RHONDA YEARY V DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RHONDA YEARY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
No. 203398
Branch Circuit Court
LC No. 95-006352 CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Neff and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging in part that it discharged her from her position at its
Cotton Correctional Facility in violation of the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq.;
MSA 3.550(101) et seq. Following a bench trial on the issue of liability only, the trial court concluded
that plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of handicap discrimination and rendered a verdict of no
cause of action in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals by right. We affirm.
The Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act [hereinafter “HCRA”] guarantees employees the
“opportunity to obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of a handicap.” MCL
37.1102(1); MSA 3.550(102(1). To establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, an
employee must prove (1) that she is “handicapped” within the meaning of the HCRA, (2) that her
handicap is unrelated to her ability to perform the duties of her particular job, and (3) that the employer
discriminated against her in some way prohibited under the HCRA. Hall v Hackley Hospital, 210
Mich App 48, 53-54; 532 NW2d 893 (1995). At issue in this case is the trial court’s conclusion that
plaintiff failed to prove the final two elements of her prima facie case. We review de novo the court’s
application of the law to the facts. See Brucker v McKinlay Transport, Inc (On Remand), 225 Mich
App 442, 448; 571 NW2d 548 (1997).
Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred when it concluded that her handicap was related to
her ability to perform her job. We disagree. An employee’s handicap is related to her ability to
perform her job when, with or without accommodation, the handicap “prevent[s] the employee from . .
-1
. performing the duties of [her] particular job or position.”
3.550(103)(l)(i). As the trial court found,
See MCL 37.1103(l)(i); MSA
[a]fter being assigned to the Cotton Facility and working for a period of time, the
[p]laintiff again was forced to take sick leave. She was notified that she had to return to
work by a date certain. [She s]howed up with a slip that was rejected because it did
not address any limitations or suggest[ ] that she could return to work without any such
limitations. [She w]as required to return with such a note [but d]id not. And indeed,
another note soon thereafter indicated that she was, indeed, unable to return to work.
Plaintiff presented no evidence that she was capable of returning to work. An employee who is unable
to report to work because of her handicap is “unable to perform her job because of her [handicap].”
Rymar v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 190 Mich App 504, 506; 476 NW2d 451 (1991); Ashworth
v Jefferson Screw Products, Inc, 176 Mich App 737, 743; 440 NW2d 101 (1989). Here, on the
date of her termination, plaintiff was unable to perform her job due to her disability. Rymar, supra at
506-507. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it concluded that plaintiff’s handicap was related
to her ability to perform her job.
Plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred when it concluded that defendant accommodated
her handicap. We disagree. The HCRA obligates employers to “accommodate a handicapper for
purposes of employment . . . unless the [employer] demonstrates that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship.” MCL 37.1102(2); MSA 3.550(102)(2). Stated somewhat differently, the HCRA
obligates employers to afford handicappers the full and fair opportunity to secure employment.
Lindberg v Livonia Public Schools, 219 Mich App 364, 367-368; 556 NW2d 509 (1996).
Although the HCRA does not define the scope of the accommodation, “[i]t is not reasonable to expect
that an institution or an employer will be better aware of the needs of a handicapped [employee] than
the [employee herself].” Id. at 367. The HCRA simply does not impose upon employers the
“additional obligation to determine which accommodations are necessary.” Id. at 367-368. When an
employer has not denied the employee anything in terms of her special requests, this Court is hesitant to
find that the employer has failed to accommodate the employee. Id. at 367.
Here, the trial court found,
[defendant] had a fairly firm policy limiting an employee to accumulative [sic] total of six
months long-term leave over the course of his or her career. . . . [W]hile the [p]laintiff
was still assigned to the Lakeland Facility, [defendant] had begun to take steps already
to terminate her for exceeding the six-month sick leave limit. But, as was testified to,
the central office intervened and ultimately sought the transfer of the [p]laintiff to the
Cotton Facility as a reasonable accommodation. At the time of the transfer, it was also
clear that the [p]laintiff already had far exceeded the six-month limit and, as was testified
to, as well, again, another accommodation was to ignore [the] excess of two months
that exceeded already [sic] the six-month limit.
-2
Plaintiff presented no evidence that she requested any accommodation beyond a transfer to a different
facility or that defendant denied her a full and fair opportunity to secure her employment. The record
reveals that despite the fact that plaintiff’s handicap prevented her from performing her duties and,
therefore, she was not protected under the HCRA, defendant did accommodate her in different ways.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of
handicap discrimination and in accordance rendering a verdict of no cause of action.
We affirm.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.