PEOPLE OF MI V TROY RIENSTRA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 192653
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 95-037985 FC
TROY RIENSTRA, a/k/a TROY REINSTRA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions for assault with intent to rob while
armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MSA
28.354(1), MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. Defendant was sentenced as a second-felony habitual
offender to an enhanced term of life imprisonment for each conviction. MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082.
We affirm.
First, defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to disqualify the
prosecutor’s office because an assistant prosecutor allegedly violated his attorney-client privilege by
examining privileged documents. The determination of the existence of a conflict of interest relating to
the prosecutor’s office is a finding of fact that we review for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); People v
Doyle, 159 Mich App 632, 641; 406 NW2d 893 (1987). Because of his suspicions that defendant
was exchanging written communications about the case (i.e., “kites”) with codefendants housed in the
same jail, the assistant prosecutor assigned to defendant’s case requested authorities at the jail to seize
the kites from defendant’s cell. When the prosecutor learned that the officers had confiscated other
documents as well, he refused to look at anything until the officers separated the kites from the other
material, after which he examined only the kites. The trial court concluded that there was no confidential
communication among the documents examined by the prosecutor, that the process followed was
appropriate, and that no violation of defendant’s attorney-client privilege occurred. Because the record
does not demonstrate any clear error regarding these findings, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion to disqualify the prosecutor’s office.
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Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence, over
defense objection, a sawed-off shotgun that was not used in the charged robbery. The decision
whether to admit evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v Lugo, 214 Mich
App 699, 709; 542 NW2d 921 (1995). This Court will find an abuse of discretion only when an
unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say there was no
justification or excuse for the ruling made. Id. At trial, a prosecution witness attributed ownership of
the shotgun to defendant and testified that the barrel was sawed off shortly before the robbery. The
witness further testified that, after the crime, defendant returned to his residence and hid the shotgun
stock in the ceiling. Last, the prosecution introduced evidence that the gun’s barrel was seized from the
floor of the vehicle that was identified as the “getaway” car after the crime. Because the shotgun was
probative of defendant’s participation in the crime and of his conspiracy to commit it, the evidence was
relevant and not unduly prejudicial. See, e.g., People v Oswald (After Remand), 188 Mich App 1, 8;
469 NW2d 306 (1991). Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the evidence at trial.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to confrontation and a fair trial by
effectively prohibiting him from cross-examining a primary prosecution witness about her admitted use
of crack cocaine. The court ruled that it would permit defendant to question the witness regarding
crack, but that if defendant did so, then the door would be opened to plaintiff’s introduction of evidence
concerning defendant’s alleged use of crack. As a result, both parties agreed not to raise the issue.
Evidence of drug addiction at or near the time of a charged theft offense may be relevant and admissible
as proof of motive; the legal relevance of drug addiction to motive for a theft offense depends on a
showing that the defendant was addicted at or near the time of the offense and was therefore compelled
to obtain the drug and lacked sufficient income from legal sources to sustain his habit. People v Jones,
119 Mich App 164, 168; 326 NW2d 411 (1982). In this case, the prosecution offered evidence of
defendant’s use of crack and the testimony of a witness that she was addicted to crack, that she and
defendant used crack over a twelve-day spree preceding the robbery, and that they stopped only
because their money ran out. Therefore, evidence of defendant’s drug addiction is relevant and
admissible evidence of defendant’s motive to commit the robbery in this case. Accordingly, the trial
court neither violated defendant’s right to confrontation nor denied his right to a fair trial by conditioning
defendant’s cross-examination of the witness about her drug addiction on the prosecution’s examination
of defendant about defendant’s own drug addiction.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney failed to challenge the legality of his arrest and the admission of his post-arrest statements.
However, defendant’s argument is without merit because the record reveals that the police obtained a
search warrant for the motel room in which defendant was staying and that the police had probable
cause to detain defendant after they entered. See People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549
NW2d 849 (1996) (“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment.”). Because defendant’s arrest was proper, defense counsel’s failure to
challenge the legality of the arrest and the admission of the post-arrest statements does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel depriving defendant of a fair trial. See generally People v Mitchell,
454 Mich 145; 560 NW2d 600 (1997).
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Last, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecution intimidated a
witness and solicited perjured testimony from her. We have reviewed defendant’s allegation and find it
unpersuasive. See, e.g., People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 559-560; 496 NW2d 336 (1992)
(“where newly discovered evidence takes the form of recantation testimony, it is traditionally regarded
as suspect and untrustworthy”).
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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