MICHELE M MATICS V THOMAS F FODOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHELE M. MATICS,
UNPUBLISHED
April 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Nos. 209671; 210440
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-564352 DP
THOMAS F. FODOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Neff and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff commenced this paternity action, and defendant acknowledged paternity upon receipt
of blood test results. On January 23, 1997, the trial court entered an order submitted by plaintiff, which
plaintiff claimed represented a settlement agreement between the parties, awarding sole custody to
plaintiff. Defendant moved to modify custody, arguing that it was in the child’s best interest to award
defendant custody. Plaintiff moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and
(C)(10) with respect to defendant’s motion to modify, arguing, inter alia, that defendant had admitted
in the pleadings that he had abandoned the motion to modify. On January 26, 1998, the trial court
entered an order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff; in docket no. 209671, defendant
appeals as of right from that order.
Defendant also moved below for rehearing or reconsideration of the trial court’s January 23,
1997, order, and for relief from that order, arguing that plaintiff had engaged in fraud or
misrepresentation in submitting the order to the court as a purported settlement agreement of the parties.
Defendant also requested an evidentiary hearing on the matter, and moved for the waiver of the
attorney/client privilege so that plaintiff’s attorneys could be examined regarding the alleged fraud. On
February 27, 1998, the trial court entered an order denying these motions; in docket no. 210440,
defendant appeals as of right from that order.
The appeals in docket n 209671 and 210440 have been consolidated. We affirm both
os.
orders.
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Docket No. 209671
In docket no. 209671, defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’ s motion
for summary disposition. We disagree. Without specifying the particular subrule of MCR 2.116(C)
upon which it was relying, the trial court granted plaintiff’ s motion for summary disposition on the
ground that defendant had abandoned his motion to modify custody. We conclude that summary
disposition was granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), which permits summary disposition on the basis
of a prior “release.” We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition.
Limbach v Oakland Co Bd of Road Comm’rs, 226 Mich App 389, 395; 573 NW2d 336 (1997).
Summary disposition must be granted if the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, or if the proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See MCR
2.116(I)(1).
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), defines “release” in part as an “[a]bandonment of claim to
party against whom it exists, and is a surrender of a cause of action and may be gratuitous or for
consideration,” citing Melo v National Fuse & Powder Co, 267 F Supp 611, 612 (D Colo 1967),
and also as the “giving up or abandoning of a claim or right to person against whom claim exists or
against whom right is to be exercised,” citing Adder v Holman & Moody, Inc, 288 NC 484; 219
SE2d 190, 195 (1975); see also Larkin v Otsego Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 207 Mich App 391,
393; 525 NW2d 475 (1994). A release extinguishes a cause of action. 1 Larkin, supra at 393. In this
case, defendant admitted in his answer to plaintiff’ s motion for attorney fees that he had abandoned his
motion to modify custody. Defendant later admitted that he had made this admission in his answer to
plaintiff’ s amended motion for summary disposition.2 Accordingly, the pleadings show that plaintiff was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law by reason of the fact that defendant’s claim for modification was
barred due to a prior “release.” MCR 2.116(C)(7) & (I)(1).
We note that the trial court granted plaintiff’ s motion for summary disposition “with prejudice.”
This should not be taken to mean that defendant is forever precluded from seeking to modify the
custody arrangement. See MCL 722.27(1)(c); MSA 25.312(7)(1)(c) (providing that a trial court may
modify or amend its previous judgments or orders regarding custody for proper cause shown or
because of a change of circumstances). The trial court made this point clear when it explained on the
record that “custody is always subject to alteration” and that defendant has a right to again make a
motion to modify custody.
Docket No. 210440
In docket no. 210440, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in deciding to enter the
January 23, 1997, order submitted by plaintiff, and that the court abused its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the decision to enter that order. We disagree.
The trial court properly entered the order submitted by plaintiff, since it was an agreement in writing and
was signed by defendant, the party against whom it was offered. MCR 2.507(H); Walbridge Aldinger
Co v Walcon Corp, 207 Mich App 566, 571; 525 NW2d 489 (1994). Defendant contends that the
trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing before entering the order to determine whether the
order submitted by plaintiff or an alternative order submitted by defendant represented the true
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settlement agreement. However, defendant failed to make a timely request for an evidentiary hearing.3
The trial court thus was not required to conduct such a hearing. See Mitchell v Mitchell, 198 Mich
App 393, 399; 499 NW2d 386 (1993).
Moreover, there was no material difference between the order submitted by plaintiff and the
order submitted by defendant. Defendant’s version contained a provision (which was crossed out in
plaintiff’s version) limiting future discovery and modifications of child support to the parties’ incomes as
reported on their income tax returns. Such a provision would have been unenforceable since it would
have limited the court’s ability to modify or amend its previous judgments orders for the best interests of
the child. MCL 722.27(1)(c); MSA 25.312(7)(1)(c). Therefore, because there was no material
difference between the two orders, any error of the trial court in entering plaintiff’s rather than
defendant’s version of the order was harmless. MCR 2.613(A).
In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for
rehearing or reconsideration of the decision to enter the January 23, 1997, order. Defendant has not
demonstrated a palpable error by which the court and the parties were misled, nor has defendant shown
that a different disposition would result from correction of the alleged error. MCR 2.119(F)(3); In re
Beglinger Trust, 221 Mich App 273, 279; 561 NW2d 130 (1997). The court was apprised of the
existence of both orders at the January 23, 1997, hearing, but chose to enter plaintiff’s version.
Moreover, since there was no material difference between the two orders, a different disposition would
not result from correction of the alleged error because entry of the order submitted by defendant would
have resulted in an order that was materially indistinguishable from the order that was in fact entered.
Defendant’s next argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion for relief from the January 23, 1997, order, and in refusing to hold an in-person
evidentiary hearing on defendant’s allegation of fraud. We disagree. An in-person evidentiary hearing
was not necessary because our review of the record indicates that the trial court resolved the fraud
issue, in part, by relying upon deposition testimony submitted by the parties. See Williams v Williams,
214 Mich App 391, 394-400; 542 NW2d 892 (1995). Although an in-person hearing is useful when it
is necessary to evaluate a witness’ demeanor in order to assess credibility, defendant has not argued
that it was necessary to consider demeanor in this case. Id., p 399 (explaining that demeanor may be
one element in assessing credibility, but that it often plays no role; other factors may be more important
determinants of credibility). Here, we conclude that the trial court was able to and in fact did resolve
defendant’s fraud allegation without reference to the demeanor of the witnesses, thus making an in
person evidentiary hearing unnecessary.
Further, the trial court’s finding that there was no fraud was not clearly erroneous, MCR
2.613(C), because this finding was supported by the deposition testimony of Joseph Kosmala.
Kosmala, an informal mediator, testified that the changes to page three of the order submitted by
plaintiff were made and initialed by the parties in Kosmala’s presence. This testimony indicated that
plaintiff did not alter the order before submitting it to the court, but rather, that both parties agreed to the
modification on page three and that no fraud occurred.
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Finally, we note that even if an in-person evidentiary hearing had been held and defendant was
able to adduce overwhelming evidence to support his allegations concerning the alteration of the
provision in question, defendant would still have been unable to establish fraud. As noted, the only
additional provision in defendant’s version of the order was unenforceable.
Hence, any
misrepresentation by plaintiff with respect to that provision would not have been material. Defendant
would thus have been unable to establish fraud. Eerdmans v Maki, 226 Mich App 360, 366; 573
NW2d 329 (1997). We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
hold an in-person evidentiary hearing and in denying defendant’s motion for relief.
Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that the trial court should have ruled that plaintiff’s
attorney/client privilege was waived because the crime-fraud exception to that privilege applied. We
disagree. Defendant has not shown that plaintiff or his attorneys engaged in a crime or fraud, nor has
defendant adduced evidence that plaintiff communicated with his attorneys regarding a crime or fraud
that was ongoing or that was to occur in the future. People v Paasche, 207 Mich App 698, 705-707;
525 NW2d 914 (1994). Defendant has thus failed to establish that the crime-fraud exception applies.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
Although a motion to modify custody may not be considered a “cause of action” in the strictest sense,
it is analogous to a complaint in that it requests the equivalent of a trial to resolve a disputed issue.
2
Defendant also concedes in his brief on appeal that he admitted in his answer to the attorney fee
motion that he was no longer seeking custody.
3
We do not consider defendant’s subsequent request for an evidentiary hearing in connection with his
motion for relief from the January 23, 1997, order, to be timely with respect to the issue whether the
court erred in entering that order in the first instance.
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