D CRAIG HENRY V JUDITH MARIE BAUM
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
D. CRAIG HENRY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 200396
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 95-179333 DO
JUDITH MARIE BAUM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Neff and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce. We affirm.
The parties were married in 1990. Plaintiff, a self-employed attorney, earned in excess of
$100,000 a year. Defendant, an executive secretary, earned approximately $50,000 a year. They
spent lavishly and accumulated substantial debts. Defendant vacated the marital home in 1995, taking
most of the furnishings with her.
The trial court found that both parties were at fault for the breakdown of the marriage. It
awarded each party the property they brought to the marriage, the personal items they had in their
possession (with three exceptions), and the debts each had in his or her own name. It required plaintiff
to assume responsibility for a tax deficiency and declined to award defendant the entire $108,000 in
cash that she brought to the marriage, finding that she was only entitled to the $60,000 she had invested
in plaintiff’s home.
Defendant contends that the trial court made erroneous findings of fact, resulting in an unfair and
inequitable distribution of the property. In reviewing a dispositional ruling in a divorce case, this Court
first reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and then decides whether the dispositional
ruling was fair and equitable in light of the facts. Dispositional rulings will be affirmed unless this Court is
left with the firm conviction that the distribution was inequitable. Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App
278, 292; 527 NW2d 792 (1995).
-1
The court may distribute all property, or the value thereof, that has “come to either party by
reason of the marriage . . . .” MCL 552.19; MSA 25.99. “The goal of the court when apportioning a
marital estate is to reach an equitable division in light of all the circumstances.” Byington v Byington,
224 Mich App 103, 114; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). “Each spouse need not receive a mathematically
equal share, but significant departures from congruence must be explained clearly by the court.” Id. at
114-115. Among the factors to be considered are the source of the property; the parties’ contributions
toward its acquisition and to the general marital estate; the duration of the marriage; the parties’ needs
and circumstances; the parties’ ages, health, life status, and earning abilities; the cause of the divorce as
well as past relations and conduct between the parties; interruption of the career or education of either
party; and general principles of equity. Hanaway, supra at 292-293.
The trial court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. The record contains ample support
for the trial court’s finding that both parties spent more than they could afford. While defendant showed
that she incurred expenses of at least $75,000 to retire a second mortgage on, and for improvements to,
plaintiff’s home, she did not show that her separate funds were used to pay the entire amount.
Moreover, the evidence regarding fault created a credibility contest between the parties. Because
“[c]redibility is a factor which the trial court alone may determine,” Snyder v Snyder, 42 Mich App
573, 578; 202 NW2d 504 (1972), its finding that both parties were at fault is not clearly erroneous.
Finally, in light of all the circumstances, we find that the trial court’s division of the assets was fair and
equitable.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
-2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
