PEOPLE OF MI V JERMAINE JAMAL ALLEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203502
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 96-01193-FC
JERMAINE JAMAL ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., Saad and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The People charged Jermaine Jamal Allen with assault with intent to commit murder, MCL
750.83; MSA 28.278, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6),
carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The jury acquitted defendant of the assault
charge, but convicted him on the other three charges. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm
defendant’s convictions, but remand for a new sentencing hearing.
This case arises from a shooting that occurred on November 22, 1995. Defendant and the
victim, Everette Taylor, saw each other outside a party store. The two men had been members of rival
gangs, the Cherry Street Boys and Kalamazoo Boys. Defendant shot Taylor several times. Defendant
admitted the shooting, but claimed he acted in self-defense. The jury acquitted defendant of assault with
intent to commit murder, but found defendant guilty of the other three offenses with which he was
charged. On April 21, 1997, the court sentenced defendant to two years’ imprisonment on the felony
firearm conviction and five- to 7 ½ years’-imprisonment on the CCW and felon in possession
convictions, with all sentences served concurrently. On May 28, 1997, the court entered an amended
judgment, providing that the felon in possession and CCW sentences were to be served consecutively
to the felony-firearm sentence.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in (1) instructing the jury on felony-firearm that its
verdict need not be consistent with its verdict in the underlying felony, assault with intent to commit
murder, and (2) failing to include a separate instruction on self-defense for felony-firearm. We disagree.
Defendant failed to object to the jury instructions. The failure to object to jury instructions waives the
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alleged error unless relief is necessary to avoid manifest injustice. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich
540, 544-545; 494 NW2d 737 (1993). This Court reviews jury instructions in their entirety to
determine whether there is error requiring reversal. People v Whitney, 228 Mich App 230, 252; 578
NW2d 329 (1998). Even if jury instructions are imperfect, there is no error if they fairly presented the
issues to be tried and sufficiently protected a defendant’s rights. Id. A jury in a criminal case may reach
different conclusions concerning an identical element of two different offenses. People v Goss (After
Remand), 446 Mich 587, 597; 521 NW2d 312 (1994). Defendant argues that the felony-firearm
instruction as given authorizes a logically inconsistent verdict. However, juries are not held to any rules
of logic. For example, juries have the power to acquit as a matter of leniency. People v Lewis, 415
Mich 443, 449; 330 NW2d 16 (1982). More specifically, a jury may decide to acquit a defendant of
an underlying offense even though it believes beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of that
offense: The jury may decide instead to extend mercy by convicting defendant of only what the jury
considered to be a lesser offense. Id., 451. We cannot conclude, as defendant argues here, that the
challenged instruction tells the jurors they have the right to ignore the court’s instructions. Rather, the
instruction only told the jury to consider the felony-firearm charge separately from the assault charge.
We see no error in this charge.
Nor can we conclude that defendant was entitled to a separate instruction for self-defense for
the felony-firearm count. The purpose of the felony-firearm statute is to reduce the possibility of injury
to victims, passersby, and police officers in the course of a felony. People v Williams, 212 Mich App
607, 609; 538 NW2d 89 (1995). It would frustrate the purpose of the felony-firearm statute to allow
an independent defense of self-defense. To the extent that defendant argues that the instruction as given
misled the jury into believing that it could not consider self-defense in deciding whether defendant had
committed assault as an element of felony-firearm, we disagree. The fairness of a jury charge cannot be
assessed in a purely mechanical matter. People v Butler, 413 Mich 377, 388; 319 NW2d 540
(1982). This Court must examine the charge as a whole, rather than piecemeal, to determine if error
exists. People v Vaughn, 447 Mich 217, 232; 524 NW2d 217 (1994). The instructions in this case
could reasonably be understood to require the jury to consider self-defense in the assault, both as a
substantive offense and as an element of the felony-firearm count. We are not convinced otherwise by
the fact that defendant was acquitted of assault but convicted of felony-firearm. A jury can reach
inconsistent verdicts. Lewis, supra, 415 Mich 449. While not a model of clarity, the instructions as
given fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. Whitney,
supra, 228 Mich App 252-253.
In a related argument, defendant claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel because
defense counsel failed to object to the jury charge on the grounds discussed above. Because we find no
error in the jury charge, we cannot find counsel ineffective on these grounds.
Defendant also argues that his felon in possession conviction must be vacated because it
infringes on his right under the Michigan Constitution to keep and bear arms. Const 1963, art 1, § 6.
This Court has found the felon in possession statute, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.424(6), constitutional in
the face of an identical challenge. People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 374-375; 571 NW2d 666
(1997). Defendant asks that we reconsider our decision in Swint. However, unless the Supreme Court
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were to rule otherwise, Swint is a binding precedent on this Court. MCR 7.215(c). Furthermore, we
see nothing in defendant’s argument to convince us that Swint should be revisited.
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in (1) entering an amended judgment when
the original sentence was valid and (2) even if the original sentence was invalid, in entering the amended
sentence without a sentencing hearing. We disagree with defendant’s claim that the original sentence
was valid on the grounds raised by defendant, but agree that a sentencing hearing was required. A
court may correct an invalid sentence, but the court may not modify a valid sentence after it has been
imposed except as provided by law. MCR 6.429(A). Defendant claims that the original sentence was
valid because there is no authority for having a firearm possession offense serve as the underlying felony
for a felony-firearm conviction. The Supreme Court has held contrary to defendant’s position. People
v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 697; 575 NW2d 283 (1998). As the Supreme Court has noted, there are
four offenses that cannot serve as the underlying offense for a felony-firearm conviction: unlawful sale of
pistols or firearms, MCL 750.223; MSA 28.420; carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA
28.424; unlawful possession of a pistol by a licensee, MCL 750.227a; MSA 28.424(1); and alteration,
removal, or obliteration of identification on a firearm, MCL 750.230; MSA 28.427. The legislative
history of the statute reflects a commitment to reach all but the excepted felonies. Mitchell, supra, 697.
In this case, the CCW charge cannot serve as the underlying felony for the felony-firearm charge;
however, the felon in possession charge can serve as an underlying felony. Defendant’s argument as to
the legal theory on which the sentence was invalid is without merit.
However, we agree that the original sentence was valid. Absent statutory authority, consecutive
sentences may not be imposed. People v Sawyer, 410 Mich 531, 534; 302 NW2d 534 (1981);
People v Alvarado, 192 Mich App 718, 720; 481 NW2d 822 (1992). MCL 750.227b(2); MSA
28.424(2)(2) provides that a felony-firearm sentence be served consecutively to the felony or attempt to
commit the felony. The statutory language makes clear that the intent behind the provision is to add to
the time a defendant must serve by having the defendant serve his felony-firearm charge consecutively to
the sentence in the underlying felony. Here, defendant was charged with possession of a firearm in the
course of committing an assault with intent to commit murder. He was acquitted of the underlying
felony. As a result, the court was correct when it originally concluded that it was required to assess
concurrent sentences in all three cases.
Further, we agree with defendant that the trial court was required to conduct a sentencing
hearing when it issued the new sentence. A hearing is required for resentencing pursuant to MCR
6.429(A). People v Thomas, 223 Mich App 9, 17; 566 NW2d 13 (1997). Plaintiff agrees that
remand for a resentencing hearing is called for.
Finally, defendant contends that he is entitled to 272 days’ credit for time served. Defendant
was arrested on January 18, 1996 and released on bond on May 4, 1996. On July 24, 1996, he was
arrested again. At the original sentencing hearing on April 21, 1997, the court directed that the sentence
commence on July 24, 1996, with an additional 108 days’ credit for time served. In the amended
sentence, the 108 days’ credit appeared; however, the language concerning commencement of sentence
was removed. A defendant who is unable to post bond must be awarded credit for all time served in
jail before sentencing. MCL 769.11b; MSA 28.1083(2); People v Lyons (After Remand), 222 Mich
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App 319, 321; 564 NW2d 114 (1997). A defendant is entitled to bond only for time served as a result
of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted. People v Adkins,
433 Mich 732, 746; 449 NW2d 400 (1989). The amended judgment of sentence does not say why
the language dealing with commencement of sentence on July 24, 1996 was deleted. We direct the trial
court to recompute defendant’s credit for time served.
Remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. We affirm in all other respects.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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