PEOPLE OF MI V GIFFORD OWENS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 9, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203725
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 97-78923-FH
GIFFORD OWENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markman, P.J., and Hoekstra and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of delivery of less than fifty grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver less
than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), possession with
intent to deliver marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(d)(iii), and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Immediately after
conviction, the trial court sentenced defendant on count three, possession with intent to deliver
marijuana, a misdemeanor, to 120 days in the county jail. One month later, the trial court sentenced
defendant, a third habitual offender, to two years’ imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction, fifteen
to forty years on the conviction for delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, and fifteen to forty years’
imprisonment on the conviction for possession with intent to deliver less than fifty g
rams of cocaine.
Each of these sentences are to run consecutively to one another. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. We disagree. In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence in a criminal case, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513-515; 489
NW2d 748, modified 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
A conviction of felony-firearm requires proof that a defendant carried or possessed a firearm
during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. People v Williams, 212 Mich App 607,
608; 538 NW2d 89 (1995). Possession may be actual or constructive and may be proved by
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circumstantial evidence. Id. at 609. A defendant may have constructive possession of a firearm if its
location is known to the defendant and if it is reasonably accessible to him. Id. Based upon our review
of the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support defendant’s felony-firearm
conviction.
Defendant’s conviction arose out of the use of a confidential police informant to execute a
“controlled buy” of crack cocaine from defendant. The informant entered a home located at 1112
Cooper and went into a small bedroom where the controlled buy transpired. Immediately prior to the
controlled buy, the informant saw defendant sleeping in the bedroom. She watched as another woman
in the home, Kathy Slavin, woke defendant and handed him a bag of crack cocaine kept either under
the bed or near it. Defendant took a quantity of crack from the bag, handed it to Slavin who then gave
it to the informant. Another witness testified that defendant was still asleep in this bedroom several
hours later. At the time of the police raid, defendant attempted to flee the house wearing only a pair of
red boxer shorts and a shirt. Later, during a search of the home pursuant to a warrant, police found,
among other things, a shotgun and a handgun. Both were found in the bedroom where the controlled
buy occurred. The handgun was in a dresser drawer and the shotgun was in a box in the corner of the
bedroom. An Ameritech telephone bill was also discovered which revealed that the telephone for the
home was listed in defendant’s name.
Because the firearms were in the same room with defendant at the time of the controlled buy,
and the room was small, the jury could reasonably infer that the weapons were readily accessible to
defendant. Further, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant had knowledge
of the location of the weapons. The shotgun was in the corner of the room in a box. With respect to
the handgun in the drawer, there was enough circumstantial evidence that defendant had control over the
bedroom that the jury could infer that defendant had knowledge of its contents. The closet and dresser
contained men’s clothing. Defendant had clearly made himself at home in the bedroom as well as the
house as he was sleeping in the room and had been dressed that day in mid January only in red silk
boxer shorts. Further, the criminal enterprise was operated out of the bedroom. Finally, the telephone
in the home was in defendant’s name. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that defendant had constructive possession of the
firearms during the commission of the felony.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant on the
misdemeanor conviction without the benefit of a presentencing report and without trial counsel being
afforded the right of allocution on defendant’s behalf. We disagree. First, defendant’s claim that he
was denied allocution is unsupported by the record. Secondly, preparation of a presentence report
prior to sentencing in a misdemeanor case, where the maximum sentence does not exceed one year, is
within the discretion of the court. People v Shackelford, 146 Mich App 330, 335; 379 NW2d 487
(1985); MCL 771.14(1); MSA 28.1144(1). Under the facts of this case, we find no abuse of that
discretion. Defendant did not request the preparation of a presentencing report. Both he and his
attorney were offered the opportunity for allocution at which time defendant requested the court’s
mercy. In addition, the trial court had before it evidence of defendant’s prior record. Indeed, the court
questioned defendant to confirm the accuracy of the information. Under these circumstances, the trial
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did not abuse its discretion when it proceeded to sentencing on the misdemeanor conviction without
securing a presentence report.
Next, defendant argues that that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine. We disagree.
In order to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of
cocaine, the prosecution must prove four elements:
(1) the substance in question must be shown to be cocaine; (2) the cocaine must be in
a mixture of less than fifty grams weight; (3) it must be shown that defendant was not
authorized to possess the substance; and (4) it must be shown that the defendant
knowingly possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver. [People v Lewis, 178 Mich
App 464, 468; 444 NW2d 194 (1989).]
The only element contested in this appeal is the fourth element - that defendant knowingly possessed
cocaine with the intent to deliver. Our Supreme Court in Wolfe, supra at 519, stated that “this element,
knowing possession with intent to deliver, has two components, (1) possession and (2) intent.”
Defendant argues that there was no evidence that he actually possessed the cocaine. We disagree.
The confidential informant testified that during the controlled buy, Slavin handed defendant a bag
of cocaine from which he distributed a quantity to Slavin. Slavin then passed the cocaine on to the
informant and two other female buyers in the room. Defendant clearly had possession and control over
the contraband at that point. Further, Officer Markiewicz testified that when he chased defendant
during the raid he saw defendant go to the northeast corner of the porch and throw something down.
Similarly, Officer Kennedy testified that there was something in defendant’s hand at the time he hit the
porch door, while trying to flee the scene. Kennedy reported that defendant went to the northeast
corner of the porch. Later, in the northeast corner of the porch, officers found the drugs that supported
the possession charge and a wallet which contained the “impress funds” and two checks made payable
to defendant. Unlike other things on the porch which were frosted over due to the below-zero
temperatures, the drugs and the wallet were warm to the touch. When defendant states that there is no
direct evidence to support a finding of actual possession, defendant ignores the well settled rule that
circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which arise from the evidence can constitute
satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. People v Greenwood, 209 Mich App 470, 472; 531
NW2d 771 (1995). From the officers’ testimony, a reasonable factfinder could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that defendant actually possessed the drugs that formed the basis for his conviction.
Although defendant does not seriously contest the intent to deliver component of the offense, we
conclude that sufficient evidence was presented on this element as well. In addition to the evidence that
defendant had actually delivered cocaine earlier to the confidential informant and two others, we note
that the cocaine found on the porch was packaged in small plastic baggies within a larger bag. From
this, the jury could conclude that the cocaine was packaged for resale. Because sufficient evidence was
presented, we affirm defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of
cocaine.
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Defendant also contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for delivery to
the confidential informant of less than fifty grams of cocaine. We have reviewed this issue and find it to
be wholly without merit. The testimony of the confidential informant was, in itself, sufficient to support
the conviction and to the extent that defendant attacks the informant’s credibility, it is the function of the
jury and not the reviewing court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. People v McFall, 224 Mich
App 403, 412; 569 NW2d 828 (1997).
Next, defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant
failed to move for a Ginther1 hearing. Therefore, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on
the record. People v McMillan, 213 Mich App 134, 141; 539 NW2d 553 (1995). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that, under an objective standard of reasonableness, counsel made an error so serious that
counsel was not functioning as an attorney as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. People v Daniel,
207 Mich App 47, 58; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). The deficiency must be prejudicial to the defendant.
Id. Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving
otherwise. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
Defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call on his behalf Slavin, the
woman that passed defendant’s drugs on to the confidential informant. Decisions as to what witnesses
to call are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 163; 560
NW2d 600 (1997). This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of
trial strategy. People v Barnett 163 Mich App 331, 338; 414 NW2d 378 (1987). In any event,
based upon the existing record, it would appear that trial counsel’s decision to forego calling Slavin was
sound. Prior to trial, defense counsel indicated that although he had subpoenaed Slavin, he did not
intend to call her because, based upon a supplemental police interview taken at the time the subpoena
was served, her testimony would have been detrimental to defendant. Moreover, defendant has not
presented any evidence to establish that Slavin would have testified favorably at trial. In other words,
defendant has failed to show that this witness’s testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial,
therefore, he has failed to meet his burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant also contends that his counsel was ineffective because he stipulated to striking
Officers Albreck, Thomlin, Black and LaPort from the witness list. Once again, decisions with respect
to who will be called at the time of trial are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. Mitchell, supra at
163. Additionally, defendant has failed to present any evidence with respect to how the testimony of
these witnesses would have altered the results of the proceedings. Therefore, we cannot conclude that
defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s actions.
Next, defendant contends that his counsel should have objected to the admission of several
items recovered during the raid: the Ameritech bill, shotgun, handgun, marijuana and scales. Because
defendant has not advanced any legitimate basis for excluding these pieces of evidence, we find no
deficiency in trial counsel’s representation. Trial counsel is not required to raise a meritless motion.
People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 425; 564 NW2d 149 (1997); People v Gist,
188 Mich App 610, 613; 470 NW2d 475 (1991).
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Finally, defendant contends that his trial counsel failed to effectively cross examine several police
witnesses to illustrate inconsistencies between the witnesses’ trial and preliminary examination testimony.
Because the trial and preliminary examination testimony of these witnesses were substantially similar, we
find no merit in defendant’s claim.
For his next claim of error, defendant contends that he was denied the opportunity to cross
examine the confidential informant regarding her history of drug addiction and prostitution and as a
result, he was precluding from effectively challenging her credibility. Because the record does not
support defendant’s position, we find no merit in this argument. During the prosecution’s direct
examination, the informant was asked why she participated in the controlled buy. In response, the
informant stated: “It’s a long story.” At that point, the court encouraged the witness to “try to boil it
down here in about ten seconds.” The witness then explained:
Well, me and my daughter went through a rape thing with a dealer and he was found not
guilty, and I can’t see them selling it to young kids.
After this response was given, the trial court instructed the prosecutor to ask the next question. During
cross examination, defense counsel questioned the informant regarding the compensation she received
for participating in the controlled buy, however, he did not inquire into her history of drug addiction or
prostitution. Therefore, there was never an occasion for the court to restrict the scope of the
examination of the informant. The record simply does not support defendant’s contention that he was
precluded from attacking the informant’s credibility.
We decline to address defendant’s argument that the informant’s receipt of fifty dollars
constituted an illegal bribe to give perjured testimony. This issue was not preserved for appeal because
it was not set forth in defendant's statement of the questions involved. MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v
Yarbrough, 183 Mich App 163, 165; 454 NW2d 419 (1990).
Lastly, defendant contends that his two sentences of fifteen to forty years, which run
consecutively to one another, are disproportionate. We disagree.
A trial court's imposition of a particular sentence is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion, which will be found where the sentence imposed does not reasonably reflect the seriousness
of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630,
636, 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in giving a sentence within the
statutory limits established by the Legislature when an habitual offender's underlying felony, in the
context of his previous felonies, evidences that the defendant has an inability to conform his conduct to
the laws of society. People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich 320, 326, 562 NW2d 2d 460
(1997).
Defendant’s argument that the consecutive nature of his sentence makes these sentences
disproportionate is without merit. In evaluating the proportionality of consecutive sentences, each is to
be considered separately for proportionality to the individual offense and the offender without
consideration of the consecutive nature of the sentences. People v Hill, 221 Mich App 391, 397; 561
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NW2d 862 (1997). Applying this principle to defendant’s sentences, we find no abuse of discretion.
Defendant has an extensive criminal record and a drug problem that has defied treatment. The
sentences imposed on defendant, a third habitual offender, were appropriate.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1972).
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