PEOPLE OF MI V HOWARD LYLE HORNING
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204114
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 97-78818-FH
HOWARD LYLE HORNING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and McDonald and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two felony counts of malicious destruction of property,
MCL 750.377a; MSA 28.609(1), and one misdemeanor count of malicious destruction of property,
MCL 750.380; MSA 28.612. The trial court sentenced defendant to four years’ probation and
required defendant to serve six days in jail. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial, which was
based on statements made by the prosecution in closing argument. The grant or denial of a motion for
mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. An abuse of that discretion will be found only
when the trial court’s denial of the motion has deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.
People v Wolverton, 227 Mich App 72, 75; 574 NW2d 703 (1997). We find no abuse of discretion.
After the jury had been excused from the courtroom, defendant objected to several remarks
made by the prosecution during its closing in rebuttal. Defendant argues the prosecutor
mischaracterized the reasonable doubt standard when he compared finding a reasonable doubt to using
common sense in crossing a highway at night. We disagree. The prosecutor’s comment was proper.
Moreover, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard and further
instructed the jury that it was to follow the trial court’s instructions on the law, even if an attorney’s
statement conflicted with the trial court’s instructions on the law, curing any possible prejudice. See
People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 549; 575 NW2d 16 (1997); People v Solak, 146 Mich App
659, 677; 382 NW2d 495 (1985).
-1
Next, defendant contends the prosecutor denigrated the defense during closing argument by
characterizing some of defendant’s closing argument as an attempt to “muddle the waters.” Viewed in
context, the prosecutor’s comment was a proper response to defendant’s closing argument. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 285-286; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Defendant also asserts the trial court should have declared a mistrial sua sponte based on a
statement the prosecutor made in his closing in rebuttal regarding the caller ID unit, which, though not
raised by defendant, the court stated may have improperly shifted the burden of proof. Defendant has
abandoned this issue because he has failed to cite any authority that supports his position that the trial
court should have sua sponte declared a mistrial. People v Thomas, 36 Mich App 23, 26; 193 NW2d
189 (1971). Moreover, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof, which cured
any possible prejudice.
Because none of the challenged remarks denied defendant a fair and impartial trial, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Wolverton, supra at 75.
Next, defendant argues the trial court should have, on its own motion, declared a mistrial after
pronouncing counsel in contempt before dismissing the jury. We disagree.
The trial court’s statement that defense counsel was in contempt, without more extensive
interjection into the proceedings, does not warrant reversal. People v Reggie Williams, 162 Mich App
542, 546-548; 414 NW2d 139 (1987). While it would have been better for the trial court to admonish
counsel outside the presence of the jury, the trial court’s statement did not deny defendant a fair and
impartial trial, especially in light of the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard any problems that
had been expressed between bench and counsel. Id.
Moreover, before sua sponte declaring a mistrial, the trial court should make explicit findings,
after a hearing on the record, that no reasonable alternative exists. People v Ricky Williams, 85 Mich
App 258, 264-265; 271 NW2d 191 (1978). We find viable the alternative chosen by the trial court;
specifically, giving a curative instruction to the jury before deliberation. Therefore, the court’s decision
not to declare a mistrial on its own motion was proper.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Helene N. White
-2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.