MARY DELANEY V MICHIGAN STATE UNIV
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARY DELANEY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 202391
Court of Claims
LC No. 95-015982 CM
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and McDonald and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10). We reverse and remand.
While attending a private wedding reception held in the Lincoln Room of defendant’s Kellogg
Center, plaintiff fell from a platform on which the head table sat sixteen inches above the floor. Plaintiff
filed suit against defendant, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate railings for the platform,
improper assembly, and inadequate illumination. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
granting summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10).
In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), this
Court must review the complaint to determine whether plaintiff has pleaded facts justifying application of
an exception to governmental immunity. Johnson v Detroit, 457 Mich 695, 700-701; 579 NW2d 895
(1998). The contents of the complaint are accepted as true unless specifically contradicted by affidavits
or other documentation submitted by the moving party. Sewell v Southfield Public Schools, 456 Mich
670, 674; 576 NW2d 153 (1998).
Because summary disposition was also granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), we must also
include consideration of the documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Patterson v Kleiman,
447 Mich 429; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests whether factual support exists for a claim. Panich v Iron Wood Products Corp, 179 Mich App
136, 139; 445 NW2d 795 (1989). In deciding such a motion, the trial court must consider the
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other admissible documentary evidence, MCR
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2.115(G)(5), and give the nonmoving party the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Porter v Royal
Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 484; 542 NW2d 905 (1995). The court’s task is to review the record
evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, and determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists to warrant a trial. Id. The grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is
reviewed de novo. McGuirk Sand & Gravel, Inc v Meridian Mut Ins Co, 220 Mich App 347, 352;
559 NW2d 93 (1996).
Pursuant to Const 1963, art 8, § 5,1 defendant Michigan State University is a governmental unit
that enjoys statutory governmental immunity from tort liability. MCL 691.1401(c), (d); MSA
3.996(101)(c), (d). MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1) provides in pertinent part that “[e]xcept
as otherwise provided in this act, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases
wherein the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”
“Governmental function” has been defined by the Legislature as “an activity which is expressly or
impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law.”
MCL 691.1401(f); MSA 3.996(101)(f). This definition has been broadly applied to require only that
“there be some constitutional, statutory, or other legal basis for the activity in which the governmental
agency was engaged.” Pawlak v Redox Corp, 182 Mich App 758, 764; 453 NW2d 304 (1990),
citing Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 253; 393 NW2d 847 (1986)
(emphasis in original). If an activity conducted by a governmental entity is considered a governmental
function, then such activity is immune from tort liability unless one of the exceptions to governmental
immunity applies. MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq.; Harris v Univ of Michigan Bd
of Regents, 219 Mich App 679, 684; 558 NW2d 225 (1996).
One such exception, pleaded herein by plaintiff, is the “proprietary function” exception set forth
in MCL 691.1413; MSA 3.996(113):
The immunity of the governmental agency shall not apply to actions to recover
for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the performance of a proprietary
function as defined in this section. Proprietary function shall mean any activity which is
conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary profit for the
governmental agency, excluding, however, any activity normally supported by taxes or
fees. No action shall be brought against the governmental agency for injury or property
damage arising out of the operation of a proprietary function, except for injury or loss
suffered on or after July 1, 1965.
In a recent opinion, Coleman v Kootsillas, 456 Mich 615, 621-622; 575 NW2d 527 (1998),
our Supreme Court articulated the appropriate analysis to be used in determining whether an activity is
proprietary in nature:
We previously held that the definition of proprietary function is clear and
unambiguous. Hyde [v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223; 393 NW2d
847 (1986)], supra at 257. Two tests must be satisfied: The activity (1) must be
conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary profit, and (2) it cannot
be normally supported by taxes and fees. Id. at 258.
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In determining whether the agency’s primary purpose is to produce a pecuniary
profit, we stated that certain considerations should be taken into account. The first is
whether a profit is actually generated.
“The fact that a governmental agency pursues an activity despite consistent
losses may be evidence that the primary purpose is not to make a pecuniary profit, but it
is not conclusive evidence. Conversely, the fact that the activity consistently generates a
profit may evidence an intent to produce a profit.” [Id. at 258 (citations omitted).]
The second consideration is “where the profit generated by the activity is
deposited and how it is spent.”
“If the profit is deposited in the governmental agency’s general fund or used to
finance unrelated functions, this could indicate that the activity at issue was intended to
be a general revenue-raising device. If the revenue is used only to pay current and long
range expenses involved in operating the activity, this could indicate that the primary
purpose of the activity was not to produce a pecuniary profit.” [Id. at 259 (citations
omitted).]
As this Court recognized in Harris, supra at 692:
[T]he broader and more extensive the definition of “governmental function,” the
less room there is for finding a proprietary function exception. Indeed . . . once the
governmental function analysis is made and it has been determined that the activity has
the indicia of a traditional governmental function, the conclusion is virtually inevitable that
the activity in question is not proprietary. However, we do not, and cannot, conclude
that for all cases a finding of governmental function forecloses any analysis of the
proprietary function exception.
The facts of the present case may indeed provide the unusual circumstances that allow for
application of the exception. On the one hand, defendant’s operation of the Kellogg Center has the
indicia of a traditional governmental function. As indicated in affidavits submitted by defendant in
support of its motion, the Kellogg Center is a residential learning and conference center that provides
both conventional and clinical learning opportunities to university students. It has meeting rooms, guest
rooms, a school of hospitality business laboratory and amphitheater, banquet rooms, and several
classrooms. The Kellogg Center houses defendant’s adult continuing education programs and the
academic and clinical undergraduate training program for the school of hospitality business students.
Many of the employees and interns at the Kellogg Center are students in the school of hospitality
program. The vice-provost for the university outreach program and defendant’s chief financial officer
both averred that the primary mission of the Kellogg Center was to provide lifelong education and
undergraduate training. The financial officer further averred that the Kellogg Center has operated with a
negative cash flow for the three fiscal years prior to 1997, but that if a month of revenue exceeds that
month’s operating expenses, surplus revenue would be used to offset any operating losses for the other
months and fund capital projects for maintaining the center. Hence, defendant argues that the Kellogg
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Center is engaged in training its college students in the area of hospitality management and its primary
purpose is therefore education, not pecuniary profit.
On the other hand, plaintiff alleges in her complaint that because the Lincoln Room in the
Kellogg Center was rented out for the purpose of a private wedding reception for which a fee was
obtained, defendant was engaged in a proprietary function, thus excepting it from statutory immunity.
Plaintiff argues that the Kellogg Center bears the hallmarks of a for-profit hotel. It operates similarly to,
and competes with, private hotels and conference centers in the area. The center hosts 1500 events
each year, nearly fifty percent of which are private bookings for seminars, conferences, or social events
such as the wedding reception attended by plaintiff in the Lincoln Room. The Kellogg Center charges
fees for these private functions. In support of her argument that the Kellogg Center was not conducted
primarily to meet defendant’s educational needs, but to produce a profit, plaintiff referenced the
deposition testimony2 of Joel Heberlein, Kellogg Center general manager since 1993. Heberlein
testified as to the goals of the Kellogg Center:
Q. So the Kellogg Center is operated primarily as a goal to make a profit?
Mr. Kiley: Objection. Mr Heberlein can only speak to what his goals are.
Q. (By Mr. Konheim): You are – then I’ll direct it to you. As general manager
of the Kellogg Center, the Kellogg Center is conducted primarily to make a profit;
correct, as you are general manager?
A. The facility is there as a continuing education facility for the University.
Q. And it also is being operated, as you said, in order to make a profit, and
that was one of your primarily [sic] goals coming in; correct?
A. As far as cash flow, to create a surplus?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. So you, as general manager, just you as general manager, operate the
Kellogg facility with a primary goal of making a profit; correct?
A. Yes.
Cogent to our consideration of plaintiff’s appeal is Dohm v Twp of Acme, 354 Mich 447; 93
NW2d 323 (1958), which precedes the current measure of a proprietary function but is nonetheless
pertinent and factually analogous. In Dohm, the plaintiff was attending a wedding anniversary
celebration at the Acme Township Hall. Plaintiff left the hall by a rear entrance for the purpose of going
to an outhouse maintained by the defendant township. While descending the steps, she fell and was
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injured. The Dohm Court, supra at 453-454, concluded that the township was engaged in the
exercise of a proprietary function:
In the case at bar it may be assumed that the town hall was erected primarily in
connection with the exercise of governmental functions of the township. The proofs in
the case disclose that approximately 6 meetings of the township board are held there
each year, and that elections are also conducted on the first floor of the building.
Obviously the use of the hall for the holding of an anniversary party of the character here
involved had no connection with the exercise of any governmental function. It was a
purely private transaction and of the character that the owner of a building adapted to
the holding of such gatherings might enter.
The fee charged in the instant case was small and the testimony indicates that
the premises, other than the second floor, are rented not more than 12 or 15 times per
year. . . . The testimony justified the inference that the money received from rentals is
sufficient to maintain the place for the proper carrying on of governmental functions
therein as well as for private parties. The amount of rental charged is not of controlling
significance. The determining factor is the nature and purpose of the use on the
occasion of the injury suffered by Mrs. Dohm. Such use was not in any way a part of,
or connected with, the exercise of a governmental function.
We conclude as to the transaction here in question that the township was
engaged in a proprietary activity and subject to liability on the ground of negligence in
failing to maintain the hall in a proper condition for use by the plaintiff Alta Marie Dohm
at the time of her injury.
In light of this relevant precedent and reviewing the evidence on record in this case and all
reasonable inferences arising therefrom, we conclude that, at this preliminary juncture in the present
proceedings, plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the activity in question at
the Kellogg Center was conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary profit so as to fall
within the proprietary function exception to governmental immunity. Under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and
(10), plaintiff has submitted allegations and proofs sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion for
summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity.
Plaintiff also argues on appeal that defendant’s use of the elevated platforms in the Lincoln
Room of the Kellogg Center for the wedding reception constituted a “building defect” within the scope
of the public building exception to statutory governmental immunity, MCL 691.1406; MSA
3.996(106). However, in her answer to defendant’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff conceded
and stipulated that the public building exception does not apply to her tort claim. As a result, the trial
court did not analyze whether the public building exception applied to these circumstances. Generally,
an issue i not properly preserved if it is not raised before and addressed by the trial court. Alford v
s
Pollution Control Inds, 222 Mich App 693, 699; 565 NW2d 9 (1997). Therefore, we decline to
address this issue on appeal.
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Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
1
Const 1963, art 8, § 5 provides in pertinent part:
[T]he trustees of Michigan State University and their successors in office shall
constitute a body corporate known as the Board of Trustees of Michigan State
University. . . . Each board shall have general supervision of its institution and the
control and direction of all expenditures from the institution’s funds.
2
Only two pages of Heberlein’s deposition testimony are contained in the lower court record.
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