PEOPLE OF MI V EILEEN M KLINE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 5, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 202932
Eaton Circuit Court
LC Nos. 96-000171 FH;
96-020354 FH
EILEEN M. KLINE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of five counts of embezzlement over $100,
MCL 750.174; MSA 28.371, and one count of attempted embezzlement over $100, MCL 750.174;
MSA 28.371. The trial court sentenced her to three years’ probation, with 150 days to be served in
jail. Defendant appeals as of right and we affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the prosecution, through its expert witness, John Bengel, improperly
interjected prejudicial statements that suggested that she was guilty of other, uncharged instances of
embezzlement. A trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion, People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 549; 581 NW2d 654 (1998), while a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed in context to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair
trial, People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266-267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
In People v McCartney, 46 Mich App 691, 692-693; 208 NW2d 547 (1973), a police
officer, who was a fingerprint expert, testified that he had recorded the defendant’s fingerprints on a
police print card two years before the charged crime, that the defendant’s inmate number was on the
card, and that such cards were used only in felony cases. This Court held (1) that the statements were
“improper and prejudicial”; (2) that even assuming, arguendo, that the statements were nonresponsive,
this assumption did not help the prosecution, since prosecutors have “a high degree of duty to insure
that police officers do not venture into forbidden areas in their testimony”; (3) that the curative
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instruction did not eliminate the prejudice; and (4) that because the curative instruction was ineffective,
the error was not “harmless beyond reasonable doubt.” Id. at 693-694.
We find the present case distinguishable from McCartney. First, Bengel’s statement that during
the investigation “we found that there were some instances back in 1993” did not necessarily imply that
defendant was suspected of other, uncharged acts of embezzlement. Bengel did not even indicate what
type of “instances” he found in 1993; if allowed to complete his sentence, he may have stated that there
had been some instances in 1993 for which defendant had been easily cleared and that he therefore did
not examine that year. Moreover, Bengel’s indication that he “was convinced that the[re] were
probably many more” acts of embezzlement was different in substance from a police officer’s testimony
that a defendant had been jailed during a felony investigation. In the latter case, the jury could infer that
police officers and prosecutors had examined the evidence, that the defendant had presented his side of
the story, and that the officials had decided there was probable cause to legally arrest and jail him,
whereas in the former case, the jury could infer only that one person suspected that there had been
more acts of embezzlement.
Second, the two statements to which defendant objects were nonresponsive answers made by a
non-police witness. In McCartney, supra at 694, this Court made a distinction between nonresponsive
answers of a police witness and nonresponsive answers of a non-police witness:
While we can sympathize with the prosecutors where witnesses other than
police officers blurt out volunteered and non-responsive answers, we are less
willing to overlook such responses when police officers are involved. We will not let the
prosecutor sit back and ask open-ended questions of police officers and then,
thereafter, deny culpability when the officer makes an inadmissible statement.
[Emphasis added.]
Because Bengel was not a police witness, because his allegedly prejudicial statements were not
responsive to the prosecutor’s questions, and because any prejudicial effect of the statements was
minimal, we conclude that Bengel’s comments did not deprive defendant of a fair trial such that a
reversal of her convictions is required.
II
Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support three of her convictions.
When determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, a court must
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of
fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
In People v Wood, 182 Mich App 50, 53; 451 NW2d 563 (1990), this Court stated:
According to CJI 27:1:01, the elements of embezzlement are: (A) the
money/personal property in question must belong to the principal; (B) the defendant
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must have had a relationship of trust with the principal because he was an agent,
servant, employee, trustee, bailee or custodian of the principal; (C) the money/personal
property in question must have come into the defendant’s possession or under his
charge or control because of that relationship of trust with the principal; (D) the
money/personal property must have been dishonestly disposed of or converted to the
defendant’s own use, or taken or secreted with intent to convert to his own use without
the consent of his principal; (E) this act must have been done without the consent of the
principal; (F) at the time of the conversion or appropriation to his own use the defendant
must have intended to defraud or cheat the principal of some property.
Defendant challenges elements D and F.
The evidence establishing that defendant (the former deputy treasurer of Eaton County)
intentionally took for her own use $1,252.53 from the Waverly School District and State of Michigan
checks (count II) is as follows: (1) the treasurer’s office had no record that either of these checks had
been receipted; (2) the Waverly Schools had not received a receipt for the check; (3) the checks were
deposited by the treasurer’s office on December 12, 1995; (4) the amount of cash deposited by the
treasurer’s office on this date was $1,252.53 less than the cash receipts for that day, and this amount
equaled the sum of the two checks; (5) according to Alvin Starr, defendant’s boss, defendant would
have been the person who would have initially received the Waverly check; (6) defendant was
sometimes given State of Michigan checks when they came into the office; (7) defendant prepared the
deposit on December 12, 1995; and (8) defendant had $24,000 in credit card debt and was sometimes
late in making her payments. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant
took at least $1,051.95 (the amount of the Waverly check) for her own use from the treasurer’s office.
Even though the evidence was arguably insufficient to establish that defendant took $200.58
representing the State of Michigan check (because no testimony established that defendant would
definitely have received this check initially), this does not invalidate defendant’s conviction on count II,
because the monetary threshold for felonious embezzlement is only $100. MCL 750.174; MSA
28.371; Wood, supra at 52-53.
The evidence establishing that defendant intentionally took $1,253.21 for her own use,
representing the Windsor Township check (count III), is as follows: (1) a State Education Tax (SET)
check from Windsor Township in the amount of $1,253.21 had been deposited by the treasurer’s office
on December 6, 1995; (2) defendant was working on December 6, 1995; (3) according to Starr, SET
checks were “most often” given to defendant; (4) according to the treasurer’s office records, the
Windsor check, along with a $9 and a $1 check, had not been receipted, and the amount of cash
deposited on December 6 was $1,263.21 (the sum of the three checks) less than the amount of cash
that had been receipted; (5) the Windsor Township treasurer did not receive a receipt for the SET
check; (6) the check was listed on the Windsor township settlement worksheet that defendant
prepared; and (7) defendant could not explain what happened to the record from which she would have
gleaned the information regarding that check. This evidence, along with the testimony regarding
defendant’s financial status, was sufficient to establish that defendant intentionally took $1,253.21 for
her own use.
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The evidence establishing that defendant intentionally took $2,107.86 for her own use,
representing the City of Lansing check (count VI), is as follows: (1) a $2,107.86 SET check from the
City of Lansing was deposited by the treasurer’s office on January 11, 1995; (2) no record of a receipt
for this check could be found; (3) the amount of cash deposited on January 11, 1995 was $2,107.86
less than the total cash receipts; (4) defendant prepared a settlement worksheet that listed the
$2,107.86 check; (5) the worksheet listed the check as having been received on September 12, 1994,
whereas it had not even been issued until January 10, 1995; and (6) defendant claimed she wrote the
wrong date on the worksheet because of human error. This evidence, along with the testimony
regarding defendant’s financial status, was sufficient to establish that defendant intentionally took
$2,107.86 for her own use, since she prepared a settlement worksheet on which the check, with an
incorrect date, was listed, even though the treasurer’s office had no receipt for the check.
III
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in qualifying John Bengel as an expert witness in
“fraud examination.” Whether a witness is qualified to render an expert opinion is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court. Mulholland v DEC Int’l Corp, 432 Mich 395, 402; 443 NW2d 340
(1989).
A witness may be qualified as an expert by virtue of “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education.” MRE 702; Mulholland, supra at 403. Here, Bengel had experience and training, because
he had performed over one hundred fraud examinations and had received training in the area of fraud
examination. Moreover, he had an undergraduate degree in business administration and he gave
biannual presentations in the area of fraud examination, which was evidence of his knowledge and skill.
Finally, that he was not certified as an accountant did not defeat his ability to testify as an expert,
because licensing is not a requirement for expert witnesses. Id. at 403-406. Given that Bengel had
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, education” in the area of fraud examination, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in qualifying him as an expert in that area.
Defendant additionally argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing any expert
testimony regarding fraud examination. Defendant did not object below as to the admissibility of
testimony in the area of fraud examination, thus this issue is not preserved for appellate review.
Moreover, the testimony was properly admitted. See King v Taylor Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 184
Mich App 204, 215; 457 NW2d 42 (1990).
IV
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present evidence
of defendant’s credit card debt. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Smith, supra, at 549. We conclude that having $24,000 of credit card debt on more than
ten different credit cards is an unusual financial condition, evidence of which was admissible, under
People v Henderson, 408 Mich 56; 289 NW2d 376 (1980), to show why defendant, in her
managerial position, would breach her employer’s trust and risk losing her job by embezzling money.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of defendant’s credit card debt at trial.
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V
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor, during closing argument, improperly interjected his
personal belief that defendant had lied on the witness stand. Defendant did not object to this alleged
incident of prosecutorial misconduct at trial. Appellate review of allegedly improper prosecutorial
remarks is generally precluded absent an objection unless a curative instruction could not have
eliminated the prejudicial effect or where failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of
justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Here, the allegedly
improper statement was nothing more than a reasonable inference based on the evidence introduced at
trial. Therefore, the statement does not mandate reversal of defendant’s convictions.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
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