LARRY G OWEN V UNADILLA TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY G. OWEN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 9, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
UNADILLA TOWNSHIP and MICHAEL VOGEL,
No. 206769
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 95-014510 NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants Unadilla Township and Michael Vogel, alleging, in relevant
part, that they discharged him from his position as chief of police in violation of various public policies.1
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary
disposition. We review the trial court’s decision de novo. Adkins v Thomas Solvent Co, 440 Mich
293, 302; 487 NW2d 715 (1992). A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Featherly v Teledyne Industries, Inc, 194 Mich
App 352, 357; 486 NW2d 361 (1992). The nonmoving party must come forward with admissible
evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in support of the claim
presented. Id. Giving the nonmoving party every reasonable benefit of the doubt, the trial court must
determine whether the record leaves open an issue about which reasonable minds might differ. Moore
v First Casualty Security Co, 224 Mich App 370, 375; 568 NW2d 841 (1997).2
In the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, an employer enjoys a significant amount
of freedom to discharge its employees at any time, for any reason. Vagts v Perry Drug Stores, Inc,
204 Mich App 481, 484; 516 NW2d 102 (1994). There are certain cases, however, in which the
employer’s motive for discharging an employee so contravenes established public policy that it gives the
employee a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Suchodoski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co,
412 Mich 692, 695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982).
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Michigan courts recognize two distinct categories of public policy exceptions relevant under the
facts of plaintiff’s case. The first category encompasses those cases in which the employer discharged
the employee because he refused to engage in some conduct that would have violated the law. Id.,
695; Vagts, supra, 485. The second category encompasses those cases in which the employer
discharged an employee because he exercised a right incident to the employment relationship, conferred
on him by some firmly rooted legislative enactment. Vagts, supra, 485; see, e.g., Sucholdoski, supra,
696-697. Accordingly, in order for plaintiff to have avoided summary disposition, he must have
demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact (1) that he refused to engage in some conduct that would
have violated the law or (2) that he exercised some statutory right incident to the employment
relationship.
We find that plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact that he refused to engage in some conduct that would have violated that
law. Plaintiff claims that he “thwarted [defendant] Vogel’s attempts to act as a de facto police chief” in
violation of MCL 750.215; MSA 28.412.3 We find that the evidence, however, does not demonstrate
that defendant Vogel impersonated a police officer or ordered plaintiff to assist him in doing so.
Although plaintiff described three incidents in which he claimed that defendant Vogel attempted to usurp
authority reserved to police officers, he presented no evidence that he ordered plaintiff to do anything
illegal.
First, defendant Vogel received complaints about a dilapidated building and ordered plaintiff to
ticket the property owner for violating the building code. Similarly, defendant Vogel received
complaints about the storage of junk vehicles on a parcel of residential property and ordered plaintiff to
ticket the property owner for violating that part of the ordinance prohibiting such storage. Finally,
defendant Vogel received complaints about some horseback riders who repeatedly trespassed on a
private road and ordered plaintiff to “tell them to stay off”, ticketing them if necessary. Because plaintiff
did not believe that the township ordinance supported such tickets, he refused to comply with each of
the orders. Even construed most favorably to plaintiff, the evidence does not demonstrate that had
plaintiff acquiesced to defendant Vogel’s orders, it would have constituted a violation of the law.
Indeed, plaintiff acknowledged that he could have written the tickets. Moreover, plaintiff acknowledged
that defendant Vogel possessed the authority, akin to that possessed by every other citizen, to request
that he write a ticket. In sum, we conclude that plaintiff failed to present any evidence that defendant
Vogel did more than insist that plaintiff do what he perceived to be his job.4
Plaintiff next claims that he refused to alter an accident report in violation of: (1) MCL 750.423;
MSA 28.665,5 (2) MCL 750.424; MSA 28.666,6 (3) MCL 750.425; MSA 28.667,7 and (4) MCL
257.744a; MSA 9.2444(1).8 The record shows that a Carol Giacinto reported to plaintiff that she was
driving through the township when another driver forced her off the road. Although plaintiff did not
issue a citation, he did indicate in the accident report that Giacinto was at fault. The record further
shows that sometime thereafter, Giacinto complained to Trustee Angelo Pecora that she was unhappy
with the way plaintiff handled the incident and advised him that she could identify the other vehicle
involved. In response, Pecora advised her to call plaintiff and explore her options. Plaintiff alleged in
his complaint that Pecora requested that he alter the accident report. Although plaintiff maintains in his
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brief that Pecora demanded that he falsify the accident report, plaintiff’s deposition testimony and
affidavit do not support such an claim. Rather, plaintiff’s deposition testimony indicates only that “he
refused to change an accident report for a friend of one of the Township Board members.” Nowhere
does plaintiff indicate the nature of the change sought, and his affidavit wholly fails to support this claim.
See Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362-363; 547 NW2d 314 (1996) (noting that the
nonmoving party must present documentary evidence demonstrating the existence of a factual dispute
and mere allegations and unsupported assertions are insufficient to satisfy the burden). Further, plaintiff
failed to present any evidence, save for his own opinion, that his refusal to change the report was a
factor in the board’s decision to terminate his employment. Thus, we conclude that plaintiff failed to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in support of his claim that he was
terminated from his position for refusing to engage in conduct that would have violated the law.
We also find that plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact that he exercised some statutory right incident to the employment
relationship. Plaintiff claims that “he requested that [defendant Unadilla Township] pay him overtime
pursuant to” MCL 408.384a(1); MSA 17.255(4a)(1).9 The record shows that in 1993, plaintiff
arranged for a traffic enforcement grant to pay himself overtime. When defendant Vogel learned of the
grant, he confronted plaintiff and told him that because he was the chief of police, he was not entitled to
overtime pay. In addition, he advised plaintiff that the board of trustees expected him to work whatever
hours he required to “get the job done.” Sometime thereafter, plaintiff approached the police
committee about establishing a schedule. When he complained about the number of hours he worked,
however, the committee responded: “that goes with the territory[; y]ou do your - do the work or we’ll
find somebody else to do it.” Plaintiff did not, however, request that defendant Unadilla Township pay
him overtime or submit documentation to the committee that he actually worked overtime until after
defendants discharged him. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it found that plaintiff
failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in
support of his claim that he exercised a statutory right incident to the employment relationship.
Having concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that he
refused to engage in conduct that would have violated the law or that he exercised a statutory right
incident to the employment relationship, we need not elaborate on plaintiff’s final claim that the trial court
erred in concluding that plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact that there existed a causal connection between a protected activity and his discharge.
Suffice it to say that our review of the record would lead us to conclude that plaintiff failed to present
facts, as opposed to suspicions, that would support a conclusion that there was a casual connection
between his discharge and the alleged protected activity.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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1
Plaintiff additionally alleged intentional interference with contractual relations by defendant Vogel.
Plaintiff, however, expressly abandons his additional allegation on appeal.
2
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court held that he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and dismissed his claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Thus, plaintiff concludes, the question before
this Court is the legal, as opposed to the factual sufficiency of his claim. Defendants, however, filed their
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), maintaining that even if the statutes
plaintiff cited in his complaint could properly form the basis of a claim for discharge in violation of public
policy, there exists no evidence that the conduct plaintiff described implicated the policies embodied in
the statutes or that it caused his discharge. In addition, the trial court examined the evidence submitted
for and against defendants’ motion and specifically found that plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient
to demonstrate a genuine issue of m
aterial fact in support of his claim. Although the trial court then
proceeded to state that: “I don’t find any of this . . . from a legal standpoint that suggested [plaintiff]
could not be fired for these reasons[,]” it does not appear to us that this formed the basis of the court’s
decision. Accordingly, we find that the question before us is the factual sufficiency of plaintiff’s claim.
3
MCL 750.215; MSA 28.412 provides that
[a]ny person who shall falsely assume to be a . . . police officer, and shall take it upon
himself to act as such, or to require any person to aid or assist him or her in any manner
pertaining to the duty of a . . . police officer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .
4
We note that plaintiff also presented evidence that defendant Vogel received repeated complaints
about drinking, junk cars, and loud parties at a local residence known as the “crooked house.” In
response, the board of trustees requested that Unadilla Township police officer Robert Markham take
on this house as a special assignment. Plaintiff indicated that he objected when advised of the
assignment. Plaintiff presented no evidence, however, that he did anything to prevent Officer Markham
from following through on the board’s request. See Vagts, supra, (suggesting that evidence the
employee merely objected to an illegal request is insufficient to demonstrate that the employee refused
to engage in conduct that would violate the law). In any event, plaintiff presented no evidence that the
board’s request contravened any law.
5
MCL 750.423: MSA 28.665 provides that
[a]ny person . . . of whom an oath shall be required by law, who shall wilfully swear
falsely, in regard to any manner or thing, respecting which such oath is . . . required,
shall be guilty of perjury . . . .
6
MCL 750.424; MSA 28.666 provides that
[a]ny person who shall be guilty of subornation of perjury, by procuring another to
commit the crime of perjury, shall be punished as provided in [MCL 750.425; MSA
28.667].
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7
MCL 750.425; MSA 28.667 provides that
[a]ny person who shall endeavor to incite any person to commit the crime of perjury,
though no perjury be committed, shall be guilty of a felony . . . .
8
MCL 257.744a; MSA 9.2444(1) provides that
[a] police officer who, knowing the statement is false, makes a materially false statement
in a citation issued under section 742 is guilty of perjury . . . .
9
MCL 408.384a(1); MSA 17.255(4a)(1) provides that
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, an employee shall receive compensation
at not less that 1-1/2 times the regular rate at which the employee is employed for
employment in a workweek in excess of 40 hours.
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