SUE A PORTER V DEPT OF EDUCATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SUE A. PORTER,
UNPUBLISHED
March 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 206721
WCAC
LC No. 00000203
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
and MICHIGAN ACCIDENT FUND,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Markman, P.J., and Jansen and J. B. Sullivan*, JJ.
MARKMAN, P.J., (dissenting).
.
I would affirm the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) and therefore
respectfully dissent. In my judgment, the WCAC did not misapprehend its role in reviewing the
judgment of the magistrate, Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 267-69; 484 NW2d 227
(1992); it was duly cognizant of the deference to be given to the decision of the magistrate, id.; it did not
misunderstand or grossly apply the substantial evidence standard, id.; and it offered an adequate reason
grounded in the record for reversing the magistrate. Id. Therefore, our “judicial tendency” should be to
affirm “in recognition that the Legislature provided for administrative appellate review by the seven
member WCAC . . . and bestowed on the WCAC final fact-finding responsibility” subject only to
“constitutionally limited judicial review.” Id. Because it is not “manifest that the WCAC exceeded its
reviewing power,” we are obligated to defer to its judgment. Id.
The majority, in my judgment, would engage this Court in a far broader review of the WCAC’s
decision. Theirs is not a “determination of error manifest in the WCAC’s decision itself”, but rather is
based upon a “determination, directly contrary to the findings of the WCAC, that the magistrate’s
findings were in fact supported by requesite, competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole
record.” York v Wayne County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 219 Mich App 370, 379-80; 556 NW2d 882
(1996)(emphasis supplied).
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Among the facts evaluated here by the WCAC were (1) plaintiff’s history of alcohol and drug
abuse; (2) plaintiff’s history of psychiatric care and medication; (3) plaintiff’s specific mental condition
variously described as a “bipolar disorder” or “manic depressiveness” by psychiatrists; (4) psychiatric
testimony that plaintiff’s mental condition was susceptible to being triggered “without any stressful
precipitants”; (5) psychiatric testimony that plaintiff is the “type of individual that tends to blame her
problems on others and virtually has no personal insight”; (6) psychiatric testimony that “there is no
connection between [plaintiff’s] employment history and her psychiatric symptoms”; (7) plaintiff’s two
nervous breakdowns; (8) plaintiff’s history of serious family trauma, including a nephew who was
charged with murdering five people and a brother apparently addicted to heroin; (9) plaintiff’s history of
extended medical leaves of absence, for both psychiatric and non-psychiatric purposes; and (10)
plaintiff’s two rapes and subsequent abortions.
The WCAC’s responsibility in this case was to determine whether plaintiff’s employment had
“significantly” affected her mental illness, by analyzing relevant occupational and non-occupational
factors. Gardner v Van Buren Public Schools, 445 Mich 23, 47, 49-50; 517 NW2d 1 (1994).
After evaluating the circumstances set forth above, as well as allegations of “harassment” of plaintiff by
her work supervisors -- the latter described by the WCAC as consisting largely of memos written
“calling plaintiff’s attention to the fact that she had too many aged files . . . and warning that her work
performance had to be improved or she would be subject to disciplinary procedures” -- the WCAC
concluded that it had not. In my judgment, the WCAC did not err, much less abuse its discretion, in
making this determination.
Nor did the WCAC err, as the majority suggests, in failing to treat plaintiff’s tortured history
merely as a “pre-existing” condition, the entirety of which suddenly lost its status as a nonemployment
condition once plaintiff ventured into the workplace. The problem, of course, is that mental conditions,
“pre-existing” or otherwise, continue to impose their burdens and symptoms upon individuals even after
job applications are accepted. Such conditions are not peremptorily transformed into “employment”
conditions through the receipt of a paycheck. While, as time passes, it may well be that preexisting
mental conditions become so intertwined with work-related stresses that it becomes increasingly difficult
to separate the two, it nevertheless is incumbent under the law that they be separated. This is what the
WCAC has reasonably sought to do here.
I would, therefore, affirm.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
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