MONICA L BERGERON V VICTOR L BERGERON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MONICA L. BERGERON,
UNPUBLISHED
April 16, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212680
Ogemaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-900930 DM
VICTOR L. BERGERON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Cavanagh and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce awarding the parties joint legal and
physical custody of their two minor sons.1 We affirm.
Custody disputes are to be resolved in the child’s best interests. To determine the best interests
of the child, the trial court must consider and explicitly state its findings and conclusions with regard to
each of the twelve factors set forth in § 3 of the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3). In
a custody case, we review the trial court’s factual findings under the “great weight of the evidence”
standard, its discretionary rulings for an abuse of discretion, and questions of law for clear legal error.
McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123, 125; 580 NW2d 485 (1998). The trial court’s findings on
each of the best-interests factors should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the
opposite direction. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 879; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). On review,
considerable deference is given to the superior vantage point of the trial court regarding issues of
credibility and preferences under the statutory factors. Thames v Thames, 191 Mich App 299, 305;
477 NW2d 496 (1991).
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in finding that factor d, the length of time the
children had lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, slightly favored plaintiff. The court recognized
that plaintiff had provided an unstable environment since the parties separated, but held defendant
partially responsible because plaintiff had been escaping domestic violence and defendant had not paid
child support. The trial court’s conclusion that the boys’ relationship with plaintiff was slightly more
stable and satisfactory than their relationship with defendant is not against the great weight of the
evidence. See Fletcher, supra at 878-879.
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Defendant also claims that the trial court’s evaluation of factor e was flawed because it did not
factor in plaintiff’s relationship with her boyfriend and pending drug charges against her. However, the
trial court found that factor e favored defendant, and defendant has not adequately explained what relief
he seeks with regard to this allegation of error.
Defendant next maintains that the trial court erred in finding that factor f favored neither party.
Defendant contends that the court did not give proper consideration to evidence that plaintiff’s
boyfriend, Michael Emerson, has spent nights with her and that plaintiff had been arrested for
manufacture and possession of marijuana. However, the Supreme Court has held that “questionable
conduct is relevant to factor f only if it is a type of conduct that necessarily has a significant influence on
how one will function as a parent.” Fletcher, supra at 887. There is no evidence that plaintiff’s
relationship with her boyfriend has had any detrimental effect on her sons. Moreover, the trial court
properly weighed defendant’s physical abuse and excessive disciplining of the children against plaintiff ’s
drug charge and her relationship with Emerson. It was not against the great weight of the evidence for
the court to conclude that factor f favored neither party.
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in finding that factors g and l favored plaintiff
because defendant had allowed the children to use heavy equipment around the farm, despite their
tender ages. We disagree. The court’s conclusion that defendant sometimes put his children in
hazardous situations and treated them like hired hands is supported by the record. That plaintiff had
been present on some of these occasions is not relevant to the trial court’s findings on these factors,
particularly as plaintiff expressed concern that the children were sometimes in danger on the farm.
Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the parties were equal regarding
factor j. We disagree. The evidence presented below indicates that the parties did not communicate
well and that both plaintiff and defendant had been uncooperative on occasion. However, both parties
testified that they recognized the importance of the children maintaining a relationship with the other
parent. The trial court’s conclusion that factor j favored neither party was not against the great weight
of the evidence.
In addition, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the parties
joint physical custody but giving plaintiff a greater amount of time with the children. However, defendant
cites no authority for the proposition that joint p
hysical custody mandates an equal division of time
between the parents. A party may not leave it to this Court to search for authority to sustain or reject its
position. City of Troy v Papadelis (On Remand), 226 Mich App 90, 95; 572 NW2d 246 (1997).
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding joint physical
custody because the evidence showed that the parties cannot cooperate. Defendant relies on Wellman
v Wellman, 203 Mich App 277; 512 NW2d 68 (1994); however, contrary to defendant’s implication,
Wellman does not stand for the proposition that joint physical custody is always inappropriate
whenever there is evidence that the parents have some difficulty in cooperating.
After reviewing the record, we find no error requiring reversal. Defendant reported some
frustration regarding the exercise of his visitation rights, but both he and his mother admitted that the
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boys had frequently been at his house. Evidence was presented that some of the difficulties had been
related to school bus policy and some were the result of defendant’s general dissatisfaction with the
amount of visitation time he had been granted. Plaintiff testified that the schedule had been working out
satisfactorily, and the caseworker reported problems only with coordinating custody exchanges and
with defendant’s occasional delay in returning the children. Considering the record as a whole, we find
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to award the parties joint physical custody.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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Defendant has not appealed the trial court’s ruling with regard to the parties’ minor daughter, Bridget.
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