ANDRE BRINKLEY V TALON INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANDRE BRINKLEY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 194954
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-474183 NP
HAWTHORNE METAL PRODUCTS,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, ATLAS TOOL,
INC, and TRI-CO ENGINEERING, INC,
Defendants.
ANDRE BRINKLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 203991
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-519559 NZ
TALON, INC and TALON CENTRE, INC,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Neff and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In No. 194954, defendant Hawthorne Products Inc. (“Hawthorne”) appeals by leave granted
the order denying its motion to strike and the order reinstating plaintiff’s complaint, while plaintiff cross
appeals the order denying his motion to compel discovery. In No. 203991, defendants Talon Inc. and
Talon Centre Inc. (“Talon”) appeal by leave granted the order denying their motion for summary
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disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) [claim barred by release]. Pursuant to this Court’s order, these
cases were consolidated. We reverse both cases.
The instant cases arise from an industrial accident in which plaintiff’s left arm and forearm were
severed when the upper part of a 22,000 pound die fell on him as he operated a press stamping out
automotive rear quarter panels at Hawthorne on August 5, 1993. Plaintiff filed an intentional tort claim
against his employer, Hawthorne, along with product liability claims against Chrysler Corporation, which
outsourced the die to Hawthorne, and Tri-Co Engineering, Inc., which designed the die. Plaintiff also
filed suit against Talon alleging that it was negligent in supplying safety services and inspections to
Hawthorne, a subsidiary of Talon, between May, 1993 and the date of the accident. It was plaintiff’s
theory that the die, which extended over the press by about three and one-half inches, was not properly
attached to the press (or “ram”) because defendant attached the die with “bridge clamps.” According
to plaintiff, the die should have been attached to the press by bolts, as there were unused slots on the
press for bolting.
No. 194954
Hawthorne claims that the trial court erred in reinstating plaintiff’s complaint because the facts as
alleged by plaintiff were insufficient to show an intentional tort and thus avoid the exclusive remedy
provision in the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA). MCL 418.131(1); MSA
17.237(131)(1). We agree.
In this case, plaintiff failed to prove an intentional tort because the facts do not show that
Hawthorne had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur or that it willfully disregarded that
knowledge. MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1); Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich
149, 161, 169, 171-172, 174, 178-179, 191; 551 NW2d 132 (1996); Palazzola v Karmazin
Products Corp, 223 Mich App 141, 149-151; 565 NW2d 868 (1997); McNees v Cedar Springs
Stamping Co (After Remand), 219 Mich App 217, 224; 555 NW2d 481 (1996); Golec v Metal
Exchange Corp, 208 Mich App 380, 383; 528 NW2d 756 (1995).
Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, there was insufficient evidence that Hawthorne’s general
foreman, William Schultz, had actual knowledge that an injury would follow from Hawthorne’s failure to
properly secure the top die to the ram and that he knowingly subjected plaintiff to a continuously
dangerous condition. While plaintiff seeks to ascribe to Schultz actual knowledge that injury was certain
to occur on the basis of Hawthorne’s failure to secure the die properly by directly bolting the die to the
ram, the evidence adduced at most raises a question of fact that Hawthorne was negligent in using a
bridge clamping method to secure the die, rather than direct bolting. In any event, Hawthorne points out
that it had used the MIOSHA-approved bridge-clamping method for over 40 years without injury.
In addition, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, James Drew’s statement to Linda Brann, the
MIOSHA investigator, does not show that Hawthorne, through Schultz, had actual knowledge that an
injury was certain to occur by continuing to use the bridge-clamping method, even after the July 8, 1993
incident in which the top die fell out. Drew’s statement establishes at most that Hawthorne was put on
notice about the problem of attaching the upper die more securely to the press, not that Hawthorne had
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actual knowledge that the bridge-clamping method was inherently dangerous. Moreover, we note that
the facts indicate that Schultz took corrective steps to attach the die more securely by adding a fourth
bolt and a fourth clamp and by instituting a new procedure whereby the die setters were required to
check each bolt and clamp on a daily basis. Lewis Reed, defendant’s die set leader, inspected all four
bolts and all four clamps on the press on the day of plaintiff’s accident and found that none was loose.
Finally, Mr. Jones, the press operator who immediately preceded plaintiff on the machine, also testified
that he noticed no problems with the press and die.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in reinstating plaintiff’s complaint because plaintiff failed to
show an intentional tort as to avoid the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA. Because we reverse
the reinstatement of plaintiff’s complaint against Hawthorne, we need not address the remaining issues
on appeal in No. 194954.
No. 203991
We also conclude that the trial court erred in denying Talon’s motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) because the release in question barred plaintiff’s claim against Talon.
In Gortney v Norfolk & W R Co, 216 Mich App 535, 539; 549 NW2d 612 (1996), this
Court observed:
The scope of a release is controlled by the intent of the parties as it is expressed in the
release. If the text in the release is unambiguous, we must ascertain the parties’
intentions from the plain, ordinary meaning of the language of the release. The fact that
the parties dispute the meaning of a release does not, in itself, establish an ambiguity. A
contract is ambiguous only if its language is reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation. If the terms of the release are unambiguous, contradictory inferences
become “subjective, and irrelevant,” and the legal effect of the language is a question of
law to be resolved summarily.
In the instant case, plaintiff settled his actions against Chrysler and Tri-Co Engineering for
$450,000 on May 1, 1996 by agreeing to a release, which plaintiff and three of his attorneys signed.
The release provides:
That the undersigned, being of lawful age, for the sole consideration of _____ to
the undersigned in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby
and for my heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns releases, acquits and
forever discharges Chrysler Corporation and Tri-Co Engineering and their agents,
servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, firms,
corporations, associations or partnerships of and for any and all claims, actions, causes
of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation
whatsoever, which the undersigned now has or which may hereafter accrue on account
of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and
unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences
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thereof resulting or to result from a series of happenings or events which involved actual
or alleged injury to Andre Brinkley on or about August 5, 1993 as a result of the actual
or alleged use of dies incorporated in a press at Hawthorne Metal Products, including
all matters related to the use, design, manufacture, distribution, warranties and/or
warnings of the dies.
At the motion hearing in the trial court, Talon argued that the release applied to all entities
involved in plaintiff’s accident, while plaintiff responded that the release applied solely to Chrysler and
Tri-Co and their affiliates. After extensive argument regarding the semantics of the release, the trial
court ruled that the language of the release was unambiguous and only applied to the signers of the
release and entered an order denying Talon’s motion for summary disposition.
Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, we believe that while the language of the release is
unambiguous, it does not apply only to the signers of the release, but bars plaintiff’s claim against Talon
as well. As both parties recognize, the focal point of the dispute is whether the language of the release
was intended to cover only the claims by the parties to the release, Harris v Lapeer Public Schools,
114 Mich App 107, 115; 318 NW2d 621 (1982), or whether the release was intended to cover claims
against all other persons arising from the August 5, 1993 incident.
The release in question released all other persons from any and all claims brought by plaintiff
arising from the August 5, 1993 incident. There is no broader classification than the word “all,” which
under its ordinary and natural meaning “leaves no room for exceptions.” Skotak v Vic Tanny, Inc, 203
Mich App 616, 619; 513 NW2d 428 (1994). Because plaintiff and his attorneys signed the release that
released all other persons, firms, corporations from any and all claims arising from the accident on
August 5, 1993, plaintiff’s suit against Talon was barred because his claim arose out of the same
transaction and occurrence. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and grant Talon’s motion
for summary disposition.
Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the language of the release clearly applies to other “potential
tortfeasors” for their liability arising from the August 5, 1993 accident. As Talon correctly observes, the
release essentially creates three categories or types of entities that are released from liability arising from
the August 5, 1993 incident. In the first category are Chrysler and Tri-Co Engineering. In the second
category are “their [Chrysler and Tri-Co Engineering’s] agents, servants, successors, heirs executors,
administrators.” In the third category are “all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or
partnerships.”
The grammatical construction of the release supports Talon’s position that three categories of
entities are envisaged. First, the release uses three connecting “ands” to denote the three different
groups. The Random House College Dictionary defines “and,” in the pertinent sense, as: “conj. 1.
(used to connect grammatically coordinate words, phrases, or clauses) with: along with; together with;
added to; in addition to: pens and pencils.” Second, the absence of a comma between the word
“administrators” and the word “and” in the phrase “administrators and all other persons” supports the
conclusion that the release envisages distinct categories of entities that are released from liability arising
from the August 5, 1993 incident. Moreover, considering that the release uses the possessive pronoun
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“their” before the phrase “agents, servants, successors, heirs executors, administrators,” but the phrase
“all other” before “persons, firms, corporations, associations or partnerships,” it is evident that Chrysler
and Tri-Co Engineering’s “agents, servants, successors, heirs executors, administrators” form a
separate and different class from “all other persons . . .”
Further, contrary to plaintiff’s claim, it was not necessary for Talon to pay consideration in order
for the release to discharge it of any liability resulting from the August 5, 1993 incident. As Talon points
out, pursuant to MCL 600.2925(a); MSA 27A.2925(a), a tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with
a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor if “[t]he liability of the
contributee for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement.” Further, MCL
600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4), amended by PA 1995, No. 161, § 1, effective on March 28, 1996,
provides that a release of one of two or more persons for the same injury does not discharge any other
persons from liability “unless its terms so provide.” Smith v Childs, 198 Mich App 94, 100; 497
NW2d 538 (1993). In addition, “[a] person liable in tort who reaches a settlement releasing the
person’s liability may be free from contribution claims made by other tortfeasors.” Id., p 101.
By entering into the settlement with plaintiff, Chrysler and Tri-Co Engineering not only preserved
their right to contribution under MCL 600.2925(a); MSA 27A.2925(a) by releasing any other potential
tortfeasor, including Talon, from liability arising from the August 5, 1993 incident, they also became free
from contribution claims made by other tortfeasors under MCL 600.2925d(b); MSA 27A.2925(4)(b).
Here, the failure of Chrysler or Tri-Co to pursue contribution claims against the other potential
tortfeasors before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations under MCL 600.2925c(4); MSA
27A.2925(3)(d) does not alter the fact that the release bars plaintiff’s claims against the other
tortfeasors arising from the August 5, 1993 accident, including Talon.1
Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that his execution of the release did not release Talon because
the release did not mention Talon by name. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the “unless its terms so
provide” language in MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4) should be construed narrowly to require
either naming the defendant or identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity i order to
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discharge that defendant from liability. In support, plaintiff cites Hunt v Chrysler Corp, 68 Mich App
744; 244 NW2d 16 (1976) and various cases from foreign jurisdictions in which their highest courts
have narrowly construed the equivalent of the “unless its terms so provide” language. Contrary to
plaintiff’s position, there is nothing to indicate that Hunt stands for the proposition that “unless its terms
so provide” language in the statute should be construed narrowly to require the specification of the
parties discharged by the release. Further, we decline to follow the example of Child v Newsom, 892
P2d 9 (Utah 1995) and the other jurisdictions in construing the statutory language of MCL 600.2925d;
MSA 27A.2925(4) narrowly as to apply only to persons specifically named, described or identified in a
release.
Moreover, we note that this Court has generally affirmed releases containing broad, all
encompassing language that unambiguously discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability for possible
claims arising from an accident. See Gortney v Norfolk & Western Railway Co, 216 Mich App 535;
549 NW2d 612 (1996); Smith, supra; Grzebik v Kerr, 91 Mich App 482, 485; 283 NW2d 654
(1979); cf. Lee v Auto Owners, 201 Mich App 39, 41; 505 NW2d 866 (1993), vacated on other
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grds, 445 Mich 908 (1994), reaffirmed on remand 208 Mich App 207; 527 NW2d 54 (1994),
vacated on other grds 451 Mich 874 (1996), affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded 218 Mich
App 672; 554 NW2d 610 (1996). On the other hand, we note that this Court in Harris, 114 Mich
App at 115, stated an exception to the general rule when it observed that “This Court will go beyond
the broad language of a release to determine the fairness of the release and the intent of the parties in
executing it.” See Petrove v Grand Trunk W. R. Co, 174 Mich App 705, 716-717; 436 NW2d 733
(1989), vacated on other grds 437 Mich 31; 464 NW2d 711 (1981), where this Court, citing Harris,
upheld the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiffs’ settlement with the Village of Leonard in exchange for
only $35,000 was not intended as a release of the numerous defendants, particularly since there was a
total mediation award of $750,000 against Volkswagen of America and $150,000 against the
defendant railroad.
However, given the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that it is necessary to go
beyond the broad but unambiguous language of the release to determine its fairness and the intent of the
parties in executing it. Here, unlike Petrove, the release in question was not a standard release, but was
prepared by Chrysler’s attorney and signed by plaintiff and his three attorneys. Moreover, we note that
plaintiff’s complaint against Talon was pending at the time that he signed the released. Plaintiff has also
not presented any extrinsic evidence to indicate that the release only applied to Chrysler, Tri-Co
Engineering and their agents. Further, the record suggests that Chrysler and Tri-Co Engineering settled
with plaintiff for $450,000 with the intention of discharging all other possible tortfeasors from liability so
as to preserve their right to contribution from these other tortfeasors and to extinguish the claims of the
other tortfeasors against them. Consequently, we conclude that the release barred plaintiff’s complaint
against Talon.
Reversed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
On the other hand, contrary to Talon’s contention, Talon was not a third-party beneficiary of the
release entered into between plaintiff and Chrysler and Tri-Co. MCL 600.1405; MSA 27A.1405. In
this regard, Talon’s reliance on Rinke v Auto Moulding Co, 226 Mich App 432, 438; 573 NW2d
344 (1997) is misplaced because there is nothing to indicate that Chrysler and Tri-Co bargained for the
release of Talon. Moreover, it appears that Chrysler and Tri-Co agreed to the release, not to confer a
benefit upon Talon and the other potential tortfeasors, but rather to protect their right to seek
contribution from the other potential tortfeasors and to prevent the latter from seeking contribution from
them.
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