IN RE GREEN & ROE MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________
In the Matter of SHELLY GREEN and CRYSTAL ROE, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 1998
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
DENNIS STURGIS,
No. 207029
Muskegon Juvenile Court
LC No. 96-022764 NA
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROBERT ROE and MARIE GREEN
Respondents.
Before: Wahls, P. J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(h); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(h). We affirm.
The juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory ground for termination was established by
clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Contrary to
respondent-appellant’s claim, the lower court did not find that respondent-appellant’s incarceration, by itself, was
sufficient grounds for terminating his parental rights under § 19b(3)(h). On the contrary, the court observed that §
19b(3)(h)
does not make incarceration an automatic trigger for termination of parental rights. Rather, the
parent facing incarceration is provided the opportunity to retain his parental rights by making
adequate arrangements for the care and custody of the child left behind.
The foregoing statement is in accord with the law. See e.g., In re Taurus, 415 Mich 512; 330 NW2d 33 (1982). The
juvenile court found that respondent-appellant failed to make arrangements for his daughter’s care and custody
before his incarceration and this finding is not clearly erroneous. We disagree with respondent-appellant’s claim that
he never had a chance to provide for his daughter’s care and custody since his incarceration and his daughter’s
removal occurred almost simultaneously. Nothing prevented respondent-appellant from requesting someone to care
for his daughter while he was in prison. Further, we reject respondent-appellant’s contention that his attempt to
obtain appellate relief in his criminal case should have precluded the juvenile court from terminating his parental
rights under § 19b(3)(h). There is no indication in the record that respondent-appellant’s plea-based conviction has
been set aside or that he will be able to provide proper care and custody of his daughter within a reasonable time.
Respondent-appellant also argues that remand is necessary to determine if a comprehensive list of
recognized Indian tribes of the United States includes the mother’s tribe. Respondent-appellant notes that if the tribe
is included on the list, the higher burden of proof required by the Indian Child Welfare Act must be applied. See 28
USC 1903, 1912(f). Remand is unnecessary, however, because, as the juvenile court found, the mother’s tribe is not
included on the list of Indian tribes recognized by the Secretary of the Interior. See 62 FR 55270. Further,
respondent-appellant lacks standing to bring this issue.
Finally, respondent-appellant failed to show that termination of his parental rights was clearly not in the
child’s best interests. In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). Thus, the juvenile court
did not err in terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights to the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5).
Affirmed.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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