SAMUEL J CLARK V LAURA (CLARK) WILSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SAMUEL J. CLARK,
UNPUBLISHED
September 8, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 208123
Ionia Circuit Court
LC No. 94-016345 DM
LAURA (CLARK) WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Wahls and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right the order dismissing her petition for de novo review of a referee’s
order changing child custody. We affirm.
The parties were divorced pursuant to a judgment entered January 5, 1996. The judgment
provided for joint physical and legal custody of the parties’ two minor children. Plaintiff moved for a
change of custody, and a referee hearing was held on August 15, 1997. The referee recommended that
physical custody be granted solely to plaintiff. A recommended order dated August 15, 1997
(hereinafter the “August 15 order”) was signed by the circuit court and mailed to the parties on August
20, 1997. The order stated that it “was subject to de novo review before the Circuit Court Judge by
filing [a] Request for De novo Review and scheduling a hearing on same within 21 days of the date” of
the order. Defendant’s objection to the recommended order and request for a de novo hearing was
filed on September 2, 1997. A notice of hearing was prepared by defendant on September 24, 1997
indicating that a hearing on the matter was scheduled for November 14, 1997. Subsequently, plaintiff
moved to dismiss the de novo hearing due to defendant’s failure to obtain timely review. The court
granted plaintiff’s motion, finding that defendant had failed to comply with the requirements for obtaining
de novo review set forth in the August 15 order.
Defendant argues that because the scheduling requirement found in the August 15 order is not
mentioned in the statute that deals with de novo review of referee hearings, the circuit court’s granting of
plaintiff’s motion was in error. While it is true that MCL 552.507(5); MSA 25.176(7)(5) does not
include such a requirement, this fact is not dispositive given the language of MCR 3.215. MCR
-1
3.215(F)(1) provides that “[t]he judicial hearing must be held within 21 days after the written objection
is filed, unless the time is extended by the court for good cause.” The hearing in this matter was initially
scheduled for November 14, 1997, which is in excess of the 21 day limit. Defendant has failed to
establish that the extended time was either sanctioned by the circuit court, or that she had good cause
for not satisfying the 21 day requirement. Furthermore, MCR 3.215(E)(3) provides that “[a] party may
obtain a judicial hearing” on a referee’s disposal of a child custody dispute “by filing . . . a written
objection and notice of hearing within 21 days after the referee’s recommendation for an order is
served on the attorney’s for the parties, or the parties if they are not represented by counsel.”
(Emphasis added.). The notice of hearing in this matter was dated September 24, 1997, also well in
excess of the 21 day time limit.
A statutory rule of practice not in conflict with the Michigan Court Rules is no longer effective
once it has been “superseded by rules adopted by the Supreme Court.” MCR 1.104. See also Neal v
Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App 701, 722; 575 NW2d 68 (1997). “In determining whether
there is a real conflict between a statute and a court rule, both should be read according to their plain
meaning.” Id. Because we find that a conflict does exist between MCL 552.507(5); MSA
25.176(7)(5), the court rule supersedes the statutory provision. McDougall v Eliuk, 218 Mich App
501, 506; 554 NW2d 56 (1996). Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in
dismissing defendant’s petition. Constantini v Constantini, 171 Mich App 466; 460 NW2d 748
(1988).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
-2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.