IN RE RACHELLE LAVERTY MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of RACHELLE LAVERTY, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY
UNPUBLISHED
June 30, 1998
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 204975
Mackinac Probate Court
LC No. 95-000974 NA
MISTI-LYN LAVERTY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KENNETH LAVERTY, SR.,
Respondent.
Before: Markman, P.J., and Griffin and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right from a probate court order terminating her parental
rights to Rachelle Laverty (the “minor child”), d/o/b March 7, 1986, based on the statutory grounds for
termination of parental rights provided by MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and (c)(i); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i) and (c)(i). We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In March 1995, petitioner Family Independence Agency obtained temporary custody of the
minor child after she reported that she had been sexually abused by respondent father. At a jury trial in
June 1995, the jury found that the probate court had jurisdiction of the minor child and that this
jurisdiction was, in part, based on allegations pertaining to respondent mother. At the adjudicative trial,
petitioner maintained that respondent father had sexually abused the minor child and that respondent
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mother failed to protect the minor child. Eventually, respondent father’s parental rights were terminated;
he is, however, not a party to this appeal. On February 20, 1997, the probate court entered a
provisional order terminating respondent mother’s parental rights but stayed the effect of the order for
three months, in short to allow for further counseling of respondent mother and the minor child aimed at
avoiding termination. On June 12, 1997, the probate court entered its final order terminating
respondent mother’s parental rights.
II. General Principles Regarding Termination of Parental Rights
If the probate court determines that the petitioner has established a statutory ground for
terminating parental rights, then the probate court must terminate the respondent’s parental rights unless
the probate court finds that termination of parental rights is not in the child’s best interests. In re HallSmith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). We review a decision to terminate
parental rights in its entirety for clear error. Id. at 472. A decision is clearly erroneous if a reviewing
court is left with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Vasquez, 199
Mich App 44, 51; 501 NW2d 231 (1993).
III. Termination of Parental Rights Under §19b(3)(b)(i)
We agree with respondent mother that the probate court erred in finding the ground for
termination of § 19b(3)(b)(i) to have been met. As in effect when respondent mother’s parental rights
to the minor child were terminated, §19b(3)(b)(i) provided:1
The court may terminate the parental rights of a parent to a child if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
***
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or
sexual abuse under either of the following circumstances:
(i) A parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the
court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or
abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.
The probate court’s finding of this ground for termination was based on its findings that respondent
father sexually abused the minor child and that respondent mother was not able to protect the minor
child. However, a natural reading of the plain language of § 19b(3)(b)(i) only allows for that ground of
termination to be found with regard to a parent who has caused physical injury or inflicted physical or
sexual abuse. See Hall-Smith, supra at 472 (in construing a statute, a court must presume the
Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed). Thus, the probate court clearly erred by finding
this ground of termination with regard to respondent mother based on sexual abuse that was, according
to the findings of the probate court, perpetrated only by respondent father. However, this error was
harmless because this was one of two alternative grounds for terminating parental rights and, as we will
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discuss below, the probate court did not clearly err by terminating respondent mother’s parental rights
on the other ground.
IV. Termination of Parental Rights Under § 19b(3)(c)(i)
Section 19b(3)(c)(i) provides the following ground for termination of parental rights:
The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more
days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by
clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the age of the child.
In finding this ground for termination to have been established, the probate court essentially found that, if
the minor child were returned to respondent mother’s care and custody, the conditions that led to
adjudication would recur – respondent father would resume sexually abusing the minor child and
respondent mother would continue to fail to protect her – and that there was not a reasonable likelihood
of these conditions being rectified within a reasonable time.
First, the probate court found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent father sexually
abused the minor child. In making this determination, the probate court emphasized the minor child’s
consistency in providing accounts of sexual abuse by respondent father, including during questioning that
suggested she was confusing this with sexual abuse by other relatives, and the lack of an apparent
motive for the minor child to lie about this matter. The probate court also noted physical symptoms that
were consistent with the occurrence of sexual abuse. While the probate court noted testimony that
respondent father “passed” a polygraph test in which he basically denied having sexually abused the
minor child, the probate court attached “little weight” to the polygraph results based on “their lack of
scientific accuracy.”
It is emphatically not our role to determine whether respondent father actually committed any
sexual misconduct against the minor child. Rather, we must review the probate court’s finding of clear
and convincing evidence that he did, as well as the probate court’s other pertinent factual findings, under
the clearly erroneous standard. Hall-Smith, supra at 472. In this regard, we must give deference to
the probate court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. MCR 2.613(C). The substantial
consistency of the minor child’s statements and her lack of motive to lie offered reasonable support to
her credibility. Because we lack a firm and definite conviction that the probate court was incorrect in
finding that respondent father sexually abused the minor child, this finding was not clearly erroneous.
Vasquez, supra.
With regard to respondent mother’s failure to protect the minor child, testimony from the minor
child indicted that respondent father continued to sexually abuse her after she first told respondent
mother about the sexual abuse and further that respondent mother discouraged her from reporting the
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abuse to a Children’s Protective Services worker. The probate court did not clearly err by considering
respondent mother’s failure to protect the minor child from sexual abuse by respondent father to have
been a condition underlying the adjudication.
The probate court’s determination that respondent mother continued to be unable to protect the
minor child from sexual abuse was based in large part on respondent mother’s refusal or inability to
regard respondent father as having committed sexual abuse against the minor child. From the testimony
below, we gather that termination of respondent mother’s parental rights might not have been sought by
petitioner if respondent mother had proclaimed that she accepted respondent father’s culpability and
essentially severed all contact with him. On the one hand, the insistence that respondent mother
proclaim that she believed that respondent father sexually abused the minor child might strike some as
almost an Orwellian attempt at thought control.
On the other hand, if, as the probate court found, respondent father indeed committed sexual
abuse against the minor child and respondent mother responded ineffectually to these reports, there
were sound reasons to conclude that the sexual abuse by respondent father would likely recur if the
minor child were reunited with respondent mother. Testimony indicated that respondent mother had
resumed an active relationship with respondent father. Even if respondent father’s parental rights were
formally terminated with regard to the minor child, one could reasonably conclude that the minor child
might often be in his presence if she were eventually reunited with respondent mother. Moreover, even
if the probate court entered orders requiring respondent mother not to allow respondent father to have
any contact with the minor child, in light of the evidence of respondent’s mother past response to the
reports of abuse one might well reasonably conclude that respondent mother would not accept or
comply with a direction to keep the minor child away from respondent father. Put simply, if respondent
mother did not believe respondent father had committed any sexual misconduct against the minor child,
any such restrictions would likely appear pointless to her.
We conclude that the probate court did not clearly err by finding that the conditions underlying
the adjudication continued to exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood that they would be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the minor child’s age. In light of this finding, it follows that
it was not feasible to return the minor child to respondent mother’s care within a reasonable time. Thus,
the probate court did not clearly err by terminating respondent mother’s parental rights. Hall-Smith,
supra at 472-473 (if a statutory ground for termination is established, a probate court must terminate
parental rights absent a showing that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interests).
V. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Respondent mother claims that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the
adjudicative jury trial. In analyzing this claim, we apply “by analogy the principles of ineffective
assistance of counsel as they have developed in the criminal law context.” In re Simon, 171 Mich App
443, 447; 431 NW2d 71 (1988). Accordingly, to obtain relief based on ineffective assistance,
respondent mother must show a reasonable probability that, but for unprofessional errors by trial
counsel, the result of the proceedings below would have been different. People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 314; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Stated otherwise, ineffective assistance of counsel requires
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representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that deprived the defendant
(or, in this case, respondent mother) of a fair trial. Pickens, supra at 302-303. Moreover, because
these claims of ineffective assistance were not advanced below, we may review only mistakes that are
apparent on the record. People v Price, 214 Mich App 538, 547; 543 NW2d 49 (1995).
While respondent mother argues that trial counsel should have sought severance of her
adjudicative trial from that of respondent father, even assuming that failure to do so was a tactical
mistake, respondent mother has not established that this denied her a fair trial. Pickens, supra at 302
303. Similarly, we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that trial counsel’s alleged deficiency
in failing to make various motions would have changed the outcome of the adjudicative jury trial, let
alone the ultimate decision to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights. Id. at 314.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
The current version of §19b(3)(b)(i) is substantially the same.
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