REATHEL A ALLEN V FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSUR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
REATHEL A. ALLEN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 13, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 200392
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 90-065461 CK
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and MacKenzie, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff is the guardian and conservator of the estate of Kay Brown, who became legally
incapacitated after she suffered closed head injuries in an automobile accident while driving an uninsured
vehicle. Plaintiff filed this action to preserve a personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits claim that
was assigned to defendant pursuant to MCL 500.3172; MSA 24.13172, the assigned claims act.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment that allowed defendant to deny Brown’s claim for PIP
benefits because she was the owner of the uninsured vehicle. See MCL 500.3113(b); MSA
24.13113(b) and MCL 500.3173; MSA 24.13173. We affirm.
Plaintiff contends that defendant should have been precluded from asserting that Brown was the
owner of the vehicle on grounds of waiver, equitable estoppel, laches, mandatory joinder principles, and
prejudice. This contention is based on defendant’s argument in a separate declaratory judgment action
brought by defendant against League General Insurance Company, the insurer of Brown’s estranged
husband, claiming that Brown was entitled to benefits under her husband’s policy.1 In that action,
defendant argued that Brown was not the owner of the uninsured vehicle because, although she had
purchased the car days before the accident, she had not yet received the car’s title or had it registered in
her name. Ultimately, this Court issued an unpublished memorandum opinion holding that Brown was
the car’s owner, effectively absolving League General from any obligation to pay PIP benefits on
Brown’s behalf. Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v League General Ins Co, unpublished memorandum
opinion of the Court of Appeals, Docket Nos. 149902, 153695, issued 1/13/95. After the Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal, the trial court in this case concluded that defendant was not precluded
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from claiming that Brown was the car’s owner and ruled that defendant could deny Brown PIP benefits
based on her ownership of the uninsured car.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by concluding that defendant had neither waived nor
was equitably estopped from asserting its right to contest ownership of the vehicle. We disagree.
Subject to two broad classes of exceptions, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel are generally not
available to force an insurer to cover a loss never assumed under the terms of its contract or policy with
the insured. Lee v Evergreen Regency Cooperative, 151 Mich App 281, 285-287; 390 NW2d 183
(1986), citing Ruddock v Detroit Life Ins Co, 209 Mich 638; 117 NW 242 (1920). The first
exception, involving insurers who reject coverage claims and fail to defend the insured in an underlying
action, is inapplicable here because plaintiff was no longer a party in the declaratory judgment action
against League General. The second exception, involving cases where the inequity suffered by the
insured as a result of misrepresentations regarding a policy by the insurer outweighs the inequity of
forcing it to pay an uncovered risk, is also inapplicable because defendant neither had a contract or
policy with plaintiff nor made any misrepresentations. Although plaintiff argues that Smith v Grange
Mut Fire Ins Co of Michigan, 234 Mich 119, 122-123; 208 NW 145 (1926), and Burton v
Wolverine Mut Ins Co, 213 Mich App 514, 515-520; 540 NW2d 480 (1995), support the
proposition that defendant should be barred from contesting the ownership issue because it failed to fully
apprise her of all its defenses, we conclude that this case is distinguishable and adopt the reasoning set
forth by the trial court:
In Smith, the insured’s property burned and she was prosecuted for arson.
The insurance company’s initial position was that the insured was excluded from
coverage due to the alleged arson. The insured asserted during the criminal trial that the
prosecution had failed to show the issuance of a binding policy because it appeared that
the company’s president had failed to sign the policy. The insured was acquitted.
Despite the acquittal, the insurance company refused to cover the loss, asserting
that the insured was estopped from claiming that the policy was enforceable in light of
her previous contention that the policy was invalid. The insured brought a declaratory
action seeking coverage. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the insurance
company was estopped from asserting at that late date that the policy was
unenforceable.
The Court is of the opinion that Smith is distinguishable because it involved a
direct contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer, where in the present
case [defendant] could have been obligated to Brown only under the assigned claims
statute. Moreover, [defendant] put Plaintiff on notice from the outset that she was not
eligible for [personal protection insurance] PIP benefits because of her ownership of the
uninsured vehicle. Finally, a factual question existed for some time regarding whether
Brown was indeed the owner of the vehicle. [Defendant] adopted the position that
Brown was the owner after discovery was conducted and the court in the declaratory
action resolved that issue. In contrast in Smith, the insurance company could have
promptly determined whether its president had endorsed the insurance policy.
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In Burton, [supra at 515-520,] the insurance company notified the insured that
his policy would be canceled in three weeks because of a misrepresentation regarding
his driving record. Within that three-week period, the insured was involved in an
accident. When he filed an insurance claim, the company stated it was rescinding the
policy ab initio.
The Court of Appeals held that although the insurance company had the right to
rescind the policy ab initio, it had waived that right when it notified the insured that his
policy would terminate in three weeks. The Court’s primary reason for this decision
was that the insured had been induced by the cancellation notice to believe he would
have coverage for three weeks, and he had failed to obtain other insurance in the
interim.
[Defendant] on the other hand, did not induce Plaintiff into believing that she
would ultimately have PIP benefits, and although [defendant] initially adopted the
position that Brown was not the owner of the vehicle, Plaintiff was aware that Brown
could eventually be declared the owner, thereby precluding her from PIP benefits.
Finally, we note that plaintiff’s failure to show that she was left in a “worse position than .. . when
coverage was initially denied” precludes a finding that these doctrines are applicable in this case. Smit v
State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 207 Mich App 674, 684; 525 NW2d 528 (1994). Therefore,
we conclude that the trial court correctly held that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel did not preclude
defendant from contesting the ownership of the uninsured car.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court should have concluded that MCR 2.205(A) and MCL
500.3172(3); MSA 24.13172(3) required the mandatory joinder of plaintiff as a party to the
declaratory judgment action between defendant and League General. The pertinent provision of MCL
500.3172(3); MSA 24.13172(3), provides:
If the obligation to provide personal protection insurance benefits cannot be ascertained
because of a dispute between 2 or more automobile insurers concerning their obligation
to provide coverage or the equitable distribution of the loss, and if a method of
voluntary payment of benefits cannot be agreed upon among or between the disputing
insurers, all of the following shall apply:
***
(d) The insurer to whom the claim is assigned shall join as parties defendant each
insurer disputing either the obligation to provide personal protection insurance benefits
or the equitable distribution of the loss among the insurers. [Emphasis added.]
The purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Heinz v
Chicago Rd Investment Co, 216 Mich App 289, 295; 549 NW2d 47 (1996). Although judicial
interpretation is not permitted if the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute’s language is clear, it is
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permissible when reasonable minds may differ regarding its meaning. Id. In addition, although effect
should be given to every word of a statute, Gebhardt v O’Rourke, 444 Mich 535, 542; 510 NW2d
900 (1994), anything not part of the Legislature’s intent, as ascertained through the act itself, must not
be read into the statute. In re Marin, 198 Mich App 560, 564; 499 NW2d 400 (1993). Although
plaintiff argues that the “spirit” of MCL 500.3172(3)(d); MSA 24.13172(3)(d) mandated her joinder in
the declaratory judgment action, the language of the provision only provides for the mandatory joinder
of insurers. We decline to read anything into the statute that is not evident from the Act itself. MCL
500.100 et seq.; MSA 24.110 et seq.; Marin, supra at 564.
With regard to MCR 2.205(A), that subrule provides:
Subject to the provisions of subrule (B) and MCR 3.501, persons having such interests
in the subject matter of an action that their presence in the action is essential to permit
the court to render complete relief must be made parties and aligned as plaintiffs or
defendants in accordance with their respective interests.
In United Services Automobile Ass’n v Nothelfer, 195 Mich App 87, 89-90; 489 NW2d 150
(1992), this Court explained:
Because joinder is mandatory under MCR 2.205(A), rather than permissive, joinder is
required for the benefit of the defendant and thereby places on the defendant the
burden of objecting to misjoinder. Thus, the defendant must make a timely assertion of
the position that separate suits violate the rule prohibiting the splitting of actions,
modernly known as the joinder rule. If the defendant fails to make such a timely
assertion, he waives his right to make such a claim; in effect, the defendant “acquiesces
in splitting causes of action by not raising timely objection.”
Notwithstanding that this rule provides that “joinder is required for the benefit of the defendant,” we
conclude that it was plaintiff’s obligation to “make a timely assertion of [her] position that separate suits
violate the rule prohibiting the splitting of actions” because she is seeking the benefit of MCR 2.205(A).
Id. at 89-90. Because the actions were originally consolidated and only severed upon her request, we
conclude that plaintiff has waived any right to object to non-joinder.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant should have been precluded under the doctrine of laches
from arguing that Brown owned the vehicle and that the trial court misinterpreted Lothian v Detroit,
414 Mich 160, 168; 324 NW2d 9 (1982), by concluding that laches may only be applied to bar the
enforcement of a claim against a defendant. Our Supreme Court has explained that the controlling
question in determining the application of the doctrine of laches is whether a defendant has been
prejudiced by a plaintiff’s delay in bringing his suit. Chesnow v Nadell, 330 Mich 487, 490; 47 NW2d
666 (1951). This Court has also explained that:
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Laches is an affirmative defense which depends not merely upon the lapse of time but
principally on the requisite of intervening circumstances which would render inequitable
any grant of relief to the dilatory plaintiff. For one to successfully assert the defense of
laches, it must be shown that there was a passage of time combined with some
prejudice to the party asserting the defense of laches. Laches is concerned mainly with
the question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced and depends on
whether the plaintiff has been wanting in due diligence. [In re Crawford Estate, 115
Mich App 19, 25-26; 320 NW2d 276 (1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted.)]
Plaintiff’s only cited authority is Lothian, supra, which she cites for the proposition that laches is
imposed when “a change in condition would make it inequitable to enforce a claim against the
defendant.” Given this Court’s explanation in Crawford, supra, at 25-26, and plaintiff’s failure to
provide any authority supporting the proposition that laches may be applied to bar a defense, we
conclude that the trial court did not err by concluding that laches was inapplicable.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that several policy
considerations based on allegations of presumed, assumed, and actual prejudice, precluded defendant
from arguing that Brown owned the vehicle. This argument is without merit. The trial court properly
concluded that plaintiff failed to show any evidence of prejudice resulting from defendant’s actions.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
1
During a scheduling conference in defendant’s case against League General, the circuit court
consolidated plaintiff’s claim against defendant with defendant’s claim against League General. Within
days, however, plaintiff requested that the cases be severed, and the court did so after defendant agreed
to the request.
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