CINDY L ZIRGIBEL V LOBDELL-EMERY CORPORATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CINDY L. ZIRGIBEL,
UNPUBLISHED
March 30, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 201392
Gratiot Circuit Court
LC No. 95-003662 CL
LOBDELL-EMERY CORPORATION, d/b/a
LOBDELL-EMERY MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Whitbeck and G.S. Allen, Jr.*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury found defendant liable to plaintiff for $50,000 in damages based on claims of sexual
harassment in the form of a hostile work environment in violation of the Civil Rights Act. MCL
37.2103(i)(iii); MSA 3.548(103)(i)(iii). Defendant appeals as of right. We reverse in part and remand
for further proceedings.
I. Basic Facts
Plaintiff was employed by defendant, an automotive parts manufacturer. Plaintiff ’s claims in
this case involve distinct acts by two separate employees of defendant. One of these claims alleged
offensive conduct by Roger Hitsman, who functioned at the pertinent time as plaintiff ’s regular and
immediate supervisor. The issues before us do not require us to elaborate further on the nature of this
claim.
The other claim involved alleged conduct by Robert Gullage. According to plaintiff ’s trial
testimony, in May 1995, she rode with three other employees, including Gullage, to a Ford plant in
Dearborn in connection with a special work assignment. While Gullage was recognized as the
supervisor in charge during the trip, he was not otherwise Gullage’s supervisor. At the Ford plant,
Gullage requested plaintiff to go to the back of the plant alone with him. At that location, he put a rag
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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down her shirt once and attempted to do so three more times, although she told him each time not to do
this. Later that evening, at the Holiday Inn where the four employees were staying, Gullage made
sexually oriented or suggestive remarks to plaintiff and telephoned her in her room at 1:00 a.m. to ask if
she wanted to do something. Plaintiff reported the incident to defendant’s personnel director who
indicated that the allegations could not be substantiated and told plaintiff that “[t]he manager in question
will never use his authority for any sexual favors or job promotions again. The bottom line is, Cindy, the
guy was just testing the water.”
II. Directed Verdict on the Claim Based on Gullage’s Conduct
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, we examine the evidence
and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. See, e.g. Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 663; 575 NW2d 745
(1998).
B. Analysis
With regard to the claim involving Gullage, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying
its motion for a directed verdict. We agree.1
Plaintiff’s testimony about Gullage’s conduct toward her describes conduct that is
unquestionably reprehensible and to which no person should be subjected. Apart from legal
considerations, such conduct warrants stern condemnation. However, it is worth emphasizing that the
defendant taken to court in this case was not the alleged perpetrator, but rather the company that
employed both that perpetrator and plaintiff.
One necessary element to establishing a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim
under the Civil Rights Act is that the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in
fact did substantially interfere with the aggrieved employee’s employment or “created an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 382; 501 NW2d 155
(1993). In this regard, the Michigan Supreme Court stated in Radtke that only rarely would single
incidents support a hostile work environment claim:
[T]he Michigan Civil Rights Act imposes liability whenever sexual harassment
creates a hostile work environment. Although rare, single incidents may create a hostile
environment—rape and violent sexual assault are two possible scenarios. One such
extremely traumatic experience may, therefore, fulfill the statutory requirement.
Because a single incident, unless extreme, will not create an offensive, hostile, or
intimidating work environment, [Chamberlin v 101 Realty, Inc, 915 F2d, 777, 783
(CA 1, 1990)]; [Highlander v K F C Nat’l Management Co, 805 F2d 644, 649
650 (CA 6, 1986)], a plaintiff usually must prove that (1) the employer failed to rectify a
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problem after adequate notice, and (2) a continuous or periodic problem existed or a
repetition of an episode was likely to occur. [Emphasis in the original.]
The claim at issue, which involves the conduct of an employee who was not plaintiff ’s ordinary
supervisor at the time during a trip away from the general work site, must reasonably be considered as a
claim of hostile work environment based on a single incident.
In our view, by using rape and violent sexual assault as examples of circumstances when a single
incident could suffice to create a triable question of fact regarding a hostile work environment claim, the
Michigan Supreme Court has indicated that such a claim should be limited to highly extreme
circumstances. The apparent conduct relative to the claim at issue, while despicable, is not at the level
of rape or violent sexual assault, as our dissenting colleague forthrightly agrees. Again, it is undisputed
that Gullage was not plaintiff’s ordinary supervisor and that the incident occurred away from the work
site during a special assignment. The alleged conduct at issue here is also far less egregious, both in
terms of content and length, than the conduct in Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 232 Mich App 560, 562
564; ___ NW2d ___, slip op, pp 1-2 (No. 202151, issued 11/20/98), in which this Court found
sufficient evidence to support a jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of hostile work
environment sexual harassment. In Chambers, there was evidence that the plaintiff ’s temporary
supervisor for a one-week period actually grabbed and rubbed intimate parts of the plaintiff ’s body,
made various sexually suggestive remarks and rubbed whipping cream on the plaintiff ’s hands and said,
“Now tell everybody you were creamed by Paul [the temporary supervisor’s first name].” Id. at 563.
The Chambers panel held that this evidence was “clearly sufficient to establish a hostile work
environment claim of sexual harassment because it was severe or pervasive.” Id. at 564. In contrast,
the alleged conduct by Gullage, was not comparable to the highly extreme nature of the conduct at issue
in Chambers. Gullage did not engage in direct contact with intimate parts of plaintiff ’s body as did the
temporary supervisor in Chambers. Further, the events in question here occurred during a brief special
assignment, not over the course of an entire week. Accordingly, there was no evidence to reasonably
support a conclusion that this single incident evinced a continuous or periodic pattern of harassment or
that a repetition of this episode was likely to occur, Radtke, supra at 395, or that the conduct
amounted to the creation of a hostile work environment. Similarly, this incident could not reasonably be
considered to have substantially interfered with plaintiff ’s employment. Id. at 382. Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Kubczak, supra, we conclude that the trial court erred by
denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim based on Gullage’s conduct.2
III. Alleged Instructional Error
While defendant’s brief on appeal could be much clearer on this point, under a fair reading of
defendant’s argument that the trial court committed instructional error, defendant is only alleging error
requiring reversal with regard to the claim involving Gullage. In light of our above conclusion that the
trial court should have directed a verdict in defendant’s favor on that claim, we need not address this
issue.
IV. Conclusion
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Defendant has raised no issue in this appeal implicating the finding of liability to plaintiff due to
Hitsman’s conduct. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment at issue in part and remand for the trial court
to enter a judgment of no cause of action with regard to plaintiff ’s claim based on Gullage’s conduct
without disturbing the finding of liability based on the claim related to Hitsman’s conduct. However,
because the jury imposed an aggregate award of damages for both claims, there is no reasonable
method of determining how much of the damage award was attributable only to the claim involving
Hitsman. Thus, we vacate the damages award in the judgment at issue and direct the trial court to
conduct a new trial limited solely to the issue of the amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled on
the claim based on Hitsman’s conduct. Cf. Woodruff v USS Great Lakes Fleet, Inc, 210 Mich App
255, 259; 533 NW2d 356 (1995) (remanding for new trial on damages where no basis established for
new trial on liability).
Reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Glenn S. Allen, Jr.
1
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant summary disposition in its favor on
this claim. However, in light of our analysis of the directed verdict issue, it is unnecessary to reach that
question.
2
In Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702, 705; 545 NW2d 596 (1996), the female
plaintiff’s male supervisor directed sexually suggestive remarks and conduct toward her and eventually
raped her when they were the only two people at the work location. The Court held that an employer
was strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment where a supervisor accomplishes the rape of a
subordinate employee by use of supervisory power. Id. at 712-714. While this case does not involve a
quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, we note that this case obviously involves conduct far less
egregious than that in Champion.
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