period is a reasonable amount of time. It is, as defendant argued, a mandatory
standard contract provision for health insurance policies. MCL 500.3422, 500.3610;
MSA 24.13422, 24.13610. It would have barred the insureds' claims for benefits and,
consequently, it barred plaintiff's subrogation claims as well. [Id. at 709-710 (citations
omitted).]
-2
Recently, in Amerisure Companies v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, 222 Mich App 97;
564 NW2d 65 (1997), the plaintiff, as subrogee of the injured worker's employer, filed suit against
defendant, the injured employee's personal automobile insurer, seeking to recover personal injury
protection benefits that it had paid to the injured worker. This Court held that the one-year period of
limitation found in § 3145 applied between no-fault insurers for recovery of money mistakenly paid by
the secondary insurer. Id. at 103. It stated:
Such actions are ones of subrogation, and, as such, plaintiff acquired no greater rights
than [the injured worker] had against defendant. Because [the injured worker's] right
against defendant was to maintain a cause of action f r payment of personal injury
o
protection benefits, plaintiff's subrogation action squarely falls within the parameters of
§ 3145 of the no-fault act. [Id.]
See also Home Ins Co v Rosquin, 90 Mich App 682; 282 NW2d 446 (1979) where the property
insurer made payments after an automobile accident caused fire damage to a business, and then, as the
subrogee of the business, filed suit against the no-fault insurer for payments on the claim. The claim was
barred where it was filed more than one year after the accident. The Court noted that although the
result might appear harsh, the statute was plain and the plaintiff was an insurance company, which was
presumably aware of the insurance laws of this state. Id. at 686. But see Madden v Employers Ins of
Wausau, 168 Mich App 33; 424 NW2d 21 (1988) which indicates that a different result may be
warranted when there are allegations of mistake of material fact and the case is thus not characterized as
one of subrogation2, a concept that was expressly rejected by the Amerisure Court.
We determine the nature of plaintiff's claim by looking at the nature of the claim that Guiles
would have. ACIA v New York Life Ins Co, 440 Mich 126, 135; 485 NW2d 695 (1992). Any
action Guiles had against defendant for payment of no-fault benefits was subject to the one year statute
of limitations. MCL 500.3145(1); MSA 24.13145(1). Plaintiff, as Guiles' subrogee, was suing
defendant to recover personal protection benefits that were owed to Guiles under the no-fault act, and
plaintiff had no greater rights against defendant than Guiles would have had. Therefore, we conclude
that the statutory one-year statute of limitations is applicable. The automobile accident in which Guiles
was injured occurred on August 17, 1993, and this action was not filed until April 29, 1996. Because,
the complaint was filed outside of the applicable limitation period stated in MCL 500.3145(1); MSA
24.13145(1), the action is barred.
In so holding, we note that plaintiff cites several cases for the proposition that the statute of
limitations is six years. While at first glance, these cases seem to support plaintiff's argument, they are
inapposite. In ACIA, supra, the subrogee, like the subrogee in Citizens, supra, was the no-fault carrier
and it was suing defendant medical insurer. The Court indicated that the nature of the suit was to be
determined by looking at the nature of the claim the subrogor would have against the defendant insurer.
Id. at 135. The one year statute of limitations did not apply in that case because a suit brought by the
subrogor would have been to enforce the health and accident insurance contract and would not have
been an action to recover personal protection benefits under the no-fault act. Id. at 137. In other
words "[b]ecause a suit brought by . . . the insured, against [the defendant] to enforce its health and
accident insurance contract would not be an 'action for recovery of personal protection insurance
-3
benefits payable under [the no-fault act]'", the one-year statute of limitations did not apply. Id. The
Court in ACIA determined that because there was no other statute of limitations directly applicable, the
general six-year limitation period applied. Id. at 136-137. Here, the one-year statute of limitations set
forth in §3145 was directly applicable where the action brought by plaintiff was to recover personal
protection benefits owed under the no-fault act.
In Transamerica Ins Corp v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 440 Mich 894; 488
NW2d 221 (1992), the Supreme Court issued an order that the plaintiff, as subrogee of its insured, was
governed by a six-year period of limitation consistent with ACIA, supra (emphasis added). Like
ACIA, it was not a case where suit was brought to recover personal protection benefits under the no
fault act, and the Court, consistent with ACIA, applied the six-year period of limitations to the case,
presumably because there was no other applicable limitation period.
Plaintiff also cites to Citizens Ins Co v Buck, 216 Mich App 217; 548 NW2d 680 (1996),
which, like ACIA and Transamerica, is not a case for the recovery of personal protection insurance
benefits from a no-fault insurer. It is true that the Court in Buck, supra at 227, citing to Transamerica,
supra, stated that "subrogation actions arising under the no-fault regime are subject to the six-year
period of limitation." This overgeneralization, however, is not consistent with ACIA or the order in
Transamerica3. Neither ACIA or Transamerica, as discussed above, stand for the universal
proposition that all subrogation actions involving a no-fault carrier are subject to a six-year period of
limitation. Indeed, our Supreme Court has indicated that we must look at the nature of the claim the
subrogor would have to determine the nature of the suit the subrogee has. ACIA, supra at 135. And,
this Court has indicated that where the insured's action would be barred by a statute of limitations, the
insurer's subrogation action is also barred. Citizens, supra 4.
On appeal, plaintiff also raises for the first time the argument that it could seek reimbursement
from Guiles under a reimbursement provision that "mandates reimbursement from its insured for
recovery which could have been received from a no-fault insurance policy." Plaintiff argues that if this
action is barred by the one-year period of limitation, and it seeks reimbursement from Guiles, the end
result would be that Guiles would pay for her own injury because she would not have recourse against
the no-fault carrier. This argument was not raised or decided by the trial court, and is not preserved for
our review. Adam v Sylvan Glynn Golf Course, 197 Mich App 95, 98; 494 NW2d 791 (1992).
Because we find that the statute of limitations was violated in this case, it is unnecessary to
address plaintiff's argument that it was entitled to reimbursement of the money it paid for Guiles' medical
expenses arising from the automobile accident.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
-4
1
After benefits were paid to Guiles, her rights were subrogated pursuant to a subrogation clause found
in the certificate of insurance issued by United Wisconsin Life Insurance Company.
2
In this case, there are no allegations that plaintiff paid pursuant to a mistake of material fact.
3
We also note that Buck did not involve a subrogation claim for no-fault benefits as in this case, but
rather, it involved a subrogation claim for wrongful death. Buck, supra at 220-221. Thus, Buck is not
controlling in this case.
4
Plaintiff also cites to Western and Southern Life Ins Co v Wall, 903 F Supp 1155 (ED Mich, 1995).
In that case, the employer sued the employee to recover medical benefits paid by the self-funded
employee welfare benefit plan. The defendant employee had recovered no-fault and liability insurance
benefits in addition to the benefits paid to her under her employer's plan. The plan wanted the employee
to reimburse it for payments it had made. The court acknowledged that the one-year period of
limitation found in MCL 500.3145(1); MSA 24.13145(1) applied to actions by insureds who seek no
fault benefits. The claim in Wall was not barred by that provision because it was not an action seeking
no-fault benefits, but rather was an action by a benefit provider to recover money from its insured under
the terms of its insurance contract. The case is entirely different than the case before this Court.
-5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.