PEOPLE OF MI V CRAIG D GILMORE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204718
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-007412
CRAIG D. GILMORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markman, P.J., and Jansen and J. B. Sullivan*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). A jury
acquitted defendant of second-degree murder, but convicted him of felony-firearm. He was sentenced
to two years’ imprisonment and granted bond pending appeal. Defendant appeals as of right and we
affirm.
This case arises from an incident that occurred on Labor Day of 1996. Ongoing conflicts and
tensions between neighbors culminated that night in defendant shooting Martha Finklea in the back and
killing her.
Defendant first argues that the jury instructions failed to inform the jury that it could not convict
defendant of felony-firearm unless it found that he committed or attempted to commit the underlying
felony. Because defendant failed to object to the trial court’s instructions in this regard, relief may be
granted only in a case of manifest injustice. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 545; 494 NW2d
737 (1993).
The elements of the crime of felony-firearm are (1) that the defendant possessed a firearm, (2)
while committing or attempting to commit a felony. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 53; 549
NW2d 1 (1996). The jury “may and should” be instructed that it may not convict a defendant of
felony-firearm unless it finds that he committed or attempted the underlying felony. People v Lewis,
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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415 Mich 443, 455; 330 NW2d 16 (1982). However, it would be error to instruct the jury that there
must be a conviction on the underlying felony before the jury can convict a defendant of felony-firearm.
Id. at 454.
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the jury instruction regarding the felony-firearm charge in
this case complies with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Lewis. The trial court instructed the jury that it
could not convict defendant of felony-firearm unless it found that he either attempted or committed a
felony. The trial court read the felony-firearm instruction almost verbatim, omitting only the sentence
that states it is not necessary for a defendant to be actually convicted of the underlying crime. This
omission could not have prejudiced defendant. Thus, the trial court did not err in its felony-firearm
instruction. Therefore, the jury instructions did not result in manifest injustice.
Defendant next argues that his felony-firearm conviction was improper because the jury’s finding
of not guilty on the second-degree murder charge clearly revealed that the jury believed the underlying
felony had not been attempted or committed.
As has been stated, a felony-firearm conviction requires a finding that the defendant either
committed the underlying felony, or attempted to do so. Davis, supra, p 53. However, the mere fact
that a jury acquits on the underlying felony does not preclude it from finding a defendant guilty of felony
firearm. People v Burgess, 419 Mich 305, 310; 353 NW2d 444 (1984). This is because Michigan
law does not require consistency of jury verdicts in criminal cases. People v Torres, 452 Mich 43, 75;
549 NW2d 540 (1996). The rationale behind allowing inconsistent jury verdicts is that demanding
rationally consistent verdicts would interfere with the jury’s power to exercise leniency. Id.
The Michigan Supreme Court addressed this issue at length in Lewis, supra at 446. In Lewis,
the Court rejected the exact argument that defendant now makes, holding that the jury’s acquittal on the
underlying felony did not necessarily mean the jury found that the defendant did not commit or attempt
the felony. Id. The Court explained that the inconsistent verdict could just as easily be read as an
implicit finding that the defendants did commit the felonies with which they were charged, but the juries
wished to be lenient. Id. at 452. Therefore, the argument that an element of felony-firearm is missing
because the jury never found a committed or attempted felony is not one requiring reversal. Id. at 455.
Conviction of an underlying felony is not an element of felony-firearm. Id. The jury in this case may
have been extending leniency to defendant, but it does not follow that it intended defendant to be freed
from all consequences of killing the victim. See id. at 449-450.
Defendant relies on Burgess, supra at 305 to support his argument. However, Burgess is
inapposite to the case at bar because there, the jury verdict had rendered a consistent verdict when it
convicted the defendant of both assault and felony-firearm. Id. at 306. This Court affirmed the felony
firearm charge despite the error that required reversal on the underlying felony. The Supreme Court
held that an appellate court cannot reverse a substantive felony conviction and allow the felony-firearm
conviction to stand when the error pertaining to the substantive conviction means that the jury’s finding
of fact that the defendant committed the underlying felony can no longer be relied upon. Id. at 312. By
allowing the felony-firearm conviction to stand after the assault charge had been reversed due to error, it
was the appellate court, and not the jury, that created the inconsistency. Id. at 310-312. The rule of
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law in Burgess is, quite simply, that an appellate court may not create an inconsistency in the verdict
where none existed before. In this case, the jury created any inconsistent verdict, which it has the
power to do, and affirmation of defendant’s felony-firearm conviction does not violate Burgess.
Accordingly, defendant’s argument that his acquittal on the underlying felony invalidates his felony
firearm conviction is without merit.
Defendant also argues that Lewis was wrongly decided and should be overturned. This Court,
and all lower courts, are bound by decisions of the Supreme Court until those decisions are overruled or
modified by the Supreme Court. Boyd v W G Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515, 523; 505 NW2d 544
(1993). This Court does not have the power or authority to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lewis. Because the Supreme Court has not overruled Lewis, it is valid and binding precedent and must
be applied to this case. Boyd, supra at 523. Thus, any argument in this regard must be directed to the
Supreme Court.
Finally, we order that defendant’s bond pending appeal be revoked immediately.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
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