DENISE A BUDY V AVIS RENT A CAR SYSTEM INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DENISE A. BUDY and KEITH A. BUDY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 1998
Plaintiffs-Appellants
and
No. 204610
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 93-001445 NI
LC No. 94-002558
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of
DENISE A. BUDY,
Plaintiff,
v
AVIS RENT A CAR SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Gribbs and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.
We affirm.
Plaintiffs allege that they were injured as a result of a collision between their automobile and an
automobile being driven in a negligent manner by Somboon Thirasisombat. At the time of the collision,
the other automobile was owned by defendant, a car-rental company, and leased to Sakesuk
Kasemsuwan. Plaintiffs sued defendant on a theory that, as owner of the automobile, it was liable for
Thirasisombat’s negligence under the owner liability statute, MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101.1 Defendant
moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it could not be held liable
for the collision, because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding its lack of consent to
Thirasisombat’s use of the automobile. See former MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1). The trial court
granted defendant’s motion and plaintiffs appealed.
-1
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. We disagree. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant a
-2
motion for summary disposition. Pinckney Community Schools v Continental Casualty Co, 213
Mich App 521, 525; 540 NW2d 748 (1995). A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374;
501 NW2d 155 (1993). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10), this Court must consider pleadings, affidavits, admissions, depositions, and any other
documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Quinto v Cross & Peters, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Summary
disposition may be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
In the trial court, the party moving for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10)
bears the initial burden of supporting its position with documentary evidence. See Munson Medical
Center v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 218 Mich App 375, 386; 554 NW2d 49 (1996). Once the moving
party properly supports its motion, the opposing party then bears the burden of showing that a dispute
exists regarding a genuine issue of material fact. Id. In so doing, the opposing party may not rest upon
mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must respond with documentary evidence setting forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. MCR 2.116(G)(4); Richardson v
Michigan Humane Society, 221 Mich App 526, 527; 561 NW2d 873 (1997). Here, plaintiffs
submitted no documentary evidence in response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition, but
rather advanced a general attack on the adequacy of defendant’s evidence. Therefore, the pertinent
question on appeal is whether defendant sustained its initial burden of supporting its position with
documentary evidence.
The operation of an automobile by one who is not a member of the family of the owner of the
automobile gives rise to a rebuttable common-law presumption that the operator was driving the
automobile with the express or implied consent of the owner. Fout v Dietz, 401 Mich 403, 405; 258
NW2d 53 (1977); see also Bieszck v Avis Rent-A-Car, 459 Mich 9, 17-18; 583 NW2d 691 (1998).
In Michigan, the sole function of a civil presumption is to place the burden of producing evidence on the
opposing party. Widmayer v Leonard, 422 Mich 280, 289; 373 NW2d 538 (1985); see also
Bieszck, supra at 19, n 9, quoting MRE 301. A presumption dissipates when the burden of production
is met. See Isabella Co Dep’t of Social Services v Thompson, 210 Mich App 612, 615; 534 NW2d
132 (1995). The “presumption of consent” applicable in this case may be overcome by the production
of “positive, unequivocal, strong and credible” evidence of a lack of consent. See Bieszck, supra at
19, quoting Ensign v Crater, 41 Mich App 477, 481-483; 200 NW2d 341 (1972). Consistent with
Michigan’s treatment of presumptions, a defendant’s “‘uncontradicted’” evidence of a lack of consent is
considered “‘sufficiently clear, positive, and credible’” to rebut the presumption of consent and “‘justify
a directed verdict for the defendant.’” See Ensign, supra at 482, quoting Krisher v Duff, 331 Mich
699, 710; 50 NW2d 332 (1950). Accordingly, summary disposition is appropriate despite the
common-law presumption where a defendant’s evidence of a lack of consent is uncontradicted.
In this case, as evidence of its lack of consent to Thirasisombat’s use of the automobile,
defendant submitted (1) a copy of its rental contract with Kasemsuwan, pursuant to which Kasemsuwan
agreed that nobody would drive defendant’s automobile without his “prior permission,” and (2)
-3
Kasemsuwan’s sworn affidavit that he never gave Thirasisombat permission to use the automobile.
Accepting the language of the rental contract as a “clear and unequivocal” statement of the relationship
between defendant and Kasemsuwan with respect to the automobile in question, see Bieszck, supra at
19-20, we conclude that if Kasemsuwan did not give Thirasisombat permission to use the automobile,
defendant could not be said to have “consented” to Thirasisombat’s use of the automobile. Cf. id.;
Caradonna v Arpino, 177 Mich App 486, 490-491; 442 NW2d 702 (1989). Thus, by submitting a
copy of the rental contract and Kasemsuwan’s affidavit, defendant satisfied its initial burden of providing
documentary evidence in support of its position that there was no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the lack of consent.
Plaintiffs argue that Kasemsuwan’s failure to report the unauthorized use of his rented
automobile to police until one month after the accident constituted circumstantial evidence contradictory
to his sworn statement that he did not give Thirasisombat permission to use the automobile. We
disagree. If anything, the fact that Kasemsuwan – who was not the owner of the automobile –
eventually did report the incident to the police was consistent with his statement. Cf. Baumgartner v
Ham, 374 Mich 169, 174-175; 132 NW2d 159 (1965). Plaintiffs also suggest that Kasemsuwan’s
statement that he forgot to take the automobile keys from Thirasisombat’s room (where he was visiting
Thirasisombat’s roommate) to his own room in the same building, constituted circumstantial evidence
that he gave Thirasisombat permission to use the automobile. Again, we disagree. Where
Kasemsuwan forgot his keys is simply not probative of the issue whether he gave Thirasisombat
permission to use the automobile. Finally, we conclude that there was nothing “inherently improbable”
about Kasemsuwan’s sworn statement, as plaintiffs urge in their reply brief on appeal.
For these reasons, we hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
The collision occurred on July 17, 1991. The owner liability statute in effect at that time, and
applicable in this case, was subsequently amended by 1995 PA 98. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ suit was
based on defendant’s liability under the former statute.
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.