PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC L SHAW
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209248
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 97-000838
ERIC L. SHAW,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Murphy and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant Eric Shaw was convicted of carjacking, MCL 750.529a; MSA
28.797(a), armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to
concurrent terms of eight to twenty years’ imprisonment for both carjacking and armed robbery, to be
served after a consecutive sentence of two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm. Defendant appeals
as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that his convictions for both carjacking and armed robbery constitute
multiple convictions for one offense in violation of the constitutional prohibitions of double jeopardy. US
Const, Ams V, XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. We disagree. This Court recently considered precisely
this issue. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337; 584 NW2d 336 (1998). The Court found no double
jeopardy problem, recognizing that the inquiry was one of legislative intent, characterizing the two crimes
as two substantially different offenses, and concluding that “the Legislature intended to separately punish
a defendant convicted of both carjacking and armed robbery, even if the defendant committed the
offenses in the same criminal transaction.” Id. at 344-345. We have no reason to express any
disagreement with Parker, and accordingly reject defendant’s argument here.
Defendant’s remaining argument on appeal is that he was denied a fair trial because the
testimony of a prosecution witness touched upon defendant’s having some criminal history. We
disagree.
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At trial, the prosecutor asked a police witness how he had come to know defendant, to which
the witness replied, “I received a radio run, which gave me an address. I responded to that location to
investigate an Eric Shaw, who at that time was wanted for a warrant from the Department of
Corrections. I don’t recall whether it was escape or parole violation.” Shortly afterward, after
conferring with counsel off the record, the trial court gave the jury a cautionary instruction, characterizing
the statement as “something that was thrown in” by the witness “with no basis or foundation,”
emphasizing that the witness had not stated that he actually knew defendant to be wanted for escape or
parole violation, and admonishing the jury to “ignore that completely.”
Although defense counsel did not specifically ask for a mistrial on the record, the transcript
reveals sufficient machinations on the part of counsel and the trial court regarding the improper testimony
that we will deem this issue preserved for appeal. This Court reviews a lower court decision on a
motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530
NW2d 497 (1995). “A mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights
of the defendant, and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” Id. (citations omitted). There is no dispute
that the witness’ remark was inappropriate. Evidence of other bad acts “can ‘weigh too much with the
jury and . . . so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge.’” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 384; 582
NW2d 785 (1998), quoting Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172, 181; 117 S Ct 644, 651-652;
136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997). However, not every instance of mention before a jury of some inappropriate
subject matter warrants a mistrial. Specifically, “an unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper
question is not grounds for the granting of a mistrial.” Haywood, supra at 228.
In this case, there is no indication that the prosecutor was trying to elicit any mention of
defendant’s involvement in other criminal activity. The prosecutor did not repeatedly ask questions that
had any obvious tendency to elicit improper answers. See People v Springs, 101 Mich App 118,
121-124; 300 NW2d 315 (1980). Instead, the statement complained of came in response a proper
question concerning how defendant had been apprehended, the witness volunteering the inappropriate
remark after answering the question asked. Further, the subject matter of the improper statement,
which did not implicate defendant in any particular crime but instead only suggesting that defendant had
been incarcerated, was not so prejudicial as to be irreparable. The trial court took pains to provide the
jury with a curative instruction, and defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the way the trial court
attempted to remedy the mishap. For these reasons, a mistrial was not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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