PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL A MOONEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 200840
Iosco Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003241 FH
MICHAEL A. MOONEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MacKenzie, P.J., and Bandstra and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction by jury for possession of less than twenty-five
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iv). We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present the audiotape
recordings of conversations between defendant and Gregory Castonguay, maintaining that these
recordings contained impermissible hearsay statements made by Castonguay,1 offered to prove that
defendant and Castonguay were conducting drug dealings. We disagree. Even if relevant, evidence
must be excluded if it is hearsay and falls within none of the statutory exceptions. MRE 802. However,
a statement which is offered only to show the state of mind of the hearer or reader of the statement is
not improperly admitted as hearsay. People v Eggleston, 148 Mich App 494, 502; 384 NW2d 811
(1986). Likewise, an utterance or a writing may be admitted to show the effect on the hearer when this
is relevant. People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 449-450; 537 NW2d 577 (1995). In the instant case,
the tape recorded statements were not used to prove the truth of anything Castonguay said -- that
defendant was negotiating with Castonguay regarding a bulldozer or any other “matter asserted” by
Castonguay. MRE 801(c). Instead, they were intended to prove that the taped conversations actually
occurred, that Castonguay’s statements had the effect of causing defendant to believe that he was
negotiating for the purchase of cocaine or otherwise to provide context for defendant’s actions. The
trial court instructed the jurors that they should limit their consideration of Castonguay’s statements to
non-hearsay purposes, and the prosecutor reiterated that instruction. We hold, therefore, that the trial
court did not err in allowing these conversations to be entered into evidence for the limited purpose of
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showing defendant’s state of mind and intent at the time of the conversations. Eggleston, supra at 504;
Fisher, supra at 449-450. Similarly, the prosecutor’s use of this evidence presented no ground for the
trial court to grant defendant a mistrial.
Defendant next argues that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for a mistrial
in part due to the prosecution’s failure to include the name of the state fingerprint expert on the witness
list and its failure to disclose the existence of the fingerprint tests, which tended to support defendant’s
innocence. Because defendant’s counsel accepted the trial court’s proposed remedy for dealing with
these failures, defendant is precluded from raising this issue on appeal. People v Roberson, 167 Mich
App 501, 517; 423 NW2d 245 (1988).
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for a mistrial
due to the prosecution’s misconduct in allowing testimony as to defendant’s exercise of his right to
silence. Defendant is mistaken. Looking at the circumstances surrounding the statement concerning
defendant’s silence, we conclude that it was improper since defendant did not claim to have made any
prior statements to the police. People v Gilbert, 183 Mich App 741, 747; 455 NW2d 731 (1990).
However, it constituted harmless error. Id. The prosecutor’s questions were certainly not offensive
under the circumstances and the minimal testimony on this matter could reasonably be considered
inadvertent. Id. Moreover, we conclude that the statement had no prejudicial impact with respect to
the verdict. Id. The trial court immediately curtailed testimony by this officer concerning inculpatory
statements made by defendant during his arrest, statements the court had previously ruled admissible.
Thus, the brief reference to defendant’s silence effectively deprived the prosecution of the chance to
present possibly much more damaging evidence. Given the circumstances surrounding this statement,
then, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant defendant a mistrial
as to this issue. People v Robertson, 87 Mich App 109, 111; 273 NW2d 501 (1978).
Defendant next argues that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for a mistrial
because the prosecutor made a reference to “O. J. Simpson” in his closing argument. Although we
agree that this reference was improper and inappropriate, we conclude that the prosecutor’s remark did
not constitute error requiring the trial court to grant defendant’s motion for a mistrial. In his closing
argument, defense counsel attacked the differing accounts of the arresting officers and stated that the
officers were lying on the stand. The prosecution mentioned the O.J. Simpson trial only in the context of
rebutting this argument. The facts surrounding the alleged Simpson crimes are in no manner similar to
those in the instant case and the prosecutor was not, therefore, inviting a comparison between Simpson
and defendant. The prosecution’s mention of the Simpson case did not require the trial court to declare
a mistrial. People v Sharbnow, 174 Mich App 94, 101-102; 435 NW2d 772 (1989).
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in exceeding the sentencing guidelines range
when determining the length of defendant’s sentence. We disagree. Seeking to impose a proportionate
sentence, the trial court properly considered evidence of defendant’s previous illegal drug usage, People
v Harris, 190 Mich App 652, 663; 476 NW2d 767 (1991), evidence of defendant’s perjury on the
witness stand, People v Adams, 430 Mich 679, 693; 425 NW2d 437 (1988), and evidence that the
factual circumstances indicated that defendant’s possession of
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cocaine was part of a larger drug transaction, People v Purcell, 174 Mich App 126, 130-131; 435
NW2d 782 (1989). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining defendant’s sentence.
People v Odendahl, 200 Mich App 539, 540-541; 505 NW2d 16 (1993).
We affirm.
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
1
Defendant does not argue that his statements on the recordings are hearsay, apparently conceding that
they were admissible under MCR 801(d)(2).
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