PEOPLE OF MI V DENNIS MICHAEL URSUY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 202968
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 96-012321 FC
DENNIS MICHAEL URSUY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and MacKenzie, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, conspiracy to
commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), and habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL
769.12; MSA 28.1084. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of accessory after the fact to
armed robbery (hereinafter” accessory after the fact”), MCL 750.505; MSA 28.773. He was
sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, to two to fifteen years’ imprisonment. We reverse
and remand for a new trial.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the crime of accessory
after the fact. Defendant asserts that the prosecution’s late request for the jury instruction deprived him
of adequate notice that he would have to defend against the crime, which he argues is not a cognate
lesser included offense of armed robbery. The prosecution concedes both that accessory after the fact
is not a cognate lesser included offense of armed robbery, and that the instruction at issue was
improper. Nevertheless, the prosecution argues that reversal is unwarranted given that pursuant to
MCL 767.76; MSA 28.1016,1 the charge of accessory after the fact could have been added to the
information. The prosecution also argues that defendant has failed to show how he would have
proceeded differently at trial had he been notified earlier that he would be facing the accessory after the
fact charge.
We are unpersuaded by the prosecution’s argument. Although the prosecution could have
amended the information before trial, see People v Hunt, 442 Mich 359, 364; 501 NW2d 151
(1993); People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 17; 507 NW2d 763 (1993), it did not do so. Further,
under the circumstances, we conclude that it is reasonable to assume that defendant would have
-1
approached trial with a different strategy had he been informed at a proper time that he would need to
defend against the accessory after the fact charge. By giving the instruction after the close of proofs,
defendant was effectively denied the opportunity to defend against the accessory after the fact charge.2
See People v Adams, 202 Mich App 385, 392; 509 NW2d 530 (1993).3 As the Adams Court
wisely observed, “once the trial is completed, or even nearly completed, it is difficult, if not impossible,
for the defendant to adjust his trial strategy to encompass the newly added offense.” Id. at 391.
We also find the prosecution’s reliance on Hunt and Fortson to be misplaced. In both of those
cases, the Courts were faced with the issue of whether an information could be amended after a
preliminary examination, but before the presentation of proofs at trial. Hunt, supra at 363-365;
Fortson, supra at 15-17. Characterizing the giving of the disputed jury instruction in the case at hand
as an “amendment,” the prosecution urges this Court to stretch the rule of Hunt and Fortson so that it
will encompass the situation at hand. We reject this invitation. Such an extension of the Hunt/Fortson
rule would, in effect, eviscerate a defendant’s right to meet the charges being brought against him.
Therefore, we hold that the giving of the accessory after the fact instruction was error requiring
reversal. Because we are reversing and remanding for a new trial, it is unnecessary for us to address
defendant’s remaining issues on appeal.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
1
MCL 767.76; MSA 28.1016 reads in pertinent part:
The court may at any time before, during or after the trial amend the indictment in
respect to any defect, imperfection or omission in form or substance or of any variance
with the evidence. If any amendment be made to the substance of the indictment or to
cure a variance between the indictment and the proof, the accused shall on his motion
be entitled to a discharge of the jury, if a jury has been impaneled and to a reasonable
continuance of the cause unless it shall clearly appear from the whole proceedings that
he has not been misled or prejudiced by the defect or variance in respect to which the
amendment is made or that his rights will be fully protected by proceeding with the trial
or by a postponement thereof to a later day with the same or another jury.
2
There is no indication in the record, and the prosecution does not contend that the instruction request
came at a stage during the proceedings when defendant would have had ample time to prepare to
defendant against it.
3
Adams involved the giving of a jury instruction for a lesser included cognate offense of the crime
originally charged. Adams, supra at 387. As previously noted, both parties in the case at hand agree
-2
that accessory after the fact is not a cognate lesser included offense for armed robbery. In the context
of the circumstances that existed in Adams, the Court
conclud[ed] that where a prosecutor seeks to add a cognate lesser included offense that
is dissimilar to the charged offense, and the information does not suggest the need to
prepare a defense against that cognate lesser included offense, and notice to the
defendant does not come until after the prosecutor begins to present evidence, the
trial court should not grant the prosecutor’s request for an instruction on that cognate
lesser included offense. [Id. at 391-392 (emphasis added).]
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.