MICHAEL D GREGORY V CINCINNATI INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL D. GREGORY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 23, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 198382
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 86-627406 CZ
CINCINNATI, INC., and ADDY-MORAND
MACHINERY CO.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CRUM & FORSTER,
Intervening Plaintiff.
MICHAEL D. GREGORY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 199691
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 86-627406 CZ
CINCINNATI, INC., and ADDY-MORAND
MACHINERY CO.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CRUM & FORSTER,
Intervening Plaintiff.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Doctoroff and Saad, JJ.
-1
CAVANAGH, P.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the trial court correctly denied defendants’ motion for
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Although the majority does not reach this
issue, I also believe that the trial court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for remittitur of
prejudgment interest.
In my opinion, plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence concerning the magnitude of the risks and
the reasonableness of the proposed alternative designs. See Reeves v Cincinnati, Inc, 176 Mich App
181, 187-188; 439 NW2d 326 (1989). With regard to the magnitude of the risk, plaintiff presented
numerous documents from governmental and industry organizations which stated that the press brake
was a very dangerous machine and that the most common accidents to its operators were hand and
finger injuries. Contrary to defendants’ argument, a “showing of the magnitude of foreseeable risks,”
see id., does not require statistical evidence when, as here, there is sufficient evidence of the likelihood
of this type of accident occurring.
In addition, plaintiff presented evidence of numerous recommendations by the government and
the industry prior to 1964 that safety devices be built into the press brake to prevent such accidents.
Plaintiff’s expert testified that these safety devices were available in 1964 and would have been
compatible with defendants’ press brake. Thus, the trial court correctly denied defendants’ motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because factual questions existed upon which reasonable minds
could differ. See Alar v Mercy Memorial Hosp, 208 Mich App 518, 524; 529 NW2d 318 (1995).
Furthermore, I would uphold the trial court’s decision to deny defendants’ motion for remittitur
as to prejudgment interest during the time of the first appeal of this matter. In defendants’ previous
appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. Thus, defendants cannot be considered
a prevailing party because they did not prevail on the entire record in their prior appeal. See MCR
2.625(B)(2).
I would affirm.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
-2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
