ANA LUCENA V EL TAURINOS RESTAURANT & LOUNGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANA LUCENA, Personal Representative
of the Estate of ESTEBAN GARCIA, JR.,
UNPUBLISHED
April 13, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
EL TAURINO’S RESTAURANT AND LOUNGE,
d/b/a EL TAURINO’S LOUNGE and RACHEL
LEDESMA, a/k/a RAQUEL LEDESMA,
No. 205074
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-517037 NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Griffin and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Ana Lucena, as personal representative of the estate of Esteban Garcia, Jr., appeals as
of right an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, El Taurino’s Restaurant and
Lounge, d/b/a El Taurino’s Lounge, and Rachel Ledesma, a/k/a Raquel Ledesma. We affirm.
Plaintiff’s decedent, Esteban Garcia, Jr., was shot and killed while a patron at defendant
Lounge, which is owned by defendant Ledesma. Consequently, plaintiff filed premises liability,
negligence, and dramshop claims against defendants. Plaintiff’s claims were summarily dismissed on the
basis that defendants did not owe Esteban a duty to protect him from the criminal act of being shot by
third party, codefendant Hinjosa.1
Plaintiff’s first issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in holding that defendants Lounge and
Ledesma did not owe a duty to Esteban, an invitee, to protect him from foreseeable, intentional criminal
acts of third parties and thereby erred in dismissing plaintiff’s premises liability claim. We disagree.
Merchants have a special relationship with their invitees and, thus, are charged with a duty to
take reasonable measures to protect identifiable invitees from foreseeable and preventable harm,
including harm caused by the criminal acts of third parties. Mason v Royal Dequindre, Inc, 455 Mich
391, 393; 566 NW2d 199 (1997). Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ deviation from their alleged
standard practice of searching patrons for weapons constitutes actionable negligence because this
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searching is a “reasonable measure” within the contemplation of the Mason standard. However, the
Mason standard requires only that a merchant provide care that would be considered “reasonable”
irrespective of safety measures that may have been contemplated or implemented by the defendant.
Scott v Harper Recreation, Inc, 444 Mich 441, 452; 506 NW2d 857 (1993); Tame v A L Damman
Co, 177 Mich App 453, 456-457; 442 NW2d 679 (1989); Theis v Abduloor, 174 Mich App 247,
250; 435 NW2d 440 (1988). Ejecting unruly patrons from the premises, calling the police, and not
ejecting a patron into a known danger are some measures that have been deemed “reasonable.”
Manuel v Weitzman, 386 Mich 157; 191 NW2d 474 (1971); Jackson v White Castle System, Inc,
205 Mich App 137; 517 NW2d 286 (1994); Schneider v Nectarine Ballroom, Inc (On Remand),
204 Mich App 1; 514 NW2d 486 (1994); Mills v White Castle System, Inc, 167 Mich App 202;
421 NW2d 631 (1988). However, merchants are not required to provide police protection, including
security guards, even in high crime areas, for the purpose of protecting their patrons from criminal acts
of third parties. Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 501; 418 NW2d 381
(1988). See also Krass v Joliet, Inc, ___Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 204413,
issued 2/2/99); Papadimas v Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich App 40; 439 NW2d 280 (1989).
Similarly, the searching of patrons for weapons prior to allowing admittance to defendant Lounge is not
a reasonable measure within the contemplation of the Mason standard and, thus, defendants are not
liable for failing to search codefendant Hinjosa for weapons prior to allowing him entry into defendant
Lounge. Further, plaintiff’s theory that defendants “voluntarily assumed” the duty to search patrons has
been rejected. Scott, supra at 452; Abner v Oakland Mall Ltd, 209 Mich App 490; 531 NW2d 726
(1995).
Even if conducting searches of patrons for weapons prior to allowing admission into defendant
Lounge was considered a reasonable measure, defendants would not be liable because Esteban was not
an “identifiable invitee” subject to a “foreseeable” shooting which was preventable by the exercise of
reasonable care as required by the Mason standard. Esteban was neither involved in the fight that
preceded the shooting nor was he a target of abusive behavior. Esteban was merely a bystander who
was hit with an errant bullet fired by his friend. Further, the alleged fact that defendant Lounge is
located in a crime-ridden and gang infested area of Detroit is insufficient to make this particular shooting
foreseeable. Papadimas, supra at 47.
Plaintiff’s second issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in holding that dramshop owners
are not liable for intentional criminal acts in light of Weiss v Hodge (After Remand), 223 Mich App
620; 567 NW2d 468 (1997). We agree with plaintiff. However, this Court reviews the grant of a
motion for summary disposition de novo and will not reverse the trial court where the right result was
reached for the wrong reason. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d
201 (1998); Samuel D Begola Services, Inc v Wild Bros, 210 Mich App 636, 640; 534 NW2d 217
(1995).
MCL 436.22(4); MSA 18.993(4) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, an individual who suffers damage
or is personally injured by a minor or visibly intoxicated person by reason of the
unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to the minor or visibly intoxicated
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person, if the unlawful sale is proven to be a proximate cause of the damage, injury, or
death, or the spouse, child, parent, or guardian of that individual, shall have a right of
action in his or her name against the person who by selling, giving, or furnishing the
alcoholic liquor has caused or contributed to the intoxication of the person or who has
caused or contributed to the damage, injury, or death.
Consequently, for plaintiff to prevail in her dramshop claim, she must prove that Esteban’s death was
proximately caused by defendant Lounge serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person, in particular,
codefendant Hinjosa. Plaintiff did not set forth any evidence in this regard. Thus, plaintiff has failed to
establish that a material fact is at issue. Paul v Lee, 455 Mich 204, 210-211; 568 NW2d 510 (1997).
Plaintiff further argues that the proximate cause of Esteban’s death was a participant in the fight,
Landau. However, plaintiff failed to name and retain Landau contrary to MCL 436.22(6); MSA
18.993(6). Spalo v A & G Enterprises (After Remand), 437 Mich 406, 410-412; 471 NW2d 546
(1991). Even if plaintiff was excused from the name and retain provision because she has no cause of
action against Landau, defendants would be entitled to adopt the defenses of the allegedly intoxicated
person pursuant to MCL 436.22(8); MSA 18.993(8). Thus, plaintiff would have no cause of action
against defendants because they would successfully defend on the basis that plaintiff failed to establish
that Landau was served alcohol after he became visibly intoxicated and that Landau was the proximate
cause of Esteban’s death.
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
Plaintiff caused a default judgment to be entered on July 31, 1995, against codefendant Hinjosa for
failure to file an appearance and answer to plaintiff’s assault and battery claims. Defendants Lounge and
Ledesma filed a cross-claim for indemnification against codefendant Hinjosa. Defendants’ cross-claim
was summarily dismissed, but is subject to automatic and immediate reinstatement if this present appeal
is successful. Consequently, codefendant Hinjosa does not appear in the case caption.
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