PEOPLE OF MI V RENARDO FRED LANE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203169
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 96-001019 FC
RENARDO FRED LANE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Saad and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316;
MSA 28.548, assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, and two counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The
assault conviction and associated felony firearm conviction were subsequently vacated on double
jeopardy grounds, and defendant was then sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment for the first-degree
murder conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals by
right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the shooting death of Mark Bowser who, along with Jajuan
Williams, was selling crack cocaine from the house of Charles Ellis Jackson. Also present in the home
were Jackson’s three children and their mother, Phyllis Goodwin.
On the evening of the shooting, defendant came to Jackson’s house, recognized Bowser as his
cousin, and the two had a conversation in the kitchen. Jajuan overheard defendant say that he intended to
rob some dope houses, and Bowser replied that that was “stupid.” Phyllis Goodwin overheard
defendant say that Bowser was his cousin, and defendant intended to kill him. She went upstairs and told
Jackson to get defendant out of the house. Defendant left shortly thereafter.
Jajuan and Bowser then went upstairs and smoked some marijuana. Defendant subsequently
returned to the house, went upstairs, and began arguing with Bowser. Jajuan, who had been sleeping,
was awakened by the argument. Defendant pointed a gun at Jajuan and told him to get his hands out of
his pockets. Defendant then pointed the gun at Bowser and demanded cocaine. Bowser gave his
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cocaine to defendant. Defendant next demanded money. Bowser said he didn't have any money.
Jackson arrived and saw defendant pointing the gun at Bowser. Defendant said he would shoot Bowser
in the leg if he refused to turn over his money. Again, Bowser said he had no money. Defendant
responded, “I’ll give you three seconds.” Defendant then shot Bowser, who pulled out a gun and
exchanged gunfire. Jajuan jumped behind the bed.
Phyllis Goodwin testified that, from another bedroom, she heard a voice say, “I don't have any
money.” She recognized defendant’s voice and heard him say, “I’ve only got two minutes. Give it to me,
I’ll blow your brains out.” Then she heard one shot and more quick shots.
After the shooting began, defendant ran out of the house. Bowser was shot in the chest. He
tried to go down the stairs but collapsed part-way down. Bowser was dead when the police and
medical units arrived.
Willie Holmes, defendant’s cousin, testified that on the evening of the shooting, defendant broke
into his house and ran into the bedroom where Holmes was sleeping. Defendant looked shocked and
surprised. At trial, Holmes testified that defendant told him that he “thinks somebody got shot.”
According to Detective Walters, however, Holmes gave a statement claiming that defendant stated, “I
just shot somebody.” Holmes then told defendant to leave his house. Later, Holmes found defendant’s
jacket in his backyard and threw it in the trash.
On the first day of trial, defendant moved for a two-week continuance in order to review a
transcript of Jackson’s statement to police. The statement was taken shortly after the incident but was
being transcribed just before trial. The court agreed to delay trial for one day. Defendant renewed his
request for a two-week continuance the following day, again asserting that he needed more time to
properly review the statement and adequately prepare to cross-examine and impeach Jackson. The
trial court denied the motion upon finding that nothing in the statement warranted further adjournment
and that defendant had ample time to consider the information.
Defendant now argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for an
additional continuance, thereby requiring reversal of his convictions. We disagree. Defendant has not
demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s denial of his request. MCL 769.26; MSA
28.1096; City of Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 350-351; 539 NW2d 781 (1995).
Jackson did not testify until the third day of trial, thus providing defense counsel with more time to
review the transcript and prepare for his cross-examination of Jackson. Also, in his cross-examination
of Jackson, defense counsel successfully elicited testimony that Jackson admittedly lied to the police
about several facts. Further, considering the overwhelming evidence against defendant, it is highly
improbable that the denial of a continuance contributed to the verdict. People v Gearns, 457 Mich
170, 203-205; 577 NW2d 422 (1998); see, generally, People v Minor, 213 Mich App 682, 685
686; 541 NW2d 576 (1995). Thus, the trial court’s denial of his request for an additional continuance
did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Hartsuff, supra.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter. We disagree. When requested by a party, a standard jury instruction must be
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given if it is requested, applicable, and accurately states the law. MCR 2.516(D)(2). Where the facts
do not warrant an instruction, however, the trial court need not give it. People v Piper, 223 Mich App
642, 648; 567 NW2d 483 (1997). We agree with the trial court that the evidence did not support an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Viewed most favorably to defendant, the facts do not establish
the required element of provocation necessary to support an instruction for manslaughter. People v
Hess, 214 Mich App 33, 38; 543 NW2d 332 (1995). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Detective Walters to testify that
Willie Holmes told him defendant said, “I just shot somebody.” Because defendant did not object to
this testimony at trial, review of this issue is foreclosed absent manifest injustice. People v Welch, 226
Mich App 461, 463; 574 NW2d 682 (1997). Here, the testimony was offered to impeach Holmes’
earlier testimony wherein Holmes claimed defendant had merely stated that he “thinks somebody got
shot.” Moreover, the exception set forth in People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 692-693; 521 NW2d
557 (1994), to the general rule that evidence of a prior inconsistent statement may be admitted to
impeach a witness, even though the statement tends directly to inculpate the defendant, is not applicable
here.
The rule set forth in People v Stanaway is that the impeachment should be disallowed
when (1) the substance of the statement purportedly used to impeach the credibility of
the witness is relevant to the central issue of the case, and (2) there is no other testimony
from the witness for which his credibility was relevant to the case. [People v Kilbourn,
454 Mich 677, 682-683; 563 NW2d 669 (1997).]
Because Holmes’ credibility is relevant to his other proffered testimony regarding finding a jacket he
believed to be defendant’s in his backyard and regarding his broken back door, Detective Walters’
impeachment testimony was proper. Kilbourn, supra. Accordingly, manifest injustice will not result
from our failure to review this issue.
Finally, we conclude that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. People
v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670,
672; 528 NW2d 842 (1995). In the absence of a Ginther hearing, we find that the record does not
support defendant’s contention that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness or deprived him of a fair trial. People v Stewart (On Remand), 219 Mich App 38, 42;
555 NW2d 715 (1996); Barclay, supra.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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