PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY J WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 13, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204297
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-149943 FC
ANTHONY J. WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Gribbs and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder (larceny), MCL
750.316; MSA 28.548. The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, second offense,
MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to life without parole. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
because the prosecutor failed to prove that he acted with wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood
that the natural tendency of his behavior was to cause death or great bodily harm, the third form of
malice necessary to sustain a felony-murder conviction. We disagree.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a directed verdict, we view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential
elements of the charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Vincent, 455 Mich
110, 121; 565 NW2d 629 (1997); People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 345; 578 NW2d 692
(1998). The malice element of felony murder may be established by showing that the defendant
intended to kill, intended to do great bodily harm, or acted with a wanton and wilful disregard of the
likelihood of the natural tendency of his act to cause death or great bodily harm. People v Dumas, 454
Mich 390, 396-397; 563 NW2d 31 (1997). Malice may be inferred from the facts and circumstances
of the killing, including evidence that the defendant set in motion a force likely to cause death or great
bodily harm. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 566; 540 NW2d 728 (1995).
In the present case, the evidence established that while the 79-year-old victim was standing on
the passenger side of her car, defendant entered his car which was parked next to the victim. He then
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reached through the window of his still-open car door, grabbed the victim’s purse and put the car in
reverse. As defendant was backing up, the victim, who was still holding on to the purse, fell to the
ground. Defendant continued backing up, eventually wrestled the purse from the victim, and drove
away. In the process, defendant drove over the victim crushing her right leg and hip. The victim told
the emergency room physician that the perpetrator “backed his car over her right leg and hip and then
drove back forward over her right leg and hip.” Three weeks after the incident, the victim died after her
right leg had been amputated in an attempt to save her life. Viewing this evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant acted in wanton and
wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of his act was likely to cause death or great
bodily harm. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
Next, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a police officer’s
hearsay testimony regarding the victim’s account of the incident. Defendant contends that the
statements cannot be deemed excited utterances because they were made in response to direct
questioning by the officer and were, therefore, not spontaneous or unreflecting. We review a trial
court’s decision whether to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Hoffman, 225 Mich
App 103, 104; 570 NW2d 146 (1997).
MRE 803(2), the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, allows the admission of
statements “relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition.” MRE 803(2). To be admissible under this exception,
two primary requirements must be met: (1) there must be a startling event, and (2) the resulting
statement must be made while under the excitement caused by that event. People v Smith, 456 Mich
543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998); People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 524; 455 NW2d 358
(1990).
In the present case, there can be little doubt that being run over by a vehicle is a startling event
and that the victim was under the stress of that event when she told the police officer what had
occurred. Defendant’s contention that the statement was unreliable because it was made in response to
police questioning is without merit. We find no abuse of discretion.
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the statements the
victim made to the emergency room physician as statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment. MRE 803(4) allows the admission of statements made for the purposes of medical treatment
or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment. In order to be admitted under this exception the
statement (1) must be made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis in connection with
treatment, and (2) must describe medical history, past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source of the injury insofar as reasonably
necessary to diagnosis and treatment. MRE 803(4); People v Meeboer (After Remand), 439 Mich
310, 322; 484 NW2d 621 (1992); People v Crump, 216 Mich App 210, 212; 549 NW2d 36
(1996).
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First, defendant contends that the victim’s statements, in particular, the statement that the car ran
over her more than once, were improperly admitted because they were not necessary for diagnosis or
treatment. We disagree.
At trial, the emergency room physician testified that the pre-examination was necessary for
diagnosis and treatment in order to ascertain the cause of the injury, the amount of force involved in the
accident, and the severity of the injury. He explained that at the onset, he had to determine if the
victim’s status had declined and to evaluate and prioritize what treatment was needed. Information
about the number of times the vehicle ran over the victim’s leg was reasonably necessary for diagnosis
or treatment as it assisted the physician in determining the severity of the injury and the extent to which
the leg was crushed. Moreover, the remaining statements that the victim had been struck with the car
door and had fallen before she was run over were also necessary for treatment. The physician testified
that the information contained in the challenged statement assisted him in determining the victim’s
treatment and especially alerted him to assess whether the victim lacked blood supply to the leg.
Second, defendant argues that the victim’s statements were unreliable because: the victim never
told bystanders, the police officer, or other medical personnel that she had been run over more than
once; the victim “may” have been experiencing the side effects of pain medication before she made the
statement; and the victim’s statement was the doctor’s summary of what the victim said and not the
victim’s own words.
After a thorough review, we find that defendant has failed to overcome the presumption of
truthfulness. Crump, supra at 212. There is no indication that the statements were unreliable, and the
effect of possible medications is sheer speculation. It is logical that the victim explained her injury in
more detail to her physician than she did to others, and the physician testified that his report reflected
what the victim told him.
Defendant also contends that the admission of the challenged hearsay statements violated his
constitutional right to confrontation. However, the contested statements fell within two firmly rooted
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Therefore, defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated. People
v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 163; 506 NW2d 505 (1993), citing Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 66; 100 S
Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980); People v Richardson, 204 Mich App 71, 74; 514 NW2d 503
(1994).
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial when the prosecutor
questioned him about his post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings1 silence. Defendant failed to object
below and this issue is not preserved for review. See People v Sutton (After Remand), 436 Mich
575, 596; 464 NW2d 276 (1990). In any event, in light of the overwhelming evidence of
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defendant’s guilt and the testimony of several witnesses who identified defendant as the perpetrator, we
are convinced that the alleged error did not change the outcome of the trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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