CAROL WAITE MATILE V L&S PRODUCTS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CAROL WAITE MATILE,
UNPUBLISHED
March 30, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 213200
WCAC
LC No. 95-000470
L & S PRODUCTS, INC. and MICHIGAN
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
AMERICAN FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY and
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Saad and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants L & S Products, Inc. and Michigan Mutual Insurance Company (collectively,
Michigan Mutual) appeal an opinion and order of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission
(WCAC) affirming a magistrate’s award of disability benefits. Initially, this Court denied defendants’
application for leave to appeal. Matile v L & S Products, Inc., unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered August 12, 1997 (Docket No. 203109). However, the Supreme Court, in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. 458
Mich 865 (1998). We vacate, in part, the orders of the magistrate and the WCAC and remand to the
magistrate for further findings.
This case involves a coverage dispute among insurers who provided worker’s compensation
insurance for defendant L & S Products, Inc. (L & S) for different time periods. Michigan Mutual
insured L & S prior to September 1, 1990. Thereafter, American Fire and Casualty Company
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(American Fire) insured L & S until October 18, 1992 and Citizens Insurance Company (Citizens)
provided insurance after October 18, 1992.
Plaintiff testified that she began working for L & S in 1989 as a packer, which required
hammering and heavy lifting. On March 23, 1990, she reported arm and elbow pain to her family
physician. He prescribed an arm brace, and plaintiff returned to work, where she was assigned light
duty. However, her problems persisted and she stopped working in October 1990. After having
elbow surgery in January and June 1991, plaintiff returned to restricted work in January 1992.
However, by February 1992, she was experiencing severe neck pain and eventually was diagnosed as
having a herniated cervical disc. Plaintiff stopped working on November 6, 1992.
In his opinion, under the heading “Findings and Analysis,” the magistrate concluded that plaintiff
had proved her case by a preponderance of the evidence. He identified the medical testimony that he
found credible, and stated that he found plaintiff and her sister, one of plaintiff’s witnesses, to be
credible. He then stated:
I am thoroughly convinced that plaintiff’s arm, neck and back difficulties resulted from
the activities of the workplace. I am also convinced that Citizen’s Insurance, the last
carrier on the risk, is free from any responsibility in this matter. It is apparent to me that
plaintiff’s complaints began in the early part of 1990 while Michigan Mutual was on the
risk. Plaintiff indicated her neck and back complaints began in early 1992 when she
returned to favored work. This was during the coverage of American Fire and
Casualty. The last carrier was only on the risk for about two weeks or so and all that
happened on its watch is that a test apparently came back in which a herniated disc was
demonstrated.
On the basis of the evidence offered, plaintiff is found entitled to workers’ compensation
benefits, both wage loss and medical, at the expense of Michigan Mutual Insurance
Company as of March 23, 1990. . . Defendant American Fire is responsible for all
benefits related to the neck and back and for differential benefits as of October 18,
1992, its last day of coverage. . . . [Emphasis in original.]
On appeal to the WCAC, Michigan Mutual argued that the magistrate’s finding that Michigan
Mutual was responsible for plaintiff’s disability benefits as of March 23, 1990, was not based upon the
proper legal standard and was not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the
whole record. Michigan Mutual also argued that the magistrate committed legal error in granting plaintiff
an open award of benefits where there was a written offer to return to work and medical testimony
suggesting only partial disability. The WCAC adopted the opinion of the magistrate in its entirety,
concluding that the magistrate’s finding that Michigan Mutual was liable for benefits was supported by
competent, material and substantial evidence. However, the WCAC did not address the standard used
by the magistrate in establishing plaintiff’s injury date or allocating liability for her worker’s
compensation benefits. With regard to Michigan Mutual’s second issue on appeal, the WCAC
concluded that the magistrate did not commit legal error.
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On appeal to this Court, Michigan Mutual does not challenge the finding that plaintiff was
entitled to benefits, but only challenges the “injury date” established by the magistrate and the allocation
of liability for plaintiff’s benefits based on that date. Michigan Mutual argues that the WCAC erred in
affirming the magistrate’s finding that March 23, 1990, was plaintiff’s injury date with regard to her arm
and elbow injury, when that decision did not identify or properly apply the legal standard set forth in
MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1):
An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of
employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be
paid compensation as provided in this act. In the case of death resulting from the
personal injury to the employee, compensation shall be paid to the employee’s
dependents as provided in this act. Time of injury or date of injury as used in this
act in the case of a disease or in the case of an injury not attributable to a single
event shall be the last day of work in the employment in which the employee was
last subjected to the conditions that resulted in the employee’s disability or death.
[Emphasis added.]
Michigan Mutual contends that because plaintiff’s arm injury was not attributable to a single event, but
was the result of “cumulative trauma” from repetitive use, the magistrate erred as a matter of law in
finding that plaintiff’s injury date was March 23, 1990, without specifically finding that plaintiff’s injury
was not aggravated by any of the work she performed when she returned to employment after being
treated for the arm and elbow injury. Furthermore, argues Michigan Mutual, the record does not
support a finding that March 23, 1990, was the last day of work during which plaintiff was subjected to
the conditions that resulted in her disability. Michigan Mutual contends that the record shows that
plaintiff’s condition was aggravated by her work conditions at least until October 22, 1990, the last day
she worked before having elbow surgery, and most likely until November 6, 1992, her final day of
work at L & S. Because Michigan Mutual’s coverage ended on September 1, 1990, it argues that it
should not be liable for any of plaintiff’s benefits.
Worker’s compensation magistrates are required to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law. MCL 418.847(2); MSA 17.237(847)(2); Woody v Cello-Foil Products (After Remand), 450
Mich 588, 594; 546 NW2d 226 (1996). Those findings must be sufficiently detailed to permit the
reviewing body to separate the facts found from the law applied, to recognize the path taken through
conflicting evidence, and to understand the testimony that was adopted, the standards that were
followed, and the reasoning used by the magistrate in arriving at his or her decision. Id. at 594-595.
The WCAC reviews the magistrate’s decision to determine if it is supported by competent, material and
substantial evidence on the whole record. Connaway v Welded Construction Co, ___ Mich App
___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 201559, issued 12/15/98), slip op at 10. When reviewing a
WCAC decision on appeal, this Court considers (1) the reasoning and analysis of the decisions of the
magistrate and the WCAC, (2) the evidence considered or ignored in those decisions and (3) the care
taken, and the nature of the issues involved, to determine whether the WCAC acted in a manner
consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review. Id.
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As the trier of fact, the magistrate in this case was required to make a clear and unequivocal
finding concerning the date of a plaintiff’s injury and resultant disability. Jones v Auto Specialties Mfg
Co, 177 Mich App 59, 67; 441 NW2d 1 (1988). Under § 301(1), where an injury is not attributable
to a single event, the date of injury is the last date that an employee performed work that contributed to
or aggravated his or her injury. Id. at 66-67. It appears from the magistrate’s opinion in this case that
he established March 23, 1990, as plaintiff’s initial “injury date.” However, he did not articulate the
legal standard he applied in arriving at that date, stating only that was the date that plaintiff’s complaints
began. American Fire and Citizens argue that the decision of the WCAC must be affirmed because
there is competent, material and substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that March 23,
1990, was the last day during which plaintiff performed work that contributed to or aggravated her
injury. However, although the magistrate summarized and commented on the testimony provided, it is
not clear from his decision whether he made a finding with regard to the last date that plaintiff performed
work that contributed to or aggravated her injury. In short, the magistrate’s conclusory finding with
regard to plaintiff’s injury date does not reveal the path taken through conflicting evidence, the standards
followed, or the reasoning used to reach his conclusion. See Woody, supra at 594-595. Such analysis
is critical to review of the magistrate’s decision, especially given his statement that he found plaintiff to
be a very credible witness and given her testimony that she continued to perform tasks, such as the
deburring of metal piping, that may have aggravated her arm and elbow injury after March 23, 1990.
Where a magistrate’s findings are insufficient for appellate review, remand to the magistrate for
the necessary findings is appropriate. Layman v Newkirk Electric Associates, Inc, 458 Mich 494,
508-509; 581 NW2d 244 (1998). Therefore, we vacate, in part, the orders of the magistrate and the
WCAC and remand to the magistrate for clarification of plaintiff’s date of injury, consistent with the
legal standard set forth in § 301(1), and allocation of liability among the insurers based upon that date.
Vacated, in part, and remanded for further findings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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