SANDRA MARIE BRATTIN V FORD MOTOR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SANDRA MARIE BRATTIN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 202535
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-538022 NO
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
PINKERTON’S, INC.,
Defendant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from orders dismissing her cause of action pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(4). We affirm.
Plaintiff was shot by her estranged husband while she was at work at defendant’s1 Sheldon
Road plant. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant, alleging that defendant was negligent and grossly
negligent in failing to provide a safe working environment. Defendant moved for summary disposition on
the ground that plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was relief under the provisions of the Worker’s Disability
Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq. The trial court agreed, and
concluded that because plaintiff had failed to allege an intentional tort against defendant, the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s cause of action. Plaintiff argues that the court erred in
concluding that relief under the Act was plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Walker v Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, Inc, 217 Mich App 705, 708; 552 NW2d 679
(1996). “When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), we must
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determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact.”
Id.
Plaintiff’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that her claim was barred
by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. We disagree.
MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the
employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury . . . . The only
exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort. An intentional tort shall exist
only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the
employer specifically intended an injury. . . .
Plaintiff argues that she is not subject to the exclusive remedy provision in this instance because
her injury was not work related but was instead the result of a personal conflict with her estranged
husband. Indeed, when an employee is injured at work through the intentional acts of a third party, and
the conflict giving rise to the injury was personal in nature and not work related, the injured employee is
not entitled to statutory worker’s compensation benefits. See Morris v Soloway, 170 Mich App 312,
316-317; 428 NW2d 43 (1988); Devault v General Motors Corp, Pontiac Motors Division, 149
Mich App 765, 771-772; 386 NW2d 671 (1986). Plaintiff argues that a corollary to this rule is that
when an employee’s injuries do not arise from the course of employment, the employee is not confined
to the statutory worker’s compensation remedies and remains free to sue the employer under general
tort principles. We do not accept this reasoning. Regardless of how plaintiff obtained her injuries,
plaintiff was undeniably in an employment relationship with defendant and, according the plain meaning
of the statute as quoted above, remains restricted to the exclusive remedy of benefits under the statute
absent an allegation of an intentional tort. MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1). Plaintiff cites no
authority that stands for the proposition that an employee may sue her employer for negligence over an
injury occurring at work but otherwise unrelated to her employment. Plaintiff’s only recourse against
defendant outside of the act was to allege an intentional tort, which she did not do.
Plaintiff’s second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that defendant was
not estopped from asserting the defense of the exclusive remedy provision of the act where defendant
had previously denied plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim on the ground that her injury was not
work related. We disagree.
Equitable estoppel arises when a party, through acts or omissions, intentionally or negligently
leads another party reasonably to believe certain facts. Moore v First Security Casualty Co, 224
Mich App 370, 376; 568 NW2d 841 (1997). The party claiming equitable estoppel must have
justifiably relied on the inducements in question, and must stand to suffer prejudice if the other party is
permitted to assume a position contrary to that which prompted the reliance. Id. In this case,
defendant’s position that plaintiff claim was governed by the exclusive remedy provision of the act was
no way inconsistent with defendant’s position that plaintiff’s injury was not work related. Indeed, as
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discussed above, both positions fairly state the law. The assertion that plaintiff may proceed against
defendant only according to the provisions of the act carries with it no necessary implication that plaintiff
may prevail under that approach. Defendant never changed its position, and in any event induced no
detrimental reliance from plaintiff. For these reasons, the trial court correctly allowed defendant to
assert as a defense the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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Because Ford Motor Company is the only defendant who is party to this appeal, in this opinion the
designation “defendant” will refer exclusively to Ford.
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