PEOPLE OF MI V LAWRENCE VAUGHN SAUERMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 22, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 199989
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-501421
LAWRENCE VAUGHN SAUERMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and MacKenzie, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520d(1)(a); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(a). The trial court sentenced him as a fourth felony habitual
offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, to 180 to 250 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of
right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to impeach
defendant with his prior breaking and entering convictions pursuant to MRE 609. This Court reviews a
trial court’s decision to allow impeachment by evidence of a prior conviction for an abuse of discretion.
People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 6; 532 NW2d 885 (1995). There was no abuse of discretion in
this case.
A witness’ credibility may be impeached with evidence of prior convictions, but only if the
convictions satisfy the criteria set forth in MRE 609. Under MRE 609, if the conviction contains an
element of theft, it is admissible if (1) the crime was punishable by more than one year in prison, and (2)
the evidence has significant probative value and the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect. People v Allen, 429 Mich 558, 605-606; 420 NW2d 499 (1988). Here, the
breaking and entering convictions were offenses involving stealth and thus were highly indicative of
veracity. They were, however, eight, seven, and five years old, somewhat reducing their probative
value. Since breaking and entering is highly dissimilar to CSC III, the crime charged, the prejudicial
effect of the evidence is limited. Additionally, the predominate factor, “the effect on the decisional
process if the defendant does not testify,” Allen, supra, p 602, was not implicated here because
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defendant took the stand. Indeed, defendant used the jury’s knowledge of his prior plea-based
convictions to his advantage; he testified that he would have once again pleaded guilty in this case if he
had committed the crime. On balance, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect or in allowing the
convictions into evidence for impeachment purposes.
Defendant also argues that several instances of prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair
trial. Again, we disagree. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s remarks or seek curative
instructions at trial. Appellate review is therefore foreclosed unless the prejudicial effect of the remarks
was so great that it could not have been cured by an appropriate instruction or a failure to review the
issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d
557 (1994). It would not. Any prejudice resulting from any of the remarks or questions of which
defendant complains, including the mention of defendant’s prior convictions during closing argument,
could have been cured by a cautionary instruction to the jury.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of the cumulative effect of the
improper admission of evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. Only actual errors are aggregated to
determine their cumulative effect. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 292 n 64; 531 NW2d 659
(1995). Because we have found no errors, there can be no cumulative error. People v Maleski, 220
Mich App 518, 525; 560 NW2d 71 (1996).
Finally, defendant argues that he must be resentenced. The claim is without merit. Although
the trial judge suggested that defendant had encouraged seven-year-old Justin Fraley to testify falsely, it
is apparent from the record that the judge’s observation did not factor into the sentence imposed.
Rather, the sentence was based on the circumstances of the offense and defendant’s criminal history.
The court noted that the case involved a sexual assault on a child and that defendant’s rehabilitation
prospects were poor. The judge also indicated that if defendant were not being sentenced as an
habitual offender, she would have sentenced him within the guidelines’ recommended range rather than
enhancing the sentence. Finally, the sentence did not violate the principle of proportionality. People v
Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). At age 26, defendant has already spent eight years in
jail and this was his fifth felony conviction. As noted by the trial court, defendant has not responded to
probation, short-term incarceration, or a mid-length term of incarceration, indicating either an inability or
unwillingness to conform his behavior to acceptable norms. In this case, he repeatedly attempted to
sexually penetrate a fourteen-year-old babysitter, leaving her with bruises and forcing her to feign an
asthma attack to end the assault. Given this offender and this offense, defendant’s sentence was not
disproportionately harsh or an abuse of discretion. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
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