PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES EDWARD HARDY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 189902
Midland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-007535 FC
JAMES EDWARD HARDY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, breaking or
attempting to escape from jail while awaiting examination or sentence on a felony, MCL 750.197(2);
MSA 28.394(2), and malicious destruction of police property, MCL 750.377b; MSA 28.609(2).
Defendant was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, to
concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder
conviction and five to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault, escape, and malicious
destruction convictions. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was restrained with shackles
and handcuffs during trial. We disagree.
Because freedom from shackling is an important part of the right to a fair trial, the shackling of a
defendant during trial is permitted only in extraordinary circumstances. People v Dixon, 217 Mich App
400, 404; 552 NW2d 663 (1996). Restraints should be permitted only to prevent escape, to protect
bystanders or officers of the court from injury, or to maintain a quiet and peaceable trial. People v
Dunn, 446 Mich 409, 426; 521 NW2d 255 (1994). There must be record evidence to support a trial
court’s decision to use restraints. Id. at 427. This Court reviews a decision to restrain a defendant for
an abuse of discretion under the totality of the circumstances. Dixon, supra at 404-405.
At the time of trial, defendant had a lengthy criminal record, including a prior conviction for
escape, and he was facing a lengthy prison sentence in another case. Moreover, the instant case
-1
involved an armed attack against two jail guards during an escape attempt from jail. Because
defendant’s history established that he was both a flight risk and a risk to the safety of the other
occupants in the courtroom, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring defendant to wear
restraints while in the court room.
Defendant next contends that the trial court deprived him of his right of allocution at sentencing
by advising him that he should focus his comments on matters related to his potential sentence, rather
than his factual guilt or innocence. We disagree.
MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c) provides that the trial court must, before imposing sentence, give the
defendant a reasonable opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances that the defendant believes
the court should consider when imposing sentence. Failure to comply with this rule requires
resentencing. People v Berry, 409 Mich 774, 779-781; 298 NW2d 434 (1980); People v Sean
Jones (On Rehearing), 201 Mich App 449, 453; 506 NW2d 542 (1993). Our review of the record
convinces us that the trial court complied with MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c) and provided defendant a full
opportunity for allocution. The court's comments were intended only as a guideline for defendant to
consider in tailoring his remarks. Notwithstanding the court's comments, defendant was permitted to
say whatever he desired on the record before sentence was imposed. The right of allocution was not
violated.
Defendant next contends that his life sentence is so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. We disagree. Defendant’s reliance on the sentencing guidelines is misplaced because the
guidelines do not apply to habitual offenders. People v McFall, 224 Mich App 403, 415; 569 NW2d
828 (1997). Defendant’s sentence was statutorily authorized. See MCL 769.12(1)(a); MSA
28.1084(1)(a). The serious nature of the offenses and defendant’s prior criminal history demonstrate
that defendant has an inability to conform his conduct to the laws of society. People v Hansford (After
Remand), 454 Mich 320, 326; 562 NW2d 460 (1997). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s life
sentence is proportional and does not constitute an abuse of sentencing discretion. Id. See also People
v Crawford, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 200722, issued 11/20/98), slip op p
6. Because defendant’s life sentence is proportional, we likewise conclude that this sentence does not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Const 1963, art 1, § 16; People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 27
41; 485 NW2d 866 (1992); see also People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 456; 569 NW2d 641
(1997).
Next, defendant, relying on CJI2d 17.7(4) and People v Miller, 91 Mich 639; 52 NW 65
(1892), argues that the trial court erroneously f
ailed to instruct the jury that great bodily harm means
permanent injury. However, defendant failed to object to this aspect of the instructions as given. Thus,
relief will be given only in cases of manifest injustice. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545;
494 NW2d 737 (1993); People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 177; 561 NW2d 463 (1997).
Jury instructions must include all elements of the charged offense and must not exclude material
issues, defenses and theories if there is evidence to support them. Even if the instructions are somewhat
imperfect, there is no error if they fairly present to the jury the issues to be tried and sufficiently protect
the rights of the defendant. People v Caulley, 197 Mich App 177, 184; 494 NW2d 853 (1992).
-2
The Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions do not have the official sanction of the Michigan
Supreme Court and trial courts are not required to use them. McFall, supra at 414. Although in
Miller, supra at 643, the Court approved a jury instruction that equated the intent to do great bodily
harm with the intent to do “serious and permanent bodily injury,” the Court in other cases has defined
the intent to do great bodily harm as the intent “to do a serious injury, of an aggravated nature.” See
People v Troy, 96 Mich 530, 537; 56 NW 102 (1893); see also People v Smith, 217 Mich 669,
673; 187 NW 304 (1922) (citing Troy, supra); People v Ochotski, 115 Mich 601, 608; 73 NW2d
889 (1898) (citing Troy, supra). In affirming the defendant’s conviction of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm in People v Mulvaney, 171 Mich 272, 278; 137 NW 155 (1912), the Court found
that the instruction “‘It must be an intent to do a serious injury of an aggravated nature’” correctly stated
the law. And in Ochotski, supra, the Court noted that the trial court instructed the jury that
no conviction could be had unless they found that in making the assault respondent
intended to do great bodily harm less than the crime of murder.
The Ochotski Court stated that “[w]e think the charge of the trial court was sufficiently specific on the
question of intent.” Id.
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that it must find “that at the time of the assault, the
defendant intended to do great bodily harm,” and that “[g]reat bodily harm means any injury that can
seriously harm the health or function of the body.” This instruction fairly presented the issue of great
bodily harm to the jury and sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. Caulley, supra. We find no
manifest injustice with this instruction. Mulvaney, supra; Ochotski, supra; Troy, supra.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser
included misdemeanor offenses of assault and battery and aggravated assault. A trial court is required
to instruct on a lesser included misdemeanor offense where (1) there is a proper request made, (2) there
is an "inherent relationship" between the greater and lesser offense, (3) the requested instruction is
supported by a "rational view" of the evidence, (4) the defendant has adequate notice if he did not make
the request, and (5) no undue confusion or other injustice would result. People v Corbiere, 220 Mich
App 260, 262-263; 559 NW2d 666 (1996); People v Malach, 202 Mich App 266, 276; 507 NW2d
834 (1993). This Court reviews a trial court’s decision whether to instruct on a lesser included
misdemeanor offense for an abuse of discretion. Malach, supra. After reviewing the record in this
case, we agree with the trial court that a rational view of the evidence did not support the requested
misdemeanor instructions and that the requested instructions were likely to cause undue confusion.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct on the
requested misdemeanors.
Finally, defendant argues that he was deprived of his statutory right to a preliminary examination
within fourteen days of his arraignment. See MCL 766.4; MSA 28.922. Although the record indicates
that defendant waived this right in writing, defendant contends that his signature was forged on the
waiver form by his attorney. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on this issue below, the trial court
found that defendant's signature was not forged and that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his statutory right to a preliminary examination within fourteen days of arraignment. Cf. People v
-3
Losinger, 331 Mich 490, 496-497; 50 NW2d 137 (1951). Our review of the record discloses that
the trial court did not clearly err in this determination. MCR 2.613(C).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R Smolenski
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.