MARIE MARQUIS V HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARIE MARQUIS,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 204169
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 96-001621 AV
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Neff and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from a circuit court order affirming a district court’s order
reducing plaintiff’s $16,575 jury award to reflect the district court’s $10,000 jurisdictional limit. Plaintiff
also challenges the circuit court’s order denying her motion for statutory interest, and its order regarding
payment of attorney fees and an attorney lien on any future amounts awarded. We affirm the reduction
of the district court award and the circuit court’s decision regarding the attorney fees and lien.
However, we remand for further findings on the amount of penalty interest and no-fault attorney fees
owed, if any, and for a recalculation of statutory interest.
I
Plaintiff first argues that once she submitted reasonable proof of efforts to mitigate damages and
the amount of work loss sustained, defendant insurer’s failure to pay overdue personal protection
insurance (PIP) benefits resulted in an automatic assessment of twelve percent interest rate under MCL
500.3142; MSA 24.13142 even if the refusal to pay was reasonable or made in good faith. We review
this question of law de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic
Ass'n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).
The twelve percent interest provision, intended to penalize the recalcitrant insurer, Sharpe v
DAIIE, 126 Mich App 144, 148-149; 337 NW2d 12 (1983), is triggered when PIP benefits become
overdue, that is, when they remain unpaid thirty days after the no-fault insurer receives “reasonable
proof of the fact and of the amount of loss sustained.” MCL 500.3142(2); MSA 24.13142(2). The
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interest is assessed despite the insurer’s good faith in not promptly paying the benefits. Davis v
Citizens Ins Co, 195 Mich App 323, 328; 489 NW2d 214 (1992).
In the present case, the Supreme Court previously held that plaintiff was entitled to differential
benefits during the time she worked at Boddy Construction, but held that a determination of benefits
beyond that point would have to await a decision concerning plaintiff’s obligation to mitigate damages.
Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 655; 513 NW2d 799
(1994). Accordingly, it is without question that plaintiff was entitled to penalty interest on any overdue
payments from the period that she was employed at Boddy Construction. However, in light of our
Supreme Court’s decision in Marquis, supra, we find that plaintiff did not provide the “reasonable
proof” necessary to support the remainder of her claim until sometime during the trial in November
1995.1 See McMillan v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 195 Mich App 463, 467-468; 491 NW2d 593
(1992).
The record before us is unclear regarding whether defendant met its deadline of paying PIP
benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3142; MSA 24.13142. Consequently, this issue must be addressed on
remand.
II
Plaintiff next argues that the district court had jurisdiction to enter a judgment over $10,000 and
thus erred in reducing the jury’s award. We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
Bruwer v Oaks, 218 Mich App 392, 395; 554 NW2d 345 (1996).
At all times relevant to the present case, MCL 600.8301; MSA 27A.8301(1) provided that the
district court has exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does not exceed
$10,000.2 In addition, specific jurisdictional statutes enable the district court to hear claims and grant
awards in cases where the amount in controversy exceeds this general monetary limit. Bruwer, supra
at 395-396. Commentators have noted that “the jurisdiction of the district court was carved out of the
original jurisdiction of the circuit court and the jurisdictional line of demarcation between the district
court and the circuit court is primarily the amount in controversy.” 14 Michigan Pleading & Practice
(2d ed), § 124.03, p 424. Historically, our Courts have held firm to these lines of demarcation. See,
e.g., Zimmer v Schindehette, 272 Mich 407; 262 NW 379 (1935) (judgment rendered by justice of
the peace held void where it was in an amount in excess of the justice’s jurisdiction); Krawczyk v
DAIIE, 117 Mich App 155; 323 NW2d 633 (1982), modified on other grounds, 418 Mich 231
(1983) (judgment awarded in district court of over $10,000 not invalid, provided that amounts in excess
of that amount can be attributed to costs, attorney fees and interest, or that the case represents an
exception, specified by statute, that would permit the court to render judgment over the jurisdictional
amount).
Plaintiff complains that the district court’s decision to reduce her award is unduly harsh.
However, this situation is mitigated by MCR 4.002(B), which permits a transfer of an action to the
circuit court where a party realizes, after filing a claim, that the relief requested may be beyond the
jurisdiction of the district court. In the present case, plaintiff could have moved to transfer the action to
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the circuit court when it became possible that her award could exceed the district court’s $10,000
jurisdictional limit. Having failed to do so, and there being no statute that would allow the district court
to hear this claim regardless of the jurisdictional amount, the district court properly reduced the award.
III
Plaintiff next argues that it was error to deny her actual and reasonable attorney fees under
MCL 500.3148(1); MSA 24.13148(1), which provides for the award of attorney fees if the insurer
unreasonably refused to pay the claim or unreasonably delayed in making the proper payments. The
inquiry is not whether coverage is ultimately determined to exist, but whether the insurer's initial refusal
to pay was reasonable. Shanafelt v Allstate Ins Co, 217 Mich App 625, 635; 552 NW2d 671
(1996). In addition, attorney fees are payable only when PIP benefits are overdue. Beach v State
Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 216 Mich App 612, 630; 550 NW2d 580 (1996).
In the present case, there was no factual uncertainty regarding differential benefits owed to
plaintiff for the time she was employed at Boddy Construction following the Marquis decision, which
was quite clear in stating what was due plaintiff and what yet needed to be determined by the trial court.
Accordingly, we do not find defendant’s failure to pay benefits owed to plaintiff while employed at
Boddy Construction to have been a decision made in good faith, and defendant should be charged for
attorney fees incurred by plaintiff in pursuing this portion of her PIP benefits claim.
We reach a different result with respect to fees incurred by plaintiff in pursuing benefits owed to
her after she left Boddy. Plaintiff’s entitlement to these benefits was not settled until after the jury verdict
was rendered. Unless defendant refused or failed to pay these benefits as discussed above, defendant
is not liable for the attorney fees associated with securing them. We thus remand this case for a
determination of fees associated with the recovery of differential benefits and for a determination of
whether defendant unreasonably delayed in paying any benefits awarded plaintiff in the jury trial, in
which case an award of additional attorney fees would be appropriate.
IV
Plaintiff next argues that the normal statutory interest on the judgment was not properly
calculated and that the circuit court erred in determining that plaintiff failed to provide any authority in
support of her calculation. We review de novo an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to MCL
600.6013; MSA 27A.6013. Beach, supra at 623-624.
Imposition of statutory interest in a civil action is mandatory under MCL 600.6013; MSA
27A.6013. Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 540; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). An insurance
policy or contract is a “written instrument,” and therefore the judgment in this case was subject to a
twelve percent interest rate pursuant to § 600.6013(5). Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co, 457 Mich 341,
350; 578 NW2d 274 (1998). This statutes provides:
For complaints filed on or after January 1, 1987, if a judgment is rendered on a
written instrument, interest shall be calculated from the date of filing the complaint
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to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year
compounded annually, unless the instrument has a higher rate of interest. In that case
interest shall be calculated at the rate specified in the instrument if the rate was legal at
the time the instrument was executed. The rate shall not exceed 13 % per year
compounded annually after the date judgment is entered. [emphasis added.]
We remand this case to the trial court for correction of the prejudgment interest awarded on t e
h
$10,000 judgment in accordance with § 600.6013(5).
V
Plaintiff raises two arguments challenging the circuit court’s determination of attorney fees and
lien rights of plaintiff’s former attorney, neither of which has merit.
A
Plaintiff first argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to determine these matters. We
review de novo a challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Bruwer, supra at 395.
“[T]he Michigan Constitution vests the circuit court with broad original jurisdiction over all
matters, so long as jurisdiction in particular is not expressly prohibited by law.” Hendrickson v
Moghissi, 158 Mich App 290, 295; 404 NW2d 728 (1987). Here, the attorney’s motion for
withdrawal was properly before the circuit court. Because the circuit court had the jurisdiction to hear
this motion, it also had, by extension, the power to determine the amount and order the payment of
attorney fees. See Horvath v Vasvary, 246 Mich 231, 233-234; 224 NW 365 (1929).
B
Plaintiff also argues that the circuit court improperly determined that her former attorney was
entitled to a one-third contingency fee and also improperly allowed a lien on future awards. Again, we
disagree.
Our review of the record reveals that there was not a clear agreement between plaintiff and the
attorney regarding fees. The circuit court thus erred in determining that the parties had a contingency fee
arrangement. However, this does not preclude the attorney from recovering a reasonable fee based on
the amount of time he devoted to the matter over the course of several years, the importance of this
effort to plaintiff in bringing her case to the present point, and the money expended in so doing. See
Baker, supra at 469; Horvath, supra at 234. The fee awarded by the circuit court was certainly
reasonable in view of these factors.
Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s imposition of an attorney lien on
future recoveries by plaintiff. Ambrose v Detroit Edison Co, 65 Mich App 484, 488-491; 237
NW2d 520 (1973). It would be unjust to deny the attorney future compensation for services
performed in bringing the case to its present position, and the record does not indicate that his motion
for withdrawal and fees in any way prejudiced plaintiff as she brings her case to this Court. Polen v
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Reynolds, 222 Mich App 20, 24-27; 564 NW2d 467 (1997); see Rippey v Wilson, 280 Mich 233,
245; 273 NW 552 (1937).
Affirmed, but the final judgment is vacated, and this matter is remanded for a determination of
the attorney fees and statutory and penalty interest due plaintiff, and other proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
We do not mean to suggest that an insurer may always withhold PIP benefits, and avoid paying
penalty interest, merely by alleging that a claimant had failed to mitigate damages. Indeed, such a
holding would open a significant loophole to the statutory provision encouraging the prompt payment of
claims. To the contrary, we base our decision on the unique facts presented here, including the decision
of the Supreme Court in Marquis, supra.
2
1996 PA 388, § 1, effective January 1, 1998, amended §600.8301 to increase the amount to
$25,000.
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