ERIN A NICOL V SINAI HOSPITAL OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ERIN A. NICOL, a Minor, by his Next Friend,
PAMELA J. MAPLE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 16, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
SINAI HOSPITAL OF DETROIT, an assumed name
for SINAI HOSPITAL OF GREATER DETROIT,
No. 207831
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-643451 NH
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Griffin and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm.
Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her minor son against defendant on October 15, 1996, alleging
medical malpractice. In response, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7) asserting that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff had
previously filed an action against defendant on March 30, 1987, which was dismissed with prejudice by
stipulation of the parties. On appeal, plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition. We disagree.
A trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo on
appeal. Limbach v Oakland Co Bd of Co Road Comm’rs, 226 Mich App 389, 395; 573 NW2d
336 (1997). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) may be granted on the
ground that a moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Traver Lakes Community
Maintenance Ass’n v Douglas Co, 224 Mich App 335, 338; 568 NW2d 847 (1997). The Court
must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Id. at 340. The Court should consider all affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions and
documentary evidence submitted. Id. A motion should only be granted where no factual development
could provide a basis for recovery. Id.
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The applicability of res judicata is a legal question that this Court reviews de novo. Bergeron v
Busch, 228 Mich App 618, 620; 579 NW2d 124 (1998). The doctrine of res judicata precludes a
subsequent lawsuit when a party demonstrates that (1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2)
the matter contested in the second case was or could have been resolved in the first case, and (3) both
actions involved the same parties or their privies. Id. at 621. This Court has held that a voluntary
dismissal with prejudice acts as an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata. Limbach,
supra at 395.
In this case, plaintiff’s initial suit was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a
stipulation by the parties. Therefore, the prior lawsuit was decided on the merits. In addition, both of
plaintiff’s complaints alleged medical malpractice resulting in the minor’s cerebral palsy and
developmental problems. Though plaintiff argues that the factual basis for the claims are distinct – the
initial complaint alleged that an unsterilized needle caused an infection, while the second complaint
alleged that the hospital neglected to treat the minor for hypoxia – the doctrine of res judicata applies
broadly to include all claims which are actually raised as well as those which could have been raised in
the earlier action. Bergeron, supra at 621; Brownridge v Michigan Mutual Ins Co, 115 Mich App
745, 747; 321 NW2d 798 (1982). Plaintiff’s present cause of action accrued at the time she filed the
initial suit because she had the information regarding the treatment of the minor’s hypoxia at the time the
original suit was filed. In fact, plaintiff does not argue otherwise on appeal. Thus, since both of
plaintiff’s actions arose out of the medical treatment the minor received, both actions arose out of the
same transaction and occurrence and could have been alleged in the prior suit. Finally, there is no
dispute that the parties to the present case are the same as in plaintiff’s previous suit. Therefore,
plaintiff’s claim was properly dismissed as it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request to set
aside the prior judgment. Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to reinstate the previous suit so that it may
be dismissed “without prejudice” instead of “with prejudice.” We disagree. MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f)
provides:
On motion and on just terms, the court may relieve a party or the legal representative of
a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding on the following grounds:
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(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
In order to receive relief from judgment under subsection (f), three requirements must be met: (1) relief
could not have been granted pursuant to any other subsection of MCR 2.612(C)(1); (2) the rights of the
opposing party must not be detrimentally affected; and, (3) the moving party must demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances entitling it to relief. McNeil v Caro Community Hosp, 167 Mich App
492, 497; 423 NW2d 241 (1988). Generally, relief is granted when the party in whose favor the
judgment was rendered is guilty of misconduct. Id.
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Here, plaintiff’s motion for relief could have been brought pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a),
which provides that relief may be granted due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” However, in order to prevail under subsection (a), a motion for relief from judgment must be
brought within one year of the judgment. MCR 2.612(C)(2). At oral arguments in the circuit court,
plaintiff’s counsel stated:
This was a mistake by – this was most likely a mistake or inadvertent – something that
was done inadvertently when it should have been dismissed without prejudice, when, in
fact, it was dismissed with. I have had a conversation with the attorney that did this and
she said there’s no way – she wouldn’t give me an affidavit for reasons that I can
understand, but she said there was no way she would have done this with prejudice.
In addition, in her brief on appeal, plaintiff states that, “[a]s the only bar to the present action is
Plaintiff’s inadvertent stipulation to the use of the phrase ‘with prejudice’ in the order dismissing the
earlier suit, then the Circuit Court should have reformed its earlier order to reflect the true intent of the
parties and to allow a suit seeking the best interests of Plaintiff Minor to proceed.” Plaintiff is estopped
from using MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) where subsection (a) applies. The mere fact that plaintiff failed to bring
the motion within one year of the judgment does not entitle her to subsequently bring the motion under
the “catch-all” of subsection (f). McNeil, supra at 497.
Moreover, resurrection of the old case would substantially and detrimentally affect defendant’s
rights. A defendant has the right to rely on the finality of a court’s judgment and should not be asked to
engage in repetitive litigation. Bergeron, supra at 620-621. The instant case is over ten years old.
Plaintiff has not shown any reason for why she failed to bring a motion for relief from judgment at an
earlier point in time. Defendant would be unduly prejudiced if plaintiff were allowed to bring her claim
some ten years after the alleged malpractice, particularly because witnesses and evidence would be
difficult to obtain after such an extensive lapse of time.
Finally, plaintiff has simply failed to show that extraordinary circumstances exist which mandate
relief from judgment. The plaintiff in McNeil argued the same facts as plaintiff does in the instant case –
that there was never any authorization of a dismissal with prejudice. This Court in McNeil determined
that this was not an extraordinary circumstance. McNeil, supra at 498. Similarly, plaintiff here is not
entitled to relief from judgment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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