CARIE GORS V CONNECTOR SET TOY CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CARIE GORS, as Next Friend
of JOSEPH GORS, a Minor,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 204725
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-619674 NP
CONNECTOR SET TOY COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Gribbs and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this products liability action, plaintiff, whose son was injured while playing with a toy
manufactured by defendant, appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. We affirm.
Although the trial court did not specify the court rule under which it granted summary
disposition, its ruling focused on the absence of a duty, implying that MCR 2.116(C)(8) was the basis
for the ruling. See Schmidt v Youngs, 215 Mich App 222, 224-225; 544 NW2d 743 (1996). We
review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Jenks v Brown,
219 Mich App 415, 417; 557 NW2d 114 (1996). Like the trial court, we take only the pleadings into
consideration, and we presume that the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations and related,
reasonable inferences are true. Id. If no factual development could possibly lead to recovery, then
summary disposition was appropriately granted. Id.
Plaintiff argues that defendant owed the users of its toy a duty to warn about the toy’s potential
for harm. In Boumelhem v Bic Corp, 211 Mich App 175, 178-179; 535 NW2d 574 (1995), we
indicated that the manufacturer of a simple product has no duty to warn of the product’s potentially
dangerous characteristics that are readily apparent upon casual inspection and reasonably expected to
be recognized by the average user of ordinary intelligence. See Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational
Industries (On Rehearing), 441 Mich 379, 385; 491 NW2d 208 (1992). Our first inquiry, then, is
whether the toy in question – a “build it yourself” race car consisting of several small parts and
propelled by a rubber band – was a “simple product.” In Jamieson v Woodward & Lothrup, 247 F
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2d 23, 28 (DC Cir 1957), the court indicated that a simple product has “universally known
characteristics,” is devoid of “parts or mechanism,” and poses only obvious dangers. Plaintiff argues
that because the toy at issue in the instant case consisted of several small parts, including a large,
stretched rubber band, it could not be considered a simple product. We disagree. Our jurisprudence
departs from a strict reading of Jamieson in that items consisting of numerous parts can be deemed
simple products.
In Viscogliosi v Montgomery Elevator Co, 208 Mich App 188, 189; 526 NW2d 599
(1994), we concluded that an airport moving walkway – which, of course, consists of several parts –
was a simple product. We stated that only one of the two tests set forth in Raines v Colt Industries,
Inc, 757 F Supp 819, 825 (ED Mich 1991), need be satisfied in order to determine that an item is a
simple product. Viscogliosi, supra at 189. The two tests are:
(1) the products are not highly mechanized, thus allowing the users to maintain control
over the products [or] (2) the intended use of the products does not place the users in
obviously dangerous positions. [Raines, supra at 825.]
The Raines court went on to designate a gun a simple product because it was not highly mechanized
and because its intended operation – to shoot targets, animals, or human attackers – did not place the
user in danger. Id.; see also Resteiner v Sturm, Ruger & Co, Inc, 223 Mich App 374, 380; 566
NW2d 53 (1997) (White, P.J.) (handgun deemed a simple product). Similarly, the toy at issue in the
instant case was not highly mechanized, and its intended use did not place its users in an obviously
dangerous position. Accordingly, it was a simple product.
The next inquiry is whether the danger about which plaintiff complains – the danger of a large,
taut rubber band projecting itself or other objects into a user’s eye – was open and obvious to an
average user of ordinary intelligence. See Boumelhem, supra at 178-179. We conclude that it was.
Rubber bands are widely known, even by minors, to snap back into place and project forward if
stretched and released, and the risk of harm this poses is obvious. See Jamieson, supra at page 26
(potential danger from use of rubber bands is obvious). The possibility that a taut rubber band stretched
around a small object will project the object if the tension on the band is suddenly released is also an
obvious danger. Because the toy at issue was a simple product and because the danger associated with
it was open and obvious, defendant was not obligated to warn plaintiff about the danger. Boumelhem,
supra at 178-179. Thus, summary disposition for defendant on the failure to warn claim was
appropriate. Plaintiff argues that even if defendant had no duty to warn, it had a duty to properly
instruct the users of its toy how to assemble the race car so as to avoid injury from the rubber band.
We find this argument duplicative of the failure to warn argument and conclude that it is without merit.
Plaintiff also argues that the toy was a defective and dangerous product for which defendant
should be held liable. In Mallard v Hoffinger Industries, Inc (On Remand), 222 Mich App 137,
141-143; 564 NW2d 74 (1997), we concluded that a manufacturer of a simple product is not required
to design safety features to protect users from dangers that are obvious and inherent in the utility of the
product. See Jamieson, supra at 37, Fisher v Johnson Milk Co, Inc, 383 Mich 158, 159-162; 174
NW2d 752 (1970), Owens v Allis-Chalmers Corp, 414 Mich 413, 423-425; 326 NW2d 372
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(1982), and Glittenberg, supra at 391-397. As we indicated earlier, the toy at issue was a simple
product. Moreover, any danger associated with it was open, obvious, and inherent in the utility of the
product. T
herefore, plaintiff's design defect claim was not viable as a matter of law, and summary
disposition with respect to it was properly granted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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