PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN CHARLES BUSH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203918
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 96-011917 FC
BRIAN CHARLES BUSH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and McDonald and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals of right from his jury conviction for first-degree felony murder, MCL
750.316; MSA 28.548, larceny from the person, MCL 750.357; MSA 28.589, and unlawful driving
away an automobile (UDAA), MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645. We affirm.
This case arose from the murder of defendant’s grandmother and the use of her assets to obtain
cocaine. Defendant was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole for the felony murder
conviction and two to five years’ imprisonment for the UDAA conviction. The larceny from the person
conviction was vacated due to the felony murder sentence.
Defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his statements to
the police into evidence. Defendant claims his statements were involuntary because he had been using
cocaine and alcohol for four days during which time he had not slept or eaten. Defendant insists that the
police should have been aware of his alleged intoxicated state and that because of this condition, he was
unable to voluntarily waive his constitutional rights. The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing pursuant
to People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), and concluded that
defendant had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights. When reviewing a trial court’s
determination of voluntariness, this Court engages in a de novo review of the trial court record but will
not disturb the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich
1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). In making this determination, this Court defers to the trial court’s
superior ability to assess the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. People v
Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 543; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). This Court evaluates the totality of the
circumstances to determine if the defendant’s confession results from his free and unconstrained choice
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or whether the defendant’s will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination has been
critically impaired. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), quoting
Culombe v Connecticut, 367 US 568, 602; 81 S Ct 1860; 6 L Ed 2d 1037 (1961).
Defendant’s own testimony established that his waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Defendant admitted that he had asked to speak to the police. Defendant acknowledged that the police
read him his Miranda1 rights and that he signed a waiver form. Although defendant asserts that he
trusted the officer who took the statement and thought he was speaking “off the record,” he did not
describe any police coercion, overreaching, or dissembling. Defendant admitted being familiar with his
rights and stated that they had been read to him on most of the prior twelve occasions when he had
been arrested. Defendant even mentioned two of the rights: the right to remain silent and the right to an
attorney. The police testified that defendant repeatedly asked to speak to a specific police officer he
had dealt with i the past, and this officer described how, while he was reading defendant his rights,
n
defendant indicated that the officer could dispense with the recitation because he was already familiar
with them. This was consistent with the officer’s testimony that defendant appeared to understand his
rights and what he was doing when he waived them. Further, we reject defendant’s contention that his
request that the interview not be taped is tantamount to an assertion of his right to remain silent or to
terminate the interview or demonstrates a lack of understanding that this statement could be used against
him. The trial court concluded that defendant had known what he was doing and that his waiver was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. We defer to the trial court’s ability to judge credibility, particularly
where, as here, our independent review of the record does not disclose that the trial court’s finding was
clearly erroneous. Cipriano, supra at 339.
Defendant next contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of drug
or alcohol intoxication. Defendant did not move for an evidentiary hearing or a remand on this issue.
Where there has been no motion for new trial or evidentiary hearing in the trial court, this Court will still
consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; however, review on appeal is limited to facts
apparent on the record. People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 181; 577 NW2d 903 (1998). The issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed using the test set forth in People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994):
[T]o find that a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel was so
undermined that it justifies reversal of an otherwise valid conviction, a defendant must
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and that the representation so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial.
Defendant must overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s actions were valid decisions of trial
strategy, and he must further show that but for the claimed error there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the trial would have been different. People v Torres, 222 Mich App 411, 424; 564
NW2d 149 (1997).
Our Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to defendant’s in People v LaVearn, 448
Mich 207; 528 NW2d 721 (1995), where it held that the defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for
choosing not to present a defense of intoxication in a first-degree murder case. The Court reasoned that
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defense counsel had made a valid strategic choice between two weak defenses and had opted to
present an alternative defense of misidentification that, if successful, offered the possibility of a complete
acquittal. Id. at 214-216. Defendant likewise was faced with two weak options: first, he could present
a defense of intoxication that offered the possibility of a reduction of the offense from first to second
degree murder but that was compromised by the evidence of defendant’s purposeful course of action
and his own admissions. Alternatively, defendant could claim that although he had initiated an assault on
the victim, someone else had actually murdered her. Defendant’s counsel chose this latter strategy.
This defense offered the possibility of an acquittal on the murder charge and conviction of a four-year
felony. This Court will not second-guess trial counsel’s choice of strategy. Id. at 215-216.
Defendant finally contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing certain evidence
(handwritten police notes and search warrant documentation) to be admitted at the hearing and at trial
where the prosecutor had failed to turn the evidence over to defendant pursuant to a discovery
agreement. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate remedy for
noncompliance with a discovery order for an abuse of discretion. People v Davie (After Remand),
225 Mich App 592, 597-598; 571 NW2d 229 (1997). However, where there is a failure to request
specific discovery or where there is no objection to the failure to provide discovery, review may be
forfeited. People v Malone, 193 Mich App 366, 371-372; 483 NW2d 470 (1992), aff’d 445 Mich
369 (1994). In such cases, appellate review is for plain error. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546
547, 552-553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). In this case, defendant objected to the failure to provide the
handwritten note but did not object to the tardy provision of the search warrant and supporting
documentation.
In People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 448; 564 NW2d 158 (1997), this Court noted that
discovery in criminal cases is governed by MCR 6.201(B) which provides, on request, for disclosure
of: (1) any exculpatory information or evidence known to the prosecutor; (2) any police report
concerning the case; (3) any written or recorded statements of the defendant, a codefendant, or an
accomplice; (4) any affidavit, warrant, and return pertaining to a search or seizure in connection with the
case; and (5) any plea agreement, grant of immunity, or other agreement for testimony in connection
with the case. The handwritten notes of the police officer who conducted the interview of defendant
might arguably fit into categories (2) or (3), while the documentation connected with the search warrant
fits into category (4). These items were not exculpatory, and therefore it must be determined if
defendant made a proper request for them. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 666; 521 NW2d 557
(1994).
Even if this Court should consider the failure to turn over copies of the note and the search
warrant to be a violation of the discovery request and agreement (as defendant appears to suggest),
such a failure does not automatically warrant the sanction of dismissal. People v Paris, 166 Mich App
276, 281; 420 NW2d 184 (1988). “Where evidence is suppressed, the proper considerations are
whether (1) suppression was deliberate, (2) the evidence was requested, and (3) in retrospect, the
defense could have significantly used the evidence.” People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 514; 503
NW2d 457 (1993), citing Paris, supra at 283. In this case, there is no indication that suppression was
deliberate.
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Moreover, it is readily apparent that the defense could not have significantly used the materials
because when the materials were provided, defendant did not use them. With respect to the
handwritten note, defendant was given a copy of the note, allowed time to review it, and asked if he had
any further cross-examination of the police officer based on the notes. Defendant stated he had none.
When the prosecutor conducted a brief inquiry of the officer with respect to the notes, defendant was
again asked if he desired further cross-examination and again he declined. With respect to the search
warrant materials, defendant did not object to the admission of the pawn ticket, and other than
requesting copies of the search warrant materials, defendant did not utilize them in any fashion.
Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate prejudicial error amounting to an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion with respect to either the preserved or unpreserved error. Absent a showing of prejudice,
this Court may not reverse defendant’s conviction. People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 215; 551 NW2d
891 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Helene N. White
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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