BABASHOLA ABE V MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BABASHOLA ABE,
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 203365
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 96-082140 NZ
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Markey and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), ruling that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff enrolled in defendant’s college of osteopathic medicine in the fall of 1987. Beginning in
December 1987, the parties commenced a repeating pattern whereby plaintiff was dismissed for
academic reasons and later reinstated, this pattern persisting through four cycles. On July 26, 1991,
plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the school. According to defendant, he unsuccessfully applied for
readmission on January 15, 1993. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on January 11, 1996, alleging that
defendant’s adverse actions concerning him constituted a pattern of discrimination based on national
origin.
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that the complaint
failed to state a claim in clear and concise terms, but the trial court denied the motion and ordered
discovery to proceed. However, when defendant moved for dismissal under 2.116(C)(7), on the
grounds that plaintiff had failed to state a claim dating from within the applicable period of limitations, the
court granted the motion. We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de
novo as a matter of law. Miller v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co, 218 Mich App 221, 233; 553
NW2d 371 (1996).
Plaintiff argues he commenced his cause of action within the statute of limitations because he
filed his complaint within three years of defendant’s denial of readmission, and that because that final
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adverse action on defendant’s part was but the last in a series of related discriminatory actions, plaintiff
remains free to press his claim as concerns all allegations of discriminatory conduct.
The parties do not dispute that that MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8), applies to
plaintiff’s cause of action, establishing a three-year limitations period. As a general rule, the statute of
limitations begins to run when a claim accrues, meaning at the time the wrong is done. MCL 600.5827;
MSA 27A.5827. However, independent acts of discrimination that otherwise lie outside the statute of
limitations can escape that bar if they form part of an ongoing pattern of such acts at least one of which
occurs within the limitations period. In such cases, the entire cause of action, including parts relating to
actions falling outside of the limitations period, will be deemed timely filed. Sumner v Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 553; 398 NW2d 368 (1986). For a continuing violation to exist, the
timely claims must be so closely connected to the otherwise time-barred claims that the continuing
nature of the discrimination is apparent. Id.
Plaintiff points out that he filed his complaint on January 11, 1996, which was within three years
of January 15, 1993, the date he alleges he was discriminatorily denied readmission to defendant’s
college of medicine. In reviewing a grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), we
consider all pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff to ascertain if the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Patterson v
Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 433-435; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). Although in the instant case defendant
submitted an affidavit stating that plaintiff had not been involved with the school since his withdrawal on
July 26, 1991, plaintiff alleged, in documentation appended to his complaint, that he was discriminatorily
denied readmission on January 15, 1993. Because that allegation of discrimination falls within the
limitations period, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of defendant
as to that specific claim.
However, we reject plaintiff’s argument that his entire cause of action falls within the statute of
limitations because he has suffered a continuing wrong from 1987 until defendant denied him
readmission. Uncontroverted evidence shows that plaintiff withdrew as a student of defendant on July
26, 1991, and has had no formal affiliation with defendant since that time. More than seventeen months
elapsed between plaintiff’s withdrawal and his allegedly being denied readmission in January 1993. This
break in the pattern of alleged discrimination, a break mostly if not entirely of plaintiff’s own making,
destroys plaintiff’s claim that the final allegation was a continuation of an ongoing pattern dating back to
1987. Although plaintiff, in documentation appended to his complaint, alleges continuing contacts and
dealings with certain of defendant’s personnel during that break, plaintiff speaks favorably of the advice
and cooperation he received from defendant’s agents during that time. Because plaintiff alleges no
discriminatory action on defendant’s part during the many months of plaintiff’s non-student status that
preceded defendant’s allegedly improper denial of plaintiff’s request to be readmitted for a fifth time, the
latter event is not sufficiently closely connected to allegations occurring before plaintiff withdrew from
school to revive them as part of a timely filed cause of action. Accordingly, we hold that the continuing
wrong theory does not apply to plaintiff’s claims of discrimination preceding the allegation of January
11, 1993, and accordingly, that the circuit court properly granted defendant’s MCR 2.116(C)(7)
motion with respect to them.
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We need not reach plaintiff’s issues on appeal concerning equal protection, governmental
immunity, and defendant’s discovery obligations. Because these issues were not raised before the trial
court, they are not preserved for appellate consideration. See Vander Bossche v Valley Pub, 203
Mich App 632, 641; 513 NW2d 225 (1994); Adam v Sylvan Glynn Golf Course, 197 Mich App
95, 98-99; 494 NW2d 791 (1992).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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