PEOPLE OF MI V ANDREW BLOUNT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 9, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203872
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 96-011359 FC
ANDREW BLOUNT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Saad and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felony murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.242(2). The
court sentenced defendant to life without parole on the felony murder conviction, to be served
consecutive to the mandatory two years’ imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
These offenses arose from a robbery of a 7-Eleven store that occurred on August 10, 1996,
during which the store manager was shot and killed. Two witnesses testified that they were with
defendant on August 10 when they drove to the 7-Eleven at defendant’s request. One witness, Alonzo
Armstrong, followed defendant into the store, while the other, Elven Morgan, remained outside. Once
inside, Armstrong saw defendant pointing a gun at the victim; defendant told Armstrong to leave. After
he left the store, Armstrong heard two or three shots. Morgan, who was around the back of the store,
heard three shots as well. Defendant then emerged from the store and got into the automobile. Both
Armstrong and Morgan testified that after they left the store, defendant threatened them if they said
anything about what happened. Four different witnesses testified that they had heard defendant admit to
committing the offense. Defendant’s theory of the case was that another person, Rodney Tillman, had
committed the murder in order to cover up a robbery he allegedly had committed at the store five days
earlier.
Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a statement
made by one witness, Jennifer Figures, to a detective, Mark Armstrong, about what she had been told
by another witness, Lottie Sanders, who was defendant’s girlfriend. We review a trial court’s decision
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to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568
(1996). An abuse of discretion will be found only when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts
upon which the trial court made its decision, would find there was no justification or excuse for the
ruling. Id. Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying, offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. MRE 801(c); People v Tanner, 222
Mich App 626, 629; 564 NW2d 197 (1997). Hearsay is not admissible at trial, unless it falls within an
exception under the Rules of Evidence. MRE 802; Tanner, supra.
On cross-examination, defendant elicited testimony from Detective Armstrong that Figures told
him that Tillman told her that defendant, along with Robert Kellogg, an employee at the 7-Eleven, and
another person, had “set-up” the August 5 robbery at the 7-Eleven. On re-direct examination, the
prosecutor made reference to that earlier questioning by defendant, and then asked if Armstrong had
received any other information from any other source to the same effect. Over the objection of
defendant, the prosecutor then elicited testimony from Armstrong that Figures had been informed by
Sanders that Robert Kellogg was involved in the August 5 robbery. The prosecutor acknowledged that
the statement was hearsay, but also stated that he was not offering the statement for the truth of the
matter asserted, “that Kellogg and [defendant] were involved in the 8-5 robbery,” but only to establish
that Tillman had made statements to Figures. Defendant contends that the court erred in allowing
Armstrong to testify to the substance of a statement made by Figures concerning a statement made by
Sanders implicating defendant and Kellogg in the August 5 robbery.1 We agree.
Although the prosecution contends that the testimony was not offered to prove that defendant
was involved in the August 5 robbery, we find that the statement was not relevant for any other purpose
than to show that defendant participated in the earlier robbery. We note that the statement contested by
defendant as hearsay is not the same statement elicited by defendant from Armstrong. Rather, in the
statement elicited by the prosecutor, Armstrong related that Figures told him defendant’s girlfriend
provided information that may have implicated defendant. Armstrong’s earlier statement was that
Figures told him Tillman, who was a potential suspect, told her that defendant was involved. Thus, we
find the prosecution’s argument that defendant may not appeal evidence that he has used to his
advantage to be without merit. The testimony in question is hearsay that does not fall within any
recognized exception. Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it.
However, the erroneous admission of evidence is harmless if it is highly probable that, in light of
the strength and weight of the untainted evidence, the tainted evidence did not contribute to the verdict.
People v Mitchell (On Remand), 231 Mich App 335, 339; 586 NW2d 119 (1998). Given the
testimony of Alonzo Armstrong and Morgan concerning the events of August 10 at the 7-Eleven and the
testimony of several others that they heard defendant admit to committing the murder, and given the
ambiguous nature of Detective Armstrong’s testimony, we find it highly probable that the tainted
evidence did not contribute to the verdict in this case. Therefore, we find that the erroneous admission
of the hearsay evidence was harmless.
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because evidence that prosecution
witnesses had received threats was admitted without a showing that those threats were connected to
defendant. Because defendant failed to object to the testimony concerning threats, he has waived
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review in the absence of manifest injustice.2 People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 398; 551 NW2d
478 (1996). Manifest injustice exists when the unpreserved error could have been outcome
determinative. People v Durham, 220 Mich App 268, 273; 559 NW2d 360 (1996). Evidence of
threats to witnesses may be used to demonstrate consciousness of guilt if there is evidence connecting
defendant to the threats. People v Walker, 150 Mich App 597, 603; 389 NW2d 704 (1985).
Evidence of threats by third parties may be admissible, regardless of whether the threats are connected
to defendant, to explain why a witness has given inconsistent statements. People v Clark, 124 Mich
App 410, 412-413; 335 NW2d 53 (1983).
At both the beginning of his testimony and when he was recalled to the stand, Elroy Sanders
testified that he was threatened and warned not to testify against defendant. During closing arguments,
the prosecutor referred to Sanders’ testimony about threats as showing defendant had attempted to
manipulate testimony. We find that these threats were never sufficiently connected to defendant to be
admissible to show consciousness of guilt. However, even though the evidence of threats to Sanders
was inadmissible for this purpose, we find that it was not determinative of the outcome. The threats
were part of the larger issue of defendant’s attempts to influence witnesses generally; the other testimony
on that point to which the prosecutor referred was supported by evidence, consisting, in part, of letters
that were admitted at trial and read during closing argument. Defendant also complains of the evidence
of threats to Tiffany Olejneczik and Jennifer and John Figures. We find that in the case of Olejneczik,
the evidence was admissible to explain a prior inconsistent statement about what occurred around the
time of the offense. In the case of the Figureses, the context of the testimony suggests that the evidence
was introduced to explain their lack of cooperation with police. Because that evidence was not
presented or argued as probative of defendant’s consciousness of guilt, and given the strength and
weight of the other evidence discussed above, we do not believe the testimony was outcome
determinative. Therefore, we find no manifest injustice.
Defendant’s third claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to inform the jury, when it
requested a transcript of the testimony of two witnesses, that it could have the testimony read to it
immediately from the court reporter’s notes. Defendant did not object to the trial court’s instruction, but
expressly acquiesced to the court’s response to the jury’s request. See People v Fetterley, 229 Mich
App 511, 519-520; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). Because defendant did not object, appellate review is
precluded absent manifest injustice. People v Weatherford, 193 Mich App 115, 121; 483 NW2d
924 (1992).
The reading and extent of the reading of testimony rest within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 56; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). A court does not abuse its
discretion when it does not foreclose the possibility of rereading the testimony in light of a later request.
People v Sullivan, 167 Mich App 39, 49; 421 NW2d 551 (1988). The trial court in this case noted
that the testimony of the two witnesses took approximately five hours and that it would take
approximately fifteen hours to transcribe the testimony. The court then sent the jury back to rely on its
collective memory, but offered to have the transcripts prepared if the jury decided it still wanted them.
Although the court did not inform the jury that they could have the requested testimony immediately
reread to them from the court reporter’s notes, because the court did not foreclose the jury from
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rehearing the testimony, we find no manifest injustice. With regard to defendant’s assertion that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to the court’s response to the
jury request, we note that this claim was not included in defendant’s statement of questions presented
and so is not properly presented for review. People v Price, 214 Mich App 538, 548; 543 NW2d 49
(1995).
Defendant’s last argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in giving an instruction to the
jury on its use of prior convictions in deciding the credibility of two witnesses, while not including three
other witnesses who also admitted to having prior convictions. Because defendant failed to object to
the instruction as given, we will not review the claim in the absence of manifest injustice. People v
Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 423; 564 NW2d 149 (1997). In reviewing jury
instructions, this Court examines the instructions as a whole; even if there are some imperfections, there
is no basis for reversal if the instructions adequately protected the defendant’s rights by fairly presenting
to the jury the issues to be tried. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 53; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
In this case, the jury was instructed on the use of prior convictions in assessing the credibility of
two witnesses, Armstrong and Kellogg. See CJI2d 5.1. Both men had prior convictions admissible
under MRE 609(a). However, the instruction did not require that the jury consider prior convictions,
nor did it preclude the jury from considering the prior convictions of the three witnesses who were not
named in the instruction. While the instruction was not perfect, it sufficiently protected defendant’s
rights by presenting the issues to be tried. Therefore, we find no manifest injustice. Again, although
defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object,
because he did not include this claim in his statement of questions presented, the issue is not presented
for review. Price, supra at 548.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
1
We note that it is not clear from the context of the testimony that Sanders actually implicated defendant
in the August 5 robbery. However, because the testimony was ambiguous, it is possible that the jury
may have inferred that she did.
2
While defendant claims that he objected to some of the testimony at issue, the record shows that he
did so on the basis of hearsay and speculation, not on the basis that the threats were not connected to
defendant. An objection not properly raised at trial is not preserved for appeal. People v Welch, 226
Mich App 461, 464; 574 NW2d 682 (1997).
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