PEOPLE OF MI V STANLEY PARKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 195820
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 95-001195 FH
STANLEY PARKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (hereinafter
“assault with intent”), MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (hereinafter “felony-firearm”), MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and one count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm (hereinafter “felon in possession”), MCL 750.224f; MSA
28.421(6). Defendant was sentenced to serve life imprisonment for his first-degree premeditated
murder conviction, ten to fifteen years in prison for the assault with intent conviction, two years’
imprisonment for each felony-firearm conviction, and five to seven and one-half years for the felon in
possession conviction. Defendant’s felony-firearm sentences are concurrent with his felon in possession
conviction, and are to be preceded by his other two prison terms. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by empanelling an
“anonymous jury.” We disagree. Defendant first raised this issue on appeal to this Court. “Issues
raised for the first time on appeal, even those relating to constitutional claims, are not ordinarily subject
to appellate review.” Michigan Up & Out of Poverty Now Coalition v Michigan, 210 Mich App
162, 167; 533 NW2d 339 (1995). “This Court may nevertheless address constitutional questions that
were not addressed below where no question of fact exists and the interests of justice and judicial
economy so dictate.” Great Lakes Div of National Steel Corp v Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379, 426;
576 NW2d 667 (198). Accord Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444
Mich 211, 234 n 23; 507 NW2d 422 (1993).
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After reviewing the record, we conclude that no there are no exigent circumstances which
would justify reversal of defendant’s convictions. In support of his argument, defendant cites to a
practice used in federal district courts whereby “certain biographical information about potential jurors
[is withheld] for the parties involved.” United States v Branch, 91 F3d 699, 723 (CA 5, 1996). The
empanelment of such an anonymous jury is considered to be a extreme measure, that “is constitutional
when necessary . . . so long as the defendants are not stripped of their rights to conduct an effective voir
dire and to maintain the presumption of innocence.” United States v Salvatore, 110 F3d 1131, 1143
(CA 5, 1997). Accord Branch, supra at 724-725.
Although the jurors in the instant case were referred to by an assigned number throughout the
record, this does not amount to the type of concealment that constitutes the designation “anonymous
jury,” as that label has come to be understood in the federal district courts.1 The concealment of the
jurors names was done to assure their anonymity from the public (particularly the media), not the parties
to the trial. There is no indication that the names of the jurors were withheld from defendant. Further,
there is no evidence that defendant was denied access to any information contained on the standard jury
personal history questionnaire. MCR 2.510. The fact that the trial judge called the system he used an
“anonymous system” is of no import. Moreover, defendant has failed to establish that his right to an
effective voir dire was prejudiced by this procedure, or that it somehow undermined his presumption of
innocence. Salvatore, supra at 1144; Branch, supra at 724-725.
Defendant next argues that his right to a fair trial was undermined by certain comments made by
Detective Kevin Vaughn at trial. We disagree. First, defendant agues that he was prejudiced when the
officer testified that he knew of defendant “from dealing with him on a prior case.” Defendant’s failure
to raise a specific and timely objection to the allegedly improper testimony precludes “appellate review
in the absence of manifest injustice.” People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 398; 551 NW2d 478
(1996). At the heart of defendant’s argument is the speculative inference that the testimony at issue
would prejudice the jury because it would likely conclude that defendant had been involved in past
criminal activity. When viewed in context, we do not agree that the testimony leads to such a
conclusion. Accordingly, we find no manifest injustice.
Second, defendant argues that he was prejudiced by Vaughn’s comment that a second officer
had told Vaughn that the second officer “did not think [defendant] . . . was being truthful and up-front”
about the murder. Defendant properly objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was inadmissible
hearsay. The trial court then struck the testimony and informed the jury to disregard it. Later, during its
final instructions to the jury, the trial court reinforced this directive when it told the jury, “At times during
the trial I have . . . stricken testimony that was heard, do not consider those things in deciding this case.
Make your decision only on the . . . evidence that I let in and nothing else.” “[A] jury is generally
presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court unless the contrary is clearly shown.” People v
Wolverton, 227 Mich App 72, 77; 574 NW2d 703 (1997). Defendant has failed to show that the jury
failed to follow the trial court’s instructions. Finding no evidence of prejudice, we conclude that the
comment did not deny defendant a fair and impartial trial.
Third, defendant argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the officer’s testimony that defendant
had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.2 People v Bobo, 390
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Mich 355; 212 NW2d 190 (1973). After the statement was made and defendant raised an objection,
the court immediately recessed the trial and met with the parties in chambers. In that meeting, the court
indicated it would sustain defendant’s objection and tell the jury to disregard the answer.3 Defense
counsel then indicated he would discuss with defendant whether or not defendant would pursue any
further remedial action. Significantly, as the following trial excerpt shows, defendant decided not to
pursue the issue and seek a mistrial:
The Court: All right. In the intervening break Mr. Sykes[4] has communicated with the
Court that he is, after consulting with his client, has elected to not request a – mistrial, at
this point in time.
Mr. Sykes, is that correct?
Mr. Sykes: That is, Your Honor. I’ve discussed the options, at this point, with my
client. We’ve decided it would not be in . . . his best interest, or the case, as far as
defensively, to request a mistrial, at this point.
And we also appreciate the fact that the Court, in instructing the jury not to consider it,
didn’t mention what it was that they we’re supposed to consider.
And, I think that it’s be dealt with sufficiently, at this point. We would ask to continue
with this jury trial.
The Court: All right. Let me just, for the record, Mr. Parker, have you heard what
Mr. Sykes just said?
Mr. Parker: Yes.
The Court: And, you’ve had an opportunity to consult with him on this?
Mr. Parker: Yes.
The Court: And, you agree with his statement?
Mr. Parker: Yes, sir.
Defendant’s approval of the trial court’s curative instruction and his documented decision not to
seek a mistrial means that he has intentionally waived his right to pursue the matter on appeal. To hold
otherwise would be to allow defendant “to harbor error to be used as an appellate parachute in the
event of jury failure.” People v Bart (On Remand), 220 Mich App 1, 15; 558 NW2d 449 (1996).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that if it found that he
“gave false statements to the police regarding this crime [it] . . . may consider this as circumstantial
evidence of” his guilt. “We review de novo a claim of instructional error.” People v Hubbard (After
Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 487; 552 NW2d 493 (1996). “We read instructions in their entirety to
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determine if error occurred requiring reversal.” People v Gaydosh, 203 Mich App 235, 237; 512
NW2d 65 (1994).
Reading the instruction in context, we do not agree that the challenged instruction was
erroneous. The statements at issue related to defendant’s claim that he had been home on the day that
the victim was shot and killed. Because those statements, “if believed, [would tend] . . . to lead
suspicion in another direction,” People v Wolford, 189 Mich App 478, 482; 473 NW2d 767 (1991),
and because the other evidence against defendant was not weak, People v Dandron, 70 Mich App
439, 442-443; 245 NW2d 782 (1976), we conclude that the instruction given was proper.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair and impartial trial when the prosecutor in his
closing argument vouched for the credibility of two prosecution witnesses, and appealed for sympathy
for the victim. Because defendant did not object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct,
appellate review “is foreclosed . . . unless the misconduct was so egregious that no curative instruction
could have removed the prejudice to the defendant or if manifest injustice would result from our failure
to review the alleged misconduct.” People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 341-342; 543 NW2d
342 (1995). This Court decides issues of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis, examining
the pertinent portion of the record and evaluating a prosecutor’s comments in context. People v
Legrone, 205 Mich App 77, 82; 517 NW2d 270 (1994).
After reviewing the challenged remarks, we find no miscarriage of justice. We do not believe
that the prosecutor’s remarks about the two witnesses improperly invaded “the jury’s exclusive
province of testing the credibility of the witnesses.” People v Jones, 60 Mich App 681, 686; 233
NW2d 22 (1975). The prosecutor did not vouch for the credibility of the two witness; the prosecutor
did not imply that he had some “special knowledge’ concerning the two witnesses’ truthfulness. People
v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). Rather, the prosecutor simply argued that
given the circumstances, the two witnesses should be believed. People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82,
104; 351 NW2d 255 (1984). As for the prosecutor’s comments regarding the victim, while they do
appear to be an improper attempt to play upon the jury’s sympathy for the victim, we find that they do
not pose grounds for a new trial. The “prejudicial effect could have been cured with a timely requested
cautionary instruction.” People v Swartz, 171 Mich App 364, 373; 429 NW2d 905 (1988).
Accordingly, manifest injustice will not result from our decision to not further consider the matter.
People v Shaneberger, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 200499, rel’d 9/18/98)
slip op at 9.
Finally, defendant raises a two prong attack to the effectiveness of his trial counsel. To prevail
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant “must show that counsel’s performance was
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing norms . . . [and] that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for c
ounsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Accord People v
Reed, 198 Mich App 639, 646; 499 NW2d 441 (1993), aff’d 449 Mich 375; 535 NW2d 496
(1995). Because defendant failed to move for either a new trial or a Ginther5 hearing, review is limited
to the existing record. People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 672; 528 NW2d 842 (1995).
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First, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to take
appropriate action to deal with the errors surrounding the testimony of officer Vaughn. We disagree.
Defendant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by either Vaughn’s testimony concerning a prior
contact with defendant, or Vaughn’s testimony that was stricken as inadmissible hearsay. Further, given
defendant’s acquiescence in the decision not to pursue a mistrial based upon the testimony concerning
defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent, we hold that defendant cannot now predicate a claim
of ineffective assistance on that action. Id. at 672-673. Again, “‘[t]o hold otherwise would allow
defendant to harbor error as an appellate parachute.’” Id. at 673, quoting People v Shuler, 188 Mich
App 548, 552; 470 NW2d 492 (1991).
Second, defendant argues that his counsel erred by not examining officer Luedecking regarding
a report filed by the officer, and the officer’s previous testimony in the trial of defendant’s accomplice.
Again, we disagree. After reviewing the existing record, we conclude that defendant cannot establish
either that his counsel’s performance was deficient, or that he was in any way prejudiced.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
1
See, e.g., Branch, supra at 723 (observing that the recognized procedure involved in empanelling an
anonymous jury involves “withholding names, addresses, places of employment, and spouses’ names
and places of employment”), citing United States v Ross, 33 F3d 1507, 1519 (CA 11, 1994).
2
US Const, Am V reads in pertinent part: “No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself . . . .”
3
After court was reconvened, the trial court told the jury: “Members of the jury, . . . in Chambers I
sustained the last objection, and have stricken from the record the last statement, or comment by
Detective Vaughn.” Further, as previously discussed, the trial court told the jury in its closing
instructions that any matter stricken from the record was to be completely disregarded.
4
Sykes was defendant’s trial counsel.
5
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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