PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH DWAYNE JENKINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 9, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 213574
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-005371 FH
KENNETH DWAYNE JENKINS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Kelly and Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The Washtenaw County Prosecutor charged defendant Kenneth Dwayne Jenkins with
possession of between 50 and 225 grams of cocaine in violation of MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iii); MSA
14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iii). The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized
during a roadside search of his vehicle’s trunk. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case
for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court again granted defendant’s motion to suppress and
dismissed the case. The prosecutor now appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
The prosecutor first argues that the trial court’s orders of suppression and dismissal violate the
doctrine of the law of the case. We disagree.
The law of the case doctrine provides that “if an appellate court has passed on a legal question
and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate
court will not be differently determined [on remand].” CAF Investment Co v Saginaw Twp, 410
Mich 428, 454, 302 NW2d 164 (1981). Similarly, the trial court may not take any action on remand
that is inconsistent with the previous judgment of the appellate court. Kalamazoo v Dep’t of
Corrections, 229 Mich App 132, 134; 580 NW2d 475 (1998).
In the present case, we find that the trial court did not decide the legal questions presented by
this case differently than did the prior panel of this Court. On remand, the trial court’s order stated:
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[T]his Court finds as a matter of fact that the officer did not use the speedometer or
any other device or visual observation to make a speeding stop. . . [T]he testimony of
the officer regarding a stop for a speeding violation is not credible. . . (emphasis
added).
The prosecutor’s protestations notwithstanding, this conclusion is wholly consistent with this
Court’s earlier ruling that the use of a patrol car’s speedometer is sufficient to provide the officer with
the requisite probable cause that the driver was speeding.
II
The prosecution also insists that the trial court’s factual determination is clearly erroneous.
Specifically, the prosecution suggests that because the officer’s testimony was uncontradicted, the trial
court had no choice but to believe it. Again, we disagree.
It is well settled that credibility is a matter for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to decide.
People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 545; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). Here, the court was free to
disbelieve the officer. Absent some other compelling evidence to the contrary, there is simply no basis
for challenging the trial court’s conclusion.
III
Because we find that the trial court’s determination - - that the police officer did not determine
that defendant was speeding before he conducted the stop of defendant’s vehicle - - was neither
inconsistent with the law of the case nor clearly erroneous, we affirm the court’s orders granting
defendant’s motion to suppress and dismissing the case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
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