JANE DEWEY HENDERSON V JAMES H HENDERSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JANE DEWEY HENDERSON,
UNPUBLISHED
January 22, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204336
Iosco Circuit Court
LC No. 95-009439 DM
JAMES H. HENDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Neff and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in modifying a prior visitation order without
conducting a hearing. We disagree. While a hearing is generally required before a visitation order may
be modified, see Rozek v Rozek, 203 Mich App 193; 511 NW2d 693 (1993), here the provision
regarding visitation in the judgment of divorce did not result in a substantive change to the prior visitation
order.
Next, defendant contends that several of the trial court’s factual findings are erroneous, and that
its ultimate property distribution is inequitable. In a divorce action, the trial court must make findings of
fact and dispositional rulings. On appeal, factual findings are to be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous. Sands v Sands, 442 Mich 30, 34; 497 NW2d 493 (1993); Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich
141, 151; 485 NW2d 893 (1992). A finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court, on all the
evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Beason v Beason,
435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990). If the findings of fact are upheld, the appellate court must
decide whether the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. Sparks, supra at
151-152. The ruling should be affirmed unless this Court is left with the firm conviction that the division
was inequitable. Id. at 152.
Absent a binding agreement, the goal in distributing marital assets in a divorce proceeding is to
reach an equitable distribution of property in light of all the circumstances. Byington v Byington, 224
Mich App 103, 114; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). The division need not be mathematically equal, but any
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significant departure from congruence must be explained by the court. Id. at 114-115. In dividing the
estate, the court should consider the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to the
marital estate, each party’s station in life, each party’s earning ability, each party’s age, health and
needs, fault or past misconduct, and any other equitable circumstance. Id. at 115. The significance of
these factors will vary from case to case, and each factor need not be given equal weight where the
circumstances dictate otherwise. Id.
In this case, the trial court’s finding that defendant was employable is not clearly erroneous.
Moreover, contrary to what defendant asserts, the trial court did consider the testimony of his expert on
this issue. The trial court had the opportunity to personally observe and hear defendant at trial.
Defendant’s testimony demonstrated a wealth of knowledge concerning investments, and there was
evidence that he amassed the funds that comprised the bulk of the marital estate. Defendant recently
had been engaged in military service and he also held two degrees, including a master’s degree in
systems management. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that
defendant was employable.
Nor did the trial court clearly err in its determination of the value of the marital home. The
record indicates that the court considered the value suggested by defendant’s expert, but found other
evidence to be more persuasive regarding the home’s value. While the appraisal relied on by the court
failed to reflect all of the home’s square footage, the expert who performed the appraisal testified that
she was aware of the square footage in question, but by law, could not expressly include it in the
calculation of square footage. The analysis performed by plaintiff’s appraiser was also more thorough
and detailed than that of defendant’s expert. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly
err in according greater weight to the testimony of plaintiff’s appraiser.
After considering the relevant factors, the court ultimately split the marital estate equally and we
are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the division was inequitable. The division of funds will
allow defendant a sufficient opportunity to provide a home for himself and maintain a decent standard of
living.
Defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly exercised jurisdiction over the children’s trusts
is without merit. The court merely indicated that the matter would be referred to the probate court if the
parties could not agree on a custodian. The court did not exercise jurisdiction over the trust assets as in
Kowalesky v Kowalesky, 148 Mich App 151; 384 NW2d 112 (1986).
Finally, defendant’s claims regarding the valuation of the Colorado property and the
indebtedness on that property are without merit. The court did not use the lowest possible value; rather,
the court valued the property considering the three different methods for valuation. We find that the trial
court did not clearly err in its valuation of the property or in its determination that the indebtedness on
the property represented a true loan.
Affirmed.
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/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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