PEOPLE OF MI V MELVIN D MARTIN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 5, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203773
Detroit Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-004761
MELVIN D. MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Jansen and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520(b); MSA 28.788(2), first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(1),
larceny from a person, MCL 750.357; MSA 28.589, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227(b); MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to thirty to sixty years’
imprisonment for each count of criminal sexual conduct, ten to twenty years’ imprisonment for home
invasion, five to ten years’ imprisonment for larceny from a person and two years’ imprisonment for
felony-firearm. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues his convictions should be reversed because the trial court improperly admitted
prior acts evidence. A trial court’s decision to admit evidence will not be reversed unless there is a
clear abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
In order to be admissible, other acts evidence must meet the standard articulated in People v
VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), modified 445 Mich 1205 (1994). The evidence
must be offered for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b), the evidence must be relevant under MRE
402, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice under MRE 403, and the trial court may, upon request, give a limiting instruction to the jury.
Id. at 74-75. In addition, where the other acts evidence is being offered to prove identity through
modus operandi, the evidence also must meet the four-part test articulated in People v Golochowicz,
413 Mich 298, 309; 319 NW2d 518 (1982). VanderVliet, supra at 66; People v Ho, 231 Mich
App 178, 186; 585 NW2d 357 (1998); People v McMillan, 213 Mich App 134, 138; 539 NW2d
553 (1995). The Golochowicz logical-relevance test requires that (1) there is substantial evidence that
-1
the defendant committed the similar act; (2) there is some special quality of the act that tends to prove
the defendant’s identity; (3) that the evidence is material to the defendant’s guilt; and (4) the probative
value of the evidence sought to be introduced is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Golochowicz, supra at 309; Ho, supra at 186.
Defendant specifically argues the evidence of his prior convictions for breaking and entering and
criminal sexual conduct should not have been admitted because it was more prejudicial than probative.
We disagree. The proper inquiry is not merely whether the evidence is more prejudicial than probative,
but whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. People v
Starr, 457 Mich 490, 499; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
The probative value of the evidence of defendant’s prior convictions is high. The prosecution
articulated fifteen separate points of similarity between the crimes for which defendant was convicted in
the early 1980s and that for which he was currently on trial. Among other things, in both assaults the
victims were vaginally penetrated from behind, the victims were assaulted in their homes in the early
morning, the victims homes were near defendant’s home, the locks of each victim’s home had been
tampered with so that they appeared functional when they were not. Moreover, in both assaults the
perpetrator wore some type of mask and used a weapon during the assault, complimented each victim
on her appearance, and attempted to have a friendly conversation with each victim after the assault. We
reject defendant’s argument that the points of similarity between the previous assault of which he was
convicted and the instant case are not significant because they are typical of most rapes. We find the
similarities between the two crimes easily rise to the level of providing a special quality to the act that
tends to prove that the acts were committed by the same person, defendant. Golochowicz, supra at
310-312; Ho, supra at 187. We also reject defendant’s argument that common scheme evidence is
not admissible unless the defendant commits a series of crimes in a regular or unique manner. To the
contrary, this Court has previously found enough similarity to allow admission when there was only a
single prior act. Ho, supra; McMillan, supra.
While we acknowledge the prejudicial nature of the challenged evidence, we do not believe the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Defendant incorrectly argues that criminal sexual conduct cases are more likely to arouse prejudice and
therefore, should be subjected to a higher standard. However, “[t]he danger the rule seeks to avoid is
that of unfair prejudice, not prejudice that stems only from the abhorrent nature of the crime itself.”
Starr, supra at 500. Moreover, the prior acts evidence was not the only evidence that the prosecution
offered to prove defendant’s identity. McMillan, supra at 139. The victim recognized defendant from
her neighborhood and identified him as her attacker. Moreover, the trial court properly cautioned the
jury before the evidence was admitted and in its final instructions to the jury that the evidence should
only be used to establish identity and not to infer that defendant must have committed this crime because
he is of bad character. Id. Therefore, we find that the probative value of the prior acts evidence was
not substantially
-2
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.