HOPE PHILLIPS V PIONEER STATE MUTUAL INS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HOPE PHILLIPS,
UNPUBLISHED
March 23, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 197346
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-537964 CK
PIONEER STATE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Griffin and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. We
affirm.
We review the trial court's grant of summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests the factual support for a claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993).
The initial burden of factually supporting the motion rests with the moving party. The burden then shifts
to the opposing party to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451
Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Summary disposition is appropriate only if there is no genuine
issue of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bourne v
Farmers Ins Exchange, 449 Mich 193, 197; 534 NW2d 491 (1995).
We find that the trial court correctly granted summary disposition for defendant because plaintiff
had no coverage for the frozen pipes peril. In this regard, we find that plaintiff's reliance on the “duties
after loss” provision of the insurance policy to establish coverage is misplaced because plaintiff did not
claim that the water damaged property was caused by the fire or otherwise came within the ambit of
coverage for the fire that occurred on March 16, 1995. Hence, the question whether plaintiff complied
with her duties relative to the fire is not relevant. The material question is whether the damage from the
frozen pipes that burst on or about April 9, 1995, is a covered peril. This, in turn, is dependent on
whether the exclusion specified for the frozen pipes peril applies. It is undisputed that the policy
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provides coverage for damage caused by “[f]reezing of a plumbing…system,” subject to the following
exclusion:
This peril does not include loss on the residence premises while the dwelling is
unoccupied, unless you have used reasonable care to:
a. maintain heat in the building; or
b. shut off the water supply and drain the system and appliances of water.
The material question before us is whether the house was “unoccupied” within the meaning of
the above exclusion. We do not agree with plaintiff's position that the exclusion should be construed as
applying only to absences for such matters as vacations and job assignments, and that a common sense
reading of the provision would not give her notice that it applies to a fire-damaged home which is
vacated because it is uninhabitable.
Temporary absences such as vacations and job assignments are the type of absences for which
the exclusion would not apply. Shackelton v Sun Fire Office, 55 Mich 288, 291-292; 21 NW 343
(1884); Krajenke v Preferred Mut Ins Co, 68 Mich App 211, 216; 242 NW2d 70 (1976). See also
Smith v Lumbermen’s Mut Ins Co, 101 Mich App 78, 84-85; 300 NW2d 457 (1980). The actual
use of a house as a dwelling place is the touchstone for occupancy. Shackelton, supra at 292. "The
use of the building for storage would not create occupancy. It is the regular presence of inhabitants that
makes occupancy." Coutu v Exchange Ins Co, 174 AD2d 241, 244; 579 NYS2d 751 (1992). A
house is unoccupied when "it ceases to be used for living purposes or as a customary place of human
habitation." Blaylock v American Guarantee Bank Liability Ins Co, 632 SW2d 719, 721 (Tex,
1982).
Circumstances may arise where an insured can be said to occupy a dwelling, even though there
is a temporary absence. However, we hold that an insured's absence that arises because the house
ceases to be habitable is unoccupied, as a matter of law, within the meaning of the exclusion for the
frozen pipes peril. Our holding is consistent with the rule of reasonable expectations that is applied
when construing insurance policies because an insured is held to knowledge of the terms and conditions
of an insurance policy, even if the policy is not read. Marlo Beauty Supply, Inc v Farmers Ins Group
of Cos, 227 Mich App 309, 324; 575 NW2d 324 (1998). Examined from an objective standpoint, an
insured such as plaintiff, reading the exclusion for the frozen pipes peril, cannot reasonably expect
coverage when there is no occupancy unless reasonable care has been taken to maintain the heat or shut
off the water supply. Id. at 316. Hence, as a matter of law, plaintiff had no coverage for the frozen
pipes peril unless she used reasonable care to either maintain heat or shut off the water supply. On this
issue, we uphold the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant because plaintiff did
not establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial on either of these issues and defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(G)(4); Quinto, supra at 362.
Because plaintiff did not have coverage for the frozen pipes peril, we find it unnecessary to
address the parties' arguments regarding whether the neglect exclusion in the insurance policy precluded
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plaintiff from recovering for the water damage to her personal property. Finally, we decline to consider
plaintiff's arguments concerning whether she established other theories of recovery in response to
defendant's motion for summary disposition. We deem plaintiff's arguments abandoned because they
are insufficiently briefed. Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 655 n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984).
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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